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SERVICE PROVISION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND EXPENDITURE, A STUDY OF SINGLE COUNTY 
METROPOLITAN AREAS 
 
Bonghee Kim, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2008 
 
Metropolitan and urban issues have been of interest to social scientists, policy analysts, and 
others for some time.  This dissertation explores service provision related to government 
structure, and measurements of these relationships in metropolitan areas, because public service 
is a primary function of government.  To account for different services in different areas, service 
expenditure and growth in service expenditure are used as the primary variables.  Relationships 
between growth in expenditures and economic-demographic conditions are examined for county 
government structure. 
 
The research method uses single county metropolitan areas to eliminate complications of large, 
multiple county metropolitan areas, such as multiple states.  The study combines content analysis 
of government and academic documentation on local governance structure and characteristics 
with quantitative analysis. 
 
There are several study findings regarding growth in service expenditure related to government 
structure and demographic condition.  First, structures of government that facilitate managerial 
competency tend to have lower cost of service provision.  Second, expenditure reduction is 
related to service scope and the type of government providing the service: 1) use of municipal 
service delivery for jurisdictional-specific services is associated with lower overall service 
expenditure for the metropolitan area; while 2) use of county services is associated with lower 
service expenditure for services which benefit from economies of scale; and 3) utilization of 
special districts is increasing and apparently benefits the tax stream and development finances.  
Third, in general metropolitan areas with more population in central cities have lower overall 
service expenditure growth. 
 
This dissertation advances the current discussion for improvement of service provision in the 
following ways.  First, it contributes to an understanding of metropolitan area conditions through 
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public service structure and governmental structure.  Second, it contributes to the development of 
a methodological approach for measurement of metropolitan governance.  This is accomplished 
with the concept of “share of service responsibility” for each type of local government and 
managerial competency.  Third, it provides a benchmark of the service structure for multiple-
county metropolitan areas. 
 v
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PREFACE 
This dissertation is prepared with many thanks to committee members, Drs. Miller, Foster, 
Dougherty, and Paytas. 
 
There have been several major societal transformations during my early working life in the 
United States.  The collapse of the manufacturing sector in the 1980s happened when I had an 
occupation for a multi-international heavy industrial corporation in Pittsburgh, and the financial 
sector mergers occurred when I was employed in this sector.  The information revolution hit full 
stride during the 1990s, during my career as a Librarian.  My Library and Information Science 
degree from the University of Pittsburgh and subsequent work taught me much regarding 
information search and sharing, but even more, organization, subject analysis, and systemic 
thinking. 
 
Dr. Mandelker from The Katz School of Business at the University introduced the concept of a 
“random walk,” and the psychological effect on capital markets.  Dr. Druzdzel from Information 
Science taught the cognitive side of human decision making and how to formulate heuristic 
objectivity.  I thank Dr. Dunn of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs for his 
ability to make policy understandable, and for his depth of knowledge and elegant writing. 
 
I am greatly indebted to my family.  My father taught his children concern for those less 
fortunate, and his academic encouragement has given me strength even as an adult.  I thank my 
husband, Gordon for his endless support, and our two boys, Kevin and Ryan, who gave up some 
of their mother’s playtime. 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Public service is a primary responsibility of governments.  This dissertation is an exploratory 
study of service provision in the United States, using single metropolitan county statistical areas 
in order to facilitate an understanding of the metropolitan condition.  Public discourse and the 
democratic process of voting enable citizens to inform governments of the services they need, 
allowing the use of service expenditures to be used as a proxy for all the various types of services 
provided.  The metropolitan condition includes the demographic and economic environment as 
well as government structure. 
 
This study conducts a two stage analysis.  The first stage explores public service expenditure 
with influencing factors to the expenditure.  The influencing factors chosen for the study are 
demography, government fragmentation, fiscal capacity, and proportional share of local 
governments’ service responsibility for 1970 and 2000.  The second stage examines the 
relationship between growth in service expenditure and economic-demographic conditions 
during these periods for two areas.  One is for reformed and unreformed metropolitan counties.  
The other area is the relationship between growth in service expenditure and economic-
demographic conditions by service contribution from each local government type, which is 
expressed as local governments’ proportional share of service responsibility. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
During recent decades, metropolitan areas have changed rapidly.  Less expensive transportation 
has enabled residents to move further from the traditional central city core, stratifying the 
citizens into economic and demographic groups.  At the same time, cheaper transportation 
enables industry to take advantage of lower labor costs in rural areas or developing nations, 
devastating the low-skilled labor force in the central cities and moving the general U.S. economy 
to become oriented to the service sector rather than manufacturing or agriculture.  These changes 
are felt more at the local level, as governments and other organizations adapt policies, programs, 
and even their formal structure to accommodate these transformations in society.  Of primary 
relevance to understand the experience of modern life in the United States is to examine the local 
government structure, as so many characteristics of the localities are reflected in or determined 
by the local governments. 
 
In the U.S., there are three primary types of local governments, the county, municipality, and 
special district.  Special districts usually have an oversight board, but for municipalities and 
counties there are three primary forms of local government; the council-manager, council-elected 
executive (or council-mayor), and commission (Foster, 1997b; Marando and Thomas, 1977; 
DeSantis and Renner, 2002).  The three types of local government provide many of the same 
service functions, although for geographically different areas, either area-wide or in 
jurisdictional specific areas (Census of Governments, 2002).  By the year 2002, the total number 
of local governments reached 57,515, mostly due to an increase in special districts.  In the 1980s 
to the year 2002, the largest increase in public expenditures was from special districts, and the 
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smallest increase was for municipalities (Schneider and Park, 1989; Benton and Menzel, 1993; 
Park, 1996; Census of Governments, 2002).  The increasing role of special districts in service 
provision contributes to further fragmentation of governmental units (Frug, 2002; Stephens and 
Wikstrom, 2000; Foster, 1997b; Miller 2002).  Table 1-1 compares the numbers for the types of 
governments. 
[Table 1-1]:  Number and Percentage Change of County, Municipality, and Special District, 
1962-2002  
Local Governments 1962 2002 % Change, 1962-2002 
Counties 3,043 3,034 -0.3
Municipalities 17,997 19,429 8.0
Special Districts 18,323 35,052 91.3
Total  39,363 57,515 46.1
Source:  Government Organization, vol. 1, no. 1, 2002. 
 
The largest type of local government, both geographically and by population, is the county.  It is 
reasonable to expect the county leadership to set the vision and character of the smaller 
governments within their boundaries.  According to the Municipal Year Book (2003), the 
commission is the most common form of county government. 
[Table 1-2]:  Forms of County Government by Percentage in the United States, 2002 
Council-manager Council-elected Executive Commission 
12.2 15.7 72.1
Source:  The Municipal Year Book, 2003 with author’s calculation. 
 
Because of increasing complexity from changes in demographic and economic conditions, as 
well as the dichotomy between central city and suburbs, there has been great interest in area-
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wide service provision for efficiency as well as for equity concern.  In recent decades, there have 
been many studies on local public service provision (Liebert, 1974; Ammons and King, 1983; 
Benton, 1992; Benton and Menzel, 1993; Benton, 2002; Cigler, 1996; Cigler, 2002).  Some 
issues and suggestions have been addressed in literature (Bollens and Schmandt, 1970; Orfield, 
1997; Downs, 1994; Savitch and Vogel, 1996; Rusk, 2003; Dodge, 1990; Miller, 2002), but there 
are few studies to address and understand appropriate provision of public services in United 
States metropolitan areas.  Because most metropolitan areas are comprised of several counties, 
with a myriad of smaller governments and agencies providing public services, this ambiguous 
quality makes studies of service provision particularly difficult.  Governance decisions for the 
area are made in a de facto manner by the actions of the many governments and agencies that 
comprise them, and contrary to original expectations, counties cannot always provide vision for 
their area. 
 
There are many studies on the relationship of governmental structure to service expenditure 
(Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Schneider and Park, 1989; Duncombe, Duncombe, and Kinney, 
1992; DeSantis and Renner, 1996; Park, 1996; Morgan and Kickham, 1999; Benton, 2002), 
which ask questions regarding expenditure or growth of expenditure, for example, “Does 
government structure matter?”  Most of these studies are focused on particular research areas, 
rather than a broad contextual interpretation of local conditions and service provision.  This 
dissertation follows the existing line of questioning, and attempts to provide quantitative analysis 
for theories affecting local and metropolitan service provision for a better understanding of the 
relationship between growth in expenditure and economic-demographic conditions.  The 
diagram below shows the general expenditures (service provision) and influencing factors. 
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Figure 1-1:  Service Provision, Response, and Factors 
 
Economic Condition  
Service 
Response 
How Should Area-wide Service be Provided? 
Equitability 
(Achievement of Area 
Identification) 
Efficiency 
(Economies of Scale) 
Service Provision is Associated with Structural Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
County Governmental Structure  
Commission 
Council-manager 
Council-elected Executive 
Service Structure 
County 
Municipality 
Special District 
Joint Local Government
Internal Factors  
Demographic Condition 
Fragmentation 
Fiscal Capacity 
Local Government Service Responsibility Share 
 5
1.2 SERVICE PROVISION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
Fundamental economic theory suggests that because basic resources to produce public goods are 
scarce and limited, society has to utilize its resources in the most efficient manner possible to 
satisfy human needs (Parkin, 1996).  Lower growth in expenditure is used in the study to 
generally indicate the effects of good performance because the more managerial competency of 
public service, the more cost control is realized.   
 
A comprehensive definition of effective governance stems from objective decision-making 
which is focused on administrative process such as efficiency (Wilson, 1887).  Effectiveness 
could be determined by service quality, but it is difficult to measure in aggregate, and difficult to 
measure consistently across governments and government levels.  This research assumes that 
over time, citizens will receive the services and quality that they demand through the democratic 
mechanisms of public discourse and elections, which makes service quality a less important 
measure of effectiveness.  This means that Wilson’s admonition to focus on efficiency of 
administrative process is the only necessary measure of effectiveness.  Since citizens demand the 
services they need, those governments that provide those services for the least expenditure 
growth generally manage their service responsibilities more effectively.  This is true for 
government-provided or contracted out services, because the costs are all service costs in which 
each unit of activities in economic institution are associated with transaction cost economics of 
series of contractual relationship (Moe, 1984; Williamson, 1985).  The more managerial 
competency, the less expenditure growth because of the competency of the service program 
managers, or of the contract negotiators. 
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 Population growth and density are used to make allowances for spending growth, otherwise, 
stagnating low-expenditure areas will be seen more favorably than dynamic areas that experience 
economic growth.  It is expected that the council-manager form of government will exhibit the 
most effective management of cost control, because the managers are not elected, resulting in a 
more objective decision process and thus in rational spending. 
1.3 CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY 
This dissertation advances the current discussion for improvement of service provision in the 
following ways.  First, it contributes to an understanding of metropolitan area condition through 
public service structure and governmental structure.  Second, it contributes to the development of 
a methodological approach for measurement of metropolitan governance.  This is accomplished 
with the concept of “share of service responsibility” for each type of local government, which is 
calculated using Miller’s (2002) “Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index.”  Third, by using single-
metropolitan county areas, it provides a benchmark of the service structure for multiple-county 
metropolitan areas. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study is organized in eight parts.  Chapter 1 introduces studies of metropolitan service 
provision and factors influencing the service response.  Chapter 2 and 3 are a general description 
of local governmental structure and their role.  Chapter 2 describes types of local governments 
and the common forms of government structure.  Chapter 3 describes the general service 
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responsibility of the types and forms of local governments.  Chapter 4 introduces the internal 
budgetary and expenditure pressures of bureaucracies to provide perspective on government 
expenditure.  Chapter 5 describes the governments and condition of the metropolitan county 
areas in the study with a perspective of the national regions of the United States.  Methodology is 
discussed in Chapter 6 for exploration of service provision (expenditure) and the influencing 
factors to the expenditure.  Chapter 7 is a study of the relationship between growth in service 
expenditure and economic-demographic conditions, for reformed and unreformed metropolitan 
counties, and for each type of local governments’ proportional share of service responsibility.  
Chapter 8 discusses limitations of this study and future study areas. 
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2.0  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 
Local governments are generally categorized as general purpose or special purpose.  Counties 
and municipalities, including cities and towns, are general purpose governments (Government 
Organization, U.S. Census Bureau, 1997).  Special districts, authorities, and school districts are 
usually categorized as special purpose governments, as they are separate from local governments 
and generally perform one or a very few service functions (Government Organization, U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1997; Burns, 1994).  The difference between the special purpose governments is 
that authorities have the ability to levy taxes and usually have elected governing boards, while 
special districts are largely financed through user fees and have appointed oversight boards 
(Foster, 1997b).  In this paper they are both in the category of special districts.  School districts 
are independent, and service a single purpose; they are present and serve the same general 
purpose throughout the nation, but they are not included in this paper because they are not 
included as special district governments for census purposes (Government Organization, U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1997). 
 
This chapter addresses the three primarily used general and special purpose local governments in 
their institutional structure and their role in local public governance or public service provision.  
The main reference sources are editorial work of Berman’s “County Governments in an Era of 
Change” (1993), Duncombe’s “County Government in America” (1966), editorial work of 
Menzel’s “American County” (1996), Burns’ “Formation of Local Governments” (1994), and 
Municipal Yearbook (various years). 
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2.1 COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
County governments are the largest unit of local government, and derive from the subdivision of 
states that existed in colonial times, which was codified shortly after independence.  They are 
rooted in the convenience to state government’s exercise of power over large territories and to 
deliver traditional statewide services such as assessing and collecting taxes, and facilitating 
access to government services for less densely settled citizens (Salant, 1993; Cigler, 2002).  
Although historically counties are a “low-budget operation with a limited mission” (Salant, 
1993: p. 107), the traditional role has been expanded to perform services similar to municipal 
governments (Marando, 1977).  Currently many county governments provide service functions 
which have been the responsibility of municipal governments (Benton and Menzel, 1993; 
Government Finance, 2002).  County governments also have a wide impact on local policies, and 
are the most territorially pervasive units of local government in the United States (Marando, 
1977: p. 1; Marando and Thomas, 1977). 
 
According to Marando (1977), there are three major influencing factors on county government.  
First, expanding socioeconomic and demographic complexity in urban areas compels more 
resources for growing service demand and more involvement at the county level for resolution of 
conflicts among competing interests.  Second, as an administrative arm of the state, their state 
government is an important factor for what action may be taken by the county government.  
Third, the major federal influence in urban areas is direct federal funds to local governments for 
federal programs such as housing, construction of sewage treatment plants, and air and water 
pollution control.  Not only do federal grants for programs influence political and administrative 
organizations, they also reduces local dependency on state aid, affecting state-local relations and 
 10
increasing fragmentation of local political power (p. 6-7).  The next section examined structures 
of county government for an understanding of metropolitan conditions and governance issues in 
service provision. 
2.1.1 Structure of County Government 
Structure is defined in terms of dynamics of authority, leadership, and decision making (Menzel, 
1996: p. 205).  These characteristics are associated with the organizational forms of county 
government.  There are three primary forms of county government; Commission, Council-
manager (administrator), and Council-elected executive (Municipal Year Book, 1975 and 2003; 
Cigler, 2002). 
1. Commission  
The commission government is the traditional form of government at the county level.  
Originally this government was put forward by a reform movement that sought to bring 
accountability and business principles to government.  The commissioners and the “row officers” 
are elected by direct citizen vote.  Judges are also elected under this system.  The row offices are 
heads of various service units, such as Register of Wills and Marriages, and are somewhat 
equivalent to the President’s cabinet at the federal level.  The commissioners serve as the 
legislators, and lead the administration (Miller, 2002).  Leaders of the row offices administer 
their areas and officers consider themselves separate from the commissioners.  The “balance of 
powers” is not as clear-cut as practiced at the federal level, but there seems to be more 
involvement and reliance on the electorate (Marando, 1977). 
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 Disadvantages associated with the commission form stem from the absence of a chief 
administrator to provide more professionalism, executive leadership, and accountability 
(DeSantis, 2002: p. 128; Duncombe, 1966).  DeSantis (2002) states that a major characteristic is 
that the smaller and more rural counties (with small population) are those that most frequently 
choose to remain under this form of government.  Although optional forms of government are 
allowed in some states, many state constitutions such as Texas permit only the commission form 
of county government (Duncombe, 1966). 
 
An urban commissioner may be more of a legislator than an administrator, where a rural 
commissioner may assume an active role in administering county functions (Marando, 1977: p. 
16).  The administrative and legislative combination both concentrates and diffuses power.  It is 
concentrated because fewer people hold more power; but diffused because the lack of clearly 
defined roles or titles for the individuals creates a lack of transparency.  This diffusion may also 
contribute to people’s lack of awareness of county government.  Counties with large population 
are more likely to modernize this traditional form to reformed governmental structure 
(MacManus, 1996: p. 54). 
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[Table 2-1]:  Pros and Cons of Commission Form of County Government 
Pros Cons 
1. Service units are more responsive to citizens 
because of the direct elections of the head of 
the units. 
 
1. The absence of a strong executive creates a 
leadership vacuum. 
2. Politicians as leaders of service units create 
less efficient and effective service, because 
the elected politicians do not necessarily 
have the professional expertise to manage 
their service unit. 
3. The system is less accountable because 
power is diffused at the commission level. 
4. The system seems to foster patronage. 
2. Council-Manager or Council-Administrator 
In this form of government, the voters elect a legislative body which serves as a policy-making 
body for the county, which hires an executive to carry out policies and oversee the executive 
departments (Duncombe, 1966).  Duncombe (1966) states that ideally and most often in practice, 
the manager is a professional person selected on the basis of ability and experience rather than 
party affiliation (p. 11). 
 
There are three subtypes of this form, relative to the amount of authority given to the 
administrator.  In the “pure” version the administrator has broad power to hire and fire 
department heads.  The second type has limited power, and in the weakest form the administrator 
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is an assistant to the legislature, performing tasks and providing advice but with little or no 
executive oversight.   
 
According to DeSantis (2002), counties with a population above 50,000 tend to use this form of 
government more than areas with the population below 50,000. 
[Table 2-2]:  Pros and Cons of Council-Manager Form of County Government 
Pros Cons 
1. More professional management. 
2. Less tendency to partisan politics 
(Nalbandian, 1991: p. 11). 
3. More transparent / less power diffusion, so 
more accountable. 
1. Somewhat less electorally responsive than 
the commission form of government. 
2. Lacking a visible leader position. 
 
3. Council-elected Executive 
This form of government is similar to the pure county manager (administrator) form, but with the 
executive being elected rather than appointed.  The separation of powers arrangement is similar 
to the federal government (Marando and Thomas, 1977).  A distinguishing characteristic is that a 
single official has a significant degree of supervision, control, or influence over most aspects of 
county administration (Duncombe, 1966).  Most often the executive sets the budget, hires and 
fires department heads, and has other powers related to the strongest form of county 
administrator; or mayor, governor, or president, but the department heads may remain the elected 
row offices, and in this case the executive’s authority is weakened.  The council performs the 
legislative role of congress and may be elected at large as commissioners usually are, but often 
 14
they are elected as representative of a section of the county.  Since county government authority 
is derived from the state, the council sets policies and approves budget and expenditures, but 
actual legal actions are severely limited compared to state or federal congress.  According to 
Duncombe (1966), counties with a population of 100,000 or more tend to have this or the 
administrator form of government (p. 12).  The Pro and Con of this government are best given in 
contrast to the commission. 
[Table 2-3]:  Pros and Cons of Council-elected Executive Form of County Government 
Pros Cons 
1. Stronger leadership in the position of county 
executive. 
2. More chances for professional management 
of services.  An elected executive would not 
want to limit their appeal by appointing 
incompetent department heads. 
3. More transparent / less power diffusion, so 
more accountable. 
4. Responsive to electorate. 
1. Possibility of divisive government as 
legislators and executive are all beholden to 
segments of the electorate. 
2. Slightly less responsive to electorate than 
the commission government form. 
 
2.1.2 County Government Use 
Based on 3,050 counties with a population of 1,000 and greater, ICMA (2003) documented 
forms of county governments.  In the year 2002, by aggregated mean percentage figure, over 
70% of these counties used the commission form of governments, while nearly 16% of counties 
used the council-elected executive form of government, and approximately 12% of counties had 
a council-manager government.  Although regional analysis is not an area of study in this paper, 
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it is useful to consider regional effects, Table 2-4 shows county governments adoption within a 
region. 
[Table 2-4]:  Percentage of County Government Forms Within Regions 
Region Council-Manager 
Council-elected 
Executive Commission  
Number 
of Counties 
Northeast 10.8 27.8 61.3 194
Midwest 6.4 11.1 82.5 1,054
South 15.0 17.3 67.7 1,379
West 17.2 15.7 67.2 408
Source:  The Municipal Year Book, 2003 with author’s calculation. 
Note: Excluded counties in states of Alaska and Hawaii. 
 
The South has the highest number of county governments and the Northeast has the least number 
of county governments compared to other regions.  The commission form of government is the 
most prevalently used within all regions.  Excluding the commission form of county government, 
the Northeast uses the council-elected executive form of government the most, while the 
Midwest uses this form of county government the least.  The West uses the council-manager 
more than any other region, and West adoption of the council-elected executive is only slightly 
smaller than its use of the council-manager form. 
2.2 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
This most local level of government includes townships, towns, and cities.  These governments 
are incorporated by constituents, and thus their authority, while derived from the state, is bottom-
up rather than top-down.  Public choice theorists view them as civic communities empowered by 
citizens to engage in important decisions for service packages by allowing citizens to select 
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communities and by selecting tax-service bundles (Tiebout, 1956; Tiebout, Ostrom, and Warren 
1961; Bish and Ostrom, 1973; Ostrom, 1975). 
 
According to Burns (1994), there is an appearance of incentives different than the best interest of 
the citizens, as for example, a coalition of businesses and middle and upper class citizens may 
create policies and built environments that keep lower income or other “undesirable” people out 
of the community.  Burns (1994) cites the seemingly large numbers of municipalities that 
provide no services (2000 of them in 1987) as evidence of this exclusive zoning purpose.  More 
fragmented metropolitan regions are likely to show greater territorial disparities in development 
because there is little incentive for a small community in a nearby urban region to try to match 
area needs such as for new jobs and housing opportunities (Lewis, 1996: p. 34). 
 
Many states, particularly in the West and South, have not incorporated all their land as towns, 
cities, or townships (Ladd, 1998; Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000; Rusk, 2003).  In the South and 
West, counties and cities are the only forms of general purpose government below the state level, 
hence annexation is the way urban expansion into unincorporated areas occurs (Johnson, Perry, 
and Lollock, 2000).  Counties provide services to the unincorporated areas, and state 
mechanisms exist for areas to incorporate or join with a nearby corporation (Duncombe, 1966).  
2.2.1 Structures of Municipal Government 
The typical municipal government provides many services organized by function to its residents 
through individual municipal departments (Kemp, 2002). 
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Similar to county forms of governments, there are three types of municipal government.  They 
are commission, mayor-council, and council-manager.  In this section, each form of government 
will be discussed and pros and cons of each will be addressed.  New England is not included in 
the sample study set, so a common municipal government structure in New England, the Town 
Meeting, is not defined. 
1. Commission 
The commission government, more common in townships, is similar to the traditional 
commission form of government at the county level.  Originally this government was put 
forward as a reform movement that sought to apply business principles to government (Miller, 
2002).  The commissioners are “department head” of one of the major units of the government, 
and together the commission makes policy decisions as if they are a “company management 
team.” 
 
Kemp (2002) states that this form of government employs non-partisan, at-large elections that 
includes electing a board of commissioners.  They serve as the legislative body of their 
municipal government.  Individual commissioners serve as the head of one or more 
administrative departments.  In this form of government, there is no sharp dichotomy between 
policy determination and policy implementation because both roles are performed by 
commissioner, not professionally trained administrators. 
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[Table 2-5]:  Pros and Cons of Commission Form of Municipal Government 
Pros Cons 
1. Government is responsive, as the people 
directly elect those in charge of the service 
units serving them. 
1. The absence of a strong executive creates a 
leadership vacuum. 
2. Politicians as leaders of service units tends 
to create less efficient and effective service 
because politicians do not necessarily know 
about the service. 
3. The government is less accountable and less 
transparent because power is diffused. 
2. Mayor-Council 
The position of mayor is a traditional executive of a city, like the president or governor.  The 
mayor shares leadership of the city with an individually elected legislative body called the 
council.  When a mayor is elected by the citizens, has veto authority for council resolutions, and 
prepares the city budget for acceptance by the council, the position is a “strong” mayor.  In cities 
where the mayor has no executive role, the position is traditional / ceremonial, and it is a “weak” 
mayor.  The “weak” mayor cities usually have a professional “city manager” to perform the 
duties of an executive for the government (DeSantis and Renner, 2002: p. 71-80).  These weak 
mayoral cities are usually council-manager form of government that happen to keep the 
traditional mayoral position, but they could be commission governments with an elected or 
appointed mayor. 
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[Table 2-6]:  Pros and Cons of Mayor-Council Form of Municipal Government 
Category 
Pros  
Category 
Cons 
Strong 
Mayor
Weak 
Mayor  
Strong 
Mayor
Weak 
Mayor    
More visible 
public 
leadership 
Yes Yes  Less responsive than commission Yes Yes 
       
Leadership that 
affects policy, 
budget, etc 
Yes No  
Less 
professional than 
council-manager 
Yes Yes 
       
Politically 
responsive 
(compared to 
Council-
manager) 
Yes Yes     
 
3. Council-Manager 
The council-manager is similar to the mayor-council government, but the administrator is an 
appointed manager, answerable to the council, rather than an elected mayor.  Lately there has 
been a blurring of the mayor-council and council-manager governments, as many mayor-council 
governments hire professional managers. 
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[Table 2-7]:  Pros and Cons of Council-Manager Form of Municipal Government 
Pros Cons 
1. More professional. 
2. Less tendency to partisan politics 
(Nalbandian, 1991: p. 11). 
3. Professional managers code of ethics and 
administrative knowledge. 
1. Less visible public leadership (than the 
strong mayor). 
2. Less responsive (the manager is not 
beholden to the public as the mayor is). 
 
2.2.2 Municipal Government Use 
Table 2-8 presents forms of municipal governments in the U.S. by region.  The mayor-council 
form of government is highly adopted in the Midwest, and also in the Northeast.  The West 
presents the lowest adoption of this form of government.  The council-manager form of 
government is mostly used by West and South while the Midwest and Northeast show a 
moderate adoption rate.  The commission form of government use is insignificant except in the 
Northeast and Midwest, where it is still low, at 3% or less. 
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[Table 2-8]:  Percentage of Municipal Government Forms by Region 
Region Total Reported Mayor-council Council manager Commission 
Northeast 666 46.0 51.0 3.0
Midwest 1,354 53.0 45.4 1.6
South 1,146 34.7 64.7 0.6
West 742 25.6 74.4 0.0
Source:  MacManus and Bullock in The Municipal Year Book, 2003. 
Note:  Excluded town meeting and representative town meeting. 
2.3 SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENT 
Special districts are generally single-purpose governments, created by one or more state, county 
or municipal governments, and functioning in one or more local jurisdictions.  They are in some 
ways local governments, as they tend to deal directly with constituents, as described in the major 
theoretical work on special districts (Burns, 1994).  “Special districts are often established to 
subsidize developers indirectly or to fuel growth, particularly at the outer frontiers of 
metropolitan areas” (Lewis, 1996). 
 
Chicoine and Walzer (1985) describe the multiplicity of interests and different hierarchical 
structures involved with special districts, because any level of local government as well as the 
state can create special districts.  Chicoine and Walzer cite a 1977 study of Springfield, IL, 
where because of the “15 independent or semi-independent government organizations,” citizens 
can receive the same services but pay property taxes differently (1985: p. 94).  The hierarchical 
structure may underlie an inexplicit principal-agent relationship.  Special districts are not the 
“agents of the state” that counties are, nor are they as representative as local governments.  
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Principle-agency theory assumes a series of contractual or agreed upon relationships and 
contributes to quality such as competition, customer service orientation, and accountability for 
meeting standards from traditional hierarchy concept orientation  (Kamensky, 1996). 
[Table 2-9]:  Pros and Cons of Special Districts 
Pros Cons 
1. Allows creation of a unit of government 
specifically for a particular service, and 
abandonment of the government when the service 
is no longer needed (usually for development). 
2. Allows citizens in a subunit of a municipality 
interested in a particular service not offered by the 
municipality to create a government to provide that 
service. 
3. Allows municipalities or other government units to 
create a government that crosses traditional 
governmental boundaries to engender economies 
of scale when providing a service. 
4. Allows governments to add a service (or separate a 
service) without increasing taxes, as the new 
government, the special district, has its own 
revenue authority. 
5. Allows governments fund and monitor service 
provision separately from other general-purpose 
government services. 
6. Provide a mechanism to separate particular 
government service financially and politically 
from the primary government. 
7. Mechanism by which governments can collaborate 
1. There is no oversight or coordination 
of special districts, so service areas 
can overlap, creating excessive costs 
for citizens. 
2. Lack of accountability to citizens 
when special district leaders are not 
elected and have little visibility in the 
community.  When leadership is 
elected, voter turnout is around 5% 
(Burns 1994, p 12). 
3. Less responsive as citizens do not 
involve in establishment. 
4. Work well as a cooperative 
mechanism within their service area, 
but prevents more substantial regional 
cooperation. 
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Pros Cons 
to provide service. 
8. Mechanism by which outsourcing or “insourcing” 
can be done without changing the way citizens pay 
for the service when the provider changes, and 
service provision contracts can be maintained. 
2.3.1 Special Districts: Public Choice and Public Interest 
Public choice largely promotes homogeneous community (Tiebout, 1956).  As communities 
provide services of interest to some majority of citizens, over time, those not interested in those 
services leave and other citizens are attracted.  This creates a self-reinforcing separation of 
citizens in different homogeneous municipalities.  Theorists such as Bollens (1957: p. 255) 
critique of special districts is that it creates inequitable, inefficient, and irrational competition for 
public monies due to the lack of coordination among governments. 
[Table 2-10]:  Aid for Special Districts (per Dollar of Own Source Revenue) 
 Aid per $ of Own Source Revenue 
Intergovernmental grants 1972 2002 Change (%)   
 Federal Government 0.29 0.16 -44.8 
 State Government 0.04 0.08 100.0 
 Local Government 0.10 0.07 -30.0 
Total Intergovernmental Grants 0.44 0.31 -29.5 
Source: Burns (1994: p. 14 ) and U.S. Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 2, 2002. 
 
The general financial trend of special districts in the United States is local independence.  Table 
3-5 shows reduced funding of special district from local governments, but an increase in funding 
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from federal sources.  Still, special districts are becoming more independent by increasing their 
capacity to generate larger internal revenue while reducing intergovernmental grants for 
operation.  With the rapid increase in special districts, internal revenue generation increased 
more than 19 times during the three decade period (5,261 million in 1972 to 102,395 million in 
2002), while matching aid per dollar of internal revenue decreased nearly by 30 percent as seen 
table in Table 2-10.  By 2002 intergovernmental grants to special districts are $0.31 per dollar of 
special districts’ own source revenues.  Although the matching grants from three tiers of 
governments are reduced from $0.44 in 1972, there is an increasing burden on state 
governments.  The burden on state governments doubled between 1972 and 2002, while federal 
government burden fell by nearly 45 percent and local governments burden fell by 30 percent.    
This may be because federal government favors block grants to the states to support many local 
initiatives, such as the change in welfare programs in 1996 (see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-book-03.html). Governments first 
responsibility is to provide for its members, the citizens (Olson, 1965: p. 15). 
 
Many researchers are concerned that the governing body of special districts is not as 
representative as general purpose governments (Burns, 1994; Foster, 1997b; Chicoine and 
Walzer, 1985; Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000).  Another criticism is that special district formation 
is due to failure of state government to equip general local government with [discretionary 
decision] power (Tees, 1971, quoted in MacManus, 1981).  Establishment of special districts 
avoids “state constitutional and statutory restrictions on local government taxing and borrowing 
powers” (MacManus, 1981: p. 1208).  Also special districts are market-oriented public service 
and “when public decisions become regulated by quasi-market mechanisms rather than 
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democratic processes, citizenship skills erode and civic identity becomes overly tied to parochial 
concerns.” (Tocqueville, 1969, quoted in Oliver, 1999).   
2.3.2 Special Districts, Collective Goods, and Regional Service 
The collective good in terms of the municipality or special district is different from collective for 
the region.  For example, within the municipalities the local governments decide land use but the 
effects of those decisions are often regional due to economic links in the region.  When public 
goods are strained within a municipal boundary or special district service area, there may be 
regional inefficiencies in many public goods and services, or inequities in citizens’ financial 
burden.   
 
However, financing services through special districts can relieve property tax burden.  
MacManus’ (1981) study focusing on the South found that use of tax-based special districts for 
property-tax burden was a fiscally effective mechanism during 1970s.  “[T]he rate of increase in 
special districts is related negatively to the rate of increase in operating expenditure level” (p. 
1213).  Also special districts can capture economies of scope as well as economies of scale when 
they span municipalities affecting fiscal structure in metropolitan areas.  Lewis (1996) states that 
forming an area wide special purpose government does not contribute to fragmentation because 
of its capability to capture regional-wide externalities, or explained in another way, a single area-
wide service provider is less fragmenting than many municipal-based special purpose 
governments.   
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Special districts are often related to economic development and private sector capital investment 
and increase the capacity of infrastructure in peripheral areas (Burns, 1994; Lewis, 1996: p. 36; 
Nunn and Schoedel, 1997; Foster, 1997b).  It provides infrastructure to support residential and 
nonresidential construction and to provide public services without municipal incorporation 
(Burns, 1994; Nunn and Schoedel, 1997).  In addition, it provides more flexibility in the issuance 
of debt to finance economic development.  Special districts were also used as a important  
financing mechanism for rapid growth policies as well as creating public-private partnerships 
(Nunn and Schoedel, 1997: p. 61-63).  Burns (1994) states that; 
 
...special districts...can fund the provision of infrastructure to improve land and make it 
valuable for development.  These governments are able to lower the costs and the risks 
of development...residents agree to support the formation of the new 
district….Developers have considered these districts as alternative to annexation since 
at least the 1950s.  Recently, developers have come to see these districts as a way 
around impact fees (p. 26). 
 
For critics of special districts, the underlying concern for serving private interest is with changes 
in demographic conditions and related fiscal constraints such as the tax burden and spending 
commitments to provide adequate services.  Development after all is mainly caused by changes 
in demographic conditions and income.  These, then, causes changes in service demand, 
resulting in fiscal strain and incentives to consolidate services with other communities.  Based on 
regression analysis to measure development effect on local spending and tax burdens, Ladd 
(1998) suggests that sparsely and densely populated areas generate higher public sector costs 
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than moderately dense areas.  This is so called a U-shaped relationship between the growth in per 
capita spending and the rate of population growth. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
In the U.S., public services are provided within overlapping jurisdictions.  The primary 
responsibilities of county government is state services and area wide functions, but county 
governments often provide services that are usually provided by municipalities or special 
districts to unincorporated areas.  County governments have several different formal forms of 
organizational structure.  In 2002 over 70% of the counties are using the commission form of 
government, which tends to be less professional, and with less visible leadership, but it is 
conceived as more responsive to citizens.  Within a region the commission form is the most 
commonly adopted in the Midwest and South.  However there is a national trend to adopt a 
council with a professional manager, or an elected executive. 
 
Forms of municipal government include townships, towns, and cities.  In terms of municipal 
government structure, the mayor-council form of governments are highly adopted in the Midwest 
followed by the South.  This form of government is more responsive to citizens, although less 
professional than the council-manager form of government.  The council-manager form of 
government is most often adopted in the West.  Although there may be a lack of leadership and 
responsiveness to citizens, this form of government is more professional and has less tendency 
toward partisan politics. By 2002 central cities had adopted the council-manager form of 
government the most among other forms of government.  In the municipal organizational 
structure, the commission form of government is less popular. 
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Figure 2-1:  Structure of Local Government 
 
Special districts exhibit ad hoc formation since states or general purpose local governments can 
create them.  A major advantage of this government is minimal cost involved to maintain status 
quo without increasing taxes, as the new government, the special district, has its own revenue 
authority.  The disadvantage of this government is adding complexity and further fragmentation 
to the mix of demographic change and responding to increasing public interests. 
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3.0  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC SERVICE 
Municipalities, cities, or towns are usually established under the laws of their states and initiated 
by citizens, but counties were created by state legislatures as sub units of the state governments, 
providing services such as record-keeping on behalf of the state.  Municipalities are often 
incorporated and have some level of authority, being only indirectly ruled by state power.  
Special districts might be agents of the state government, but often not directly because all three 
governments; state, county and municipal, may establish special districts (Miller, 2002).  This 
leads to a complex set of overlapping levels of authority, as shown in Table 3-1. 
[Table 3-1]:  Authority Characteristics of Local Governments 
Types of 
Gov’t 
Proprietary Function Legality Limitation 
Discretionary 
Power 
Operational 
Capacity 
Corp. 
Quasi- 
Corp. 
Authority 
from State 
Gov’t 
Subject
to Suit
Cross 
Boundary 
Service
Ordinance 
Power   
County  ● ● ●  ● 
Municipality ●  ● ● ●  
Special 
Districts 
 ●  ●  ● 
Source: Chicoine and Walzer,1985; Zimmerman, 1992; Stephen and Wikstrom, 2000. 
Note: * Excluded school districts; towns and township are treated as municipalities. 
 
The incorporated nature of municipalities means they are operated much like a business, 
although subject to more contact and legal control by the state government than for-profit private 
enterprises.  This control is not operational, the “corporation” conducts its business apart from 
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the state, and also the county.  Although the municipalities are geographically within the county, 
there is no federal-system relationship between them (except Miami-Dade county in Florida); 
they both derive authority from the state.  Within the complex state system, local service 
provision is intertwined with the local-state relationship with many state imposed restrictions 
such as debt limits (Chicoine and Walzer, 1985; Burns, 1994), fiscal conditions (Ladd and 
Yinger, 1989; Stein, 1984), range of service functions, and each local governments’ level of 
service performed (Liebert, 1974; Dye and Garcia, 1978; Stein, 1982; Park, 1996) as well as 
local socio-economic conditions (Dye and MacManus, 1990) and policy outcomes (Peterson, 
1981; Park, 1996). 
3.1 COUNTY GOVERNMENT ROLE AND GOVERNANCE 
Currently, counties serve all residents with state functions, and oftentimes serve basic local 
services in unincorporated areas of the county.  For many decades, the county role in public 
services measured by expenditure is large in local public service provision and its role is 
increasing in many service functions as well as cooperative role with other governments and 
other parties (Benton and Menzel, 1993; Finances of County Governments from Census Bureau, 
2002).  “Counties often function as key elements in the cooperative system or the network of 
local governments that hold the system together, and…participate in various types of cooperative 
undertakings.  They supply services under contract to municipal governments and jointly plan, 
finance, or deliver services on the basis of agreements with other local metropolitan or regional 
association”  (Berman, 1993: p. 135-142).  With this increasing service role of county 
governments in the United States, governance structure in urban areas has to cope with a need 
for increasing administrative capacity for performance improvement. 
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 County governments are primarily established by state government as constitutionally 
recognized legal subdivisions.  However county government have relations to other governments 
which are broad in two scopes; 1) county federal relationships; and 2) county relationship with 
other units of local government (Duncombe, 1966). 
 
First, federal agencies provide counties a variety of information such as statistics, 
documentation, research reports as well as advisory, consulting, and training services.  Federal 
grants are channeled through the state government.  Also agricultural and environment issues are 
often cooperatively managed by federal, state, and county governments as a partnership. 
 
Second, although historically counties are established to deliver a limited set of services within 
their geographic boundaries (DeSantis and Renner, 1993: p. 81), there are many forms of 
intergovernmental relationships in many counties; 1) as a legal and fiscal arm of state in 
relationships with townships and special districts; 2) as a vendor of services to other local 
governmental units; 3) as a purchaser of governmental services; 4) as creator of dependent 
districts and service areas, 5) as a participants in informal cooperative arrangements; 6) as a 
partner in joint city-county agencies; 7) as a partner in inter-county agencies; and 8) as a 
participant in voluntary regional conferences. 
 
Among counties with a public manager or an elected executive, the innovator and facilitator 
model as developed for mayoral and manager leadership in cities may be useful (Dahl, 1961; 
George 1968; Cunningham 1970; all in Svara, 1996).  However, it is important to recognize the 
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more complex environment county leaders find themselves in compared to city leaders.  County 
leaders must contend with similar administrative and legislative bodies, and in addition, must be 
able to integrate departments related to state functions, and the municipalities which are 
geographically within the counties (Svara, 1996). 
3.2 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ROLE AND GOVERNANCE 
A municipality serves its residents in its incorporated area.  Benton and Menzel (1993) state that 
“Growth in unincorporated America between 1980 and 1990 registered a 9 percent gain 
compared to an 8 percent gain in incorporated America.  In rapid-growth states like Florida, the 
population growth in unincorporated areas has been much more dramatic….In fact, 51 percent of 
Florida’s population currently resides outside the state’s municipalities” (p. 55). 
 
According to the public choice theory, municipalities compete with each other for favorable 
population within their region (Tiebout, 1956).  In practice this means they need to be responsive 
to their citizens, and they also need to maximize service provided and minimize costs to the 
citizens.  An economic shortcoming of municipalities’ ability to provide services in many cases 
is that they are unlikely to capture economies of scale because of their limited geographical area 
and population.  For example, the cost of pavement per mile cannot be reduced by buying 
supplies less expensively in bulk, since the number of roads within the municipality are limited.  
These two factors contribute to an incentive to cooperate in service provision, or the use of 
financing mechanisms to shift citizen costs from taxes to paying another agency for services 
whenever possible, or both. 
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Since the 1970s, local areas are more geared to narrowly focused program and development 
oriented services, and away from redistributive policy (Peterson, 1995).  A consequence of 
competition for favorable population (which usually means the more affluent) is that the 
metropolitan region becomes stratified, with wealthy suburbs surrounding the central city, which 
retains the less well-off because of the lower property values and established public 
transportation network (Orfield, 1997; Rusk, 2003). 
 
Lowered tax base from population loss or unemployment produces a condition where a 
significant percentage of the city population is dependent on the city for basic goods and services 
(Stein, 1984).  Both levels of government experience constraints for meeting service demand 
from residents.  Counties have pressure of serving increasing population outside of incorporated 
areas.  Major urban center municipalities (the central cities) are constrained with population loss, 
and unfavorable fiscal and economic health (Ladd and Yinger, 1989).  Growing municipalities 
face service demands that may require new infrastructure.  All governments are under citizen 
pressure to reduce taxes, as well as from mandates from higher order governments.  In order to 
circumvent the constraints and maintain service provision responsibility, there is tendency for a 
reliance on special districts (Chicoine and Walzer, 1985; Burns, 1994; Stephens and Wikstrom, 
2000). 
 
Often this results in the three types of local government being involved with many of the same 
functions.  While it is difficult with the present data to know how much any particular population 
has duplicate services, it is certain that many local services provided by different governments 
within the metropolitan regions encompass services that might be better provided on a regional 
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basis, and there may be services provided by counties that could be relegated to the 
municipalities.  In any event, it is useful to know about which level of government produces 
efficient and effective services in which areas.  Table 3-2 lists the functions that may be provided 
by local governments for comparison.  
[Table 3-2]:  Service Function Categories by Type of Local Government 
 
Categories 
  
County 
  
Municipality 
  
Special District 
Governmental Admin.  Yes  Yes  No 
Social Service and 
Income Maintenance 
 Yes  Yes  No public welfare 
Transportation  
No parking 
facility; no water 
transportation 
 
No parking 
facility; no water 
transportation 
 
No transit 
subsidies; no other 
transportation 
Public Safety  Yes  Yes  
No correction; no 
protective 
inspection and 
regulation 
Environment and 
Housing 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Library, Educational  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Utility  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Liquor Store  Yes  Yes   
Employee Retirement  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Debt Management  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sources:   
1)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 2, Table 1, Finances of Special District Governments.  
2)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 3, Table 1, Finances of County Governments. 
3)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 4, Table 1, Finances of Municipal and Township Governments. 
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 Governmental Administration:  Financial administration, Judicial and legal, General public 
building, and  Other governmental administration. 
Social Service and Income Maintenance:  Public welfare, Hospitals, and Health. 
Transportation:  Highway, Air transportation, Transit subsidies, Other transportation, Parking 
facilities, and Water transportation and terminals. 
Public Safety:  Police protection, Fire protection, Correction, and Protective inspection and 
regulation. 
Environment and Housing:  Natural resources, Parks and recreation, Housing and community 
development, Sewerage, and Solid waste management. 
Educational:  Library. 
3.3 AREA-WIDE SERVICE PROVISION 
In U.S. history to approximately 1940, most of the population centers in the Northeast region 
underwent major structural reorganization as they grew in population and geographical size by 
merging with, or annexing smaller jurisdictions.  The expansion of cities in the Northeast was 
largely halted by the ability of suburban municipal corporations to resist the cities.  Over the last 
half century, cities in the South and West have experienced growth by expanding into areas that 
were not incorporated, with some annexation (Mogulof, 1972; Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000; 
Frug, 2002; Rusk, 2003). 
 
This paper discusses the local conditions and service share relationships of local governments in 
single metropolitan counties.  It is worth noting the importance of the role of the state legislation 
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under which local governments of all types receive their ability to operate, as is shown by 
municipal governments authority to resist assimilation by larger municipalities.  State legislation 
and incentives have a great impact on local government cooperation (School District and 
Municipal Reorganization: Research Findings & Policy Proposals, 2007).  An analysis of the 
effect of legislation and incentives on local government action is not in the scope of the analysis 
of this dissertation, however, this dissertation lays the groundwork for a future study which 
incorporates the economic-demographic conditions, government structure, and government 
service responsibilities with the type of legislative controls on the local governments, and the 
types of state incentive programs that promote local government cooperation. 
 
As mentioned earlier, public service in the United States is increasingly provided through new 
formation of special districts.  This contributes to increasing fragmentation.  Wildavsky (1966) 
states that budget efficiency cannot be achieved through the fragmented nature of units within 
governments.  The same fragmentation and budget efficiency must also apply to the multiple 
local governments in the metropolitan areas. 
 
“If counties had not existed at the beginning of the decade, something like them would probably 
have been invented by the end of it to deliver sub-regional and regional service” (Dodge, 1990: 
p. 358).  Counties are the largest unit of local government, except for five metropolitan 
governments created in recent decades.  Dodge’s comments, the history of structural city 
expansion, formation of metropolitan governments (merged city-county or regional councils), the 
incentives for municipalities to provide services efficiently, and equity concerns are evidence of 
pressures for area wide governance.  But the state laws granting local governments corporation 
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status has been an effective impediment to formal, that is structural regional governance.  
Although the fragmentation of metropolitan areas into multiple municipalities can be said to be 
inequitable and inefficient, it also provides for more responsive government, and different levels 
of service and cost from which citizens may choose.  According to Post and Stein (2000), 
fragmented metropolitan area governance does not directly influence urban-suburban economic 
dependence (p. 56).  Also Parks and Oakerson (1993) state that overlapping jurisdictional 
boundaries among counties and municipalities can facilitate intergovernmental cooperation (p. 
38-39).  In this regard, there has been increasing concern and interest in area-wide cooperation 
based on a growing understanding of local interdependence and the need for continuation of 
economic progress of the area-wide as a whole (Hill, Wolman, and Ford, 1995; Orfield, 1997; 
Peirce, Johnson, and Hall, 1993; Savitch and Vogel, 1996; Rusk, 2003).  The Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 grants the federal transportation relationship to a single 
agency (the Metropolitan Planning Organization, or MPO) within a metropolitan area that is to 
decide allocation of federal transportation funds in the area (Miller, 2002).  This gives much 
greater authority to any semi-formal metropolitan governmental councils and further increases a 
movement toward area-wide planning and development. 
 
Structural area-wide service provision means municipal mergers or annexations to form a 
government serving a larger geographical area. This practice, not uncommon in the northeast 
until the 1950s, and in the south and west until recently, has not been favored in recent years.  
And yet already in existence is a larger structural government, which is the county.  A series of 
policies and practices have prevented a larger county-wide role in service provision.  Federal 
policies have favored decentralization by awarding grants to cities and municipalities, and the 
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municipalities have been reluctant to give up independent revenue and action.  State policies 
sometimes do not permit counties to perform these services (Chicone and Walzer, 1985; 
Zimmerman, 1992; Stephen and Wikstrom, 2000). 
 
County governments taking on a role of municipal services can largely capture efficiency and 
equity benefits (Berman 1993: p. 135-142) and they demonstrate an increasing role in 
metropolitan areas, as seen by service expenditure analysis (Benton and Menzel, 1993;  Finances 
of County Governments from Census Bureau, 2002).  
 
There are two ways for area-wide action without a government structure.  They are the modern 
regional service approaches of administrative and fiscal regionalism that can be defined when it 
is desirable for financial or equity reasons (Miller, 2002). 
 
In the administrative approach, special districts can deliver a particular public service and can be 
created by counties, or by multiple municipalities as needed.  They are administrative units that 
can span governmental jurisdictions to offer practical solutions to area-wide problems, 
economies of scale for those services that benefit from scale, and they do not interrupt the 
authority of the county or municipal governments (Miller, 2002).  Inter-local agreements are also 
administrative.  They are cooperative arrangements formed by negotiation between two or more 
local governments, which is often encouraged by the state (Miller, 2002).  Such a network 
approach was promoted by Dodge (1996) and Savitch and Vogel (1996).  Lessons can be learned 
from existing practice.  For example, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., and the Regional 
Efficiency Development Incentive Program (REDI) in New Jersey. 
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 The financial cooperation of fiscal approach can be a “fiscal equivalent of a regional government 
without the regional government” (Miller, 2002).  This has an effect of reducing municipal 
government competition for siting of stores and businesses in their jurisdiction, spreading the 
costs and benefits of development among more municipalities as they are affected, and “levels 
the playing field” between wealthy and less affluent portions of a metropolitan area to reduce the 
trend toward increased disparity.  There are several methods for fiscal approach: cultural asset 
districts, tax-base sharing, and “peaceful coexistence strategies.”  Cultural asset districts provide 
a mechanism for suburban areas to support cultural assets such as zoos, museums, and so on, 
which are usually located in the central cities which tend to be less fiscally capable in current 
times.  Tax-base sharing is a way for more affluent neighborhoods and municipalities to share 
finances with less affluent neighborhoods and municipalities.  The distinctive feature of tax-base 
sharing is that the funds are distributed to municipalities rather than cultural organizations.  
Peaceful coexistence strategies contain elements of either cultural asset districts or tax-base 
sharing, but their signature characteristic is that the agreement is between incorporated and non-
incorporated areas, such as between a central city and a rural county. 
3.4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIP: REVENUES AND EXPENDITURE 
As mentioned in previous sections in this chapter, county, municipality, and special district 
governments provide public services.  In this section, tax revenue and expenditure between local 
governments will be discussed.  Also levels of expenditure for functions from local governments 
will be demonstrated. 
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1. Revenue Source 
Ability to generate revenue enables local government power (Klase, Mok, and Pops, 1996; Ladd, 
1998).  “[T]he power to tax permits local governments to raise revenue to provide services such 
as public safety, health, transportation, education and social services” and local governments 
take into account the property tax burden in other jurisdictions to differentiate their community 
fiscally from the others when making their own tax decisions (Ladd, 1998: p. 1; Ladd, 1992).  In 
the U.S., property tax is a primary revenue source for local governments.  In particular the 
property tax is the most important county tax and an overall increase in tax effort in a 
metropolitan areas may negatively affect overall employment growth (Bowman, MacManus, and 
Mikesell, 1992; Cigler, 1996: p. 175).  Over time the traditional property tax revenue stream has 
become limited by exemptions and by re-definitions of property (Ladd, 1998), so that between 
1927-2002, the property tax as a percentage of own-source revenue for all types of local 
government has declined by nearly 64% (see Appendix Table A-5 for property tax trend). 
 
To illustrate the recent local property tax trend, proportion of property tax from own tax revenue,  
and proportion of property tax from total general revenue are shown in Table 3-3. 
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[Table 3-3]:  Percentage of Property Tax Revenue and Change by Type of Local Government, 
1991/92–2001/02 
Governments 
As a percentage of own taxes As a percentage of general revenue 
1991/92
% Change 
1991/92 – 
2001/02
% Change 
1991/92 – 
2001/022001/02 1991/92 2001/02      
County 74.4 69.1 -7.0 27.8 24.2 -13.0
Municipality 52.9 48.6 -8.2 23.1 20.4 -11.6
Special district 66.8 69.8 4.6 10.7 11.0 2.7
Sources:   
1)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 2, Table 1, Finances of Special District Governments.  
2)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 3, Table 1, Finances of County Governments. 
3)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 4, Table 1, Finances of Municipal and Township Governments. 
 
As seen in Table 3-3, the percentage change in proportion of property tax as a percentage of own 
taxes as well as a percentage of general revenue has been negative for both county and municipal 
governments.  Increasing revenue can be seen only in special districts.  The negative change in 
percentage of general revenue for county is larger than that of municipality. 
 
During the period 1991/92-2001/02, Table 3-4 shows that total local government revenue 
increased by 69% (liquor store and employee retirement revenue are excluded).  However, the 
percentage of both own revenue sources and utility revenue has decreased by 6.5%.  Offsetting 
this revenue loss is an increase in revenue from intergovernmental sources, by 6.6%. 
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[Table 3-4]:  Local Government Revenue Source, 1991/92-2001/02 (in Mil.) 
 Years Percentage to Total Revenue 
1991/92 2001/02 1991/92 2001/02 Change     
Intergovernmental revenue 119,609 215,188 27.9 29.7 6.6
 Fed 18,512 38,903 _ _ _
 State 90,485 157,753 _ _ _
 Local 10,613 18,533 _ _ _
Own Revenue 254,306 420,218 59.3 58.0 -2.1
Utility 55,010 88,790 12.8 12.3 -4.4
Total Revenue 428,925 724,196  
Sources:   
1)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 2, Table 1, Finances of Special District Governments. 
2)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 3, Table 1, Finances of County Governments. 
3)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 4, Table 1, Finances of Municipal and Township Governments. 
 
A further break down of the revenue source changes by category and type of government in 
Table 3-5 reveals that special district revenue from state, county government or the federal 
government has increased substantially.  It also shows a large decrease for local government 
funding of special districts. 
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[Table 3-5]:  Changes in Revenue Source by Type of Local Government, 1991/92-2001/02 (in 
Mil.) 
Revenue Source 
Percentage Change 1991/92-
2001/02 
Percentage Change in Ratio of 
Revenue Source to Total Revenue, 
1991/92-2001/02 
County
Special 
District
Special 
DistrictMunicipal County Municipal All       
Intergov’t revenue 68.2 50.0 80.5 2.9 6.5 16.5 6.6
 Fed 78.4 72.0 111.7 34.1 16.2 24.1 _
 State 132.5 87.6 125.6 0.8 3.4 37.3 _
 Local 74.7 66.9 149.5 5.2 16.5 -13.3 _
Own Revenue 82.3 88.1 57.6 -2.0 -1.2 -4.6 -2.1
Utility 69.8 59.5 73.5 14.8 -4.8 -4.7 -4.4
Total Revenue 98.9 53.7 73.3 _ _ _
Sources: 
1)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 2, Table 1, Finances of  Special District Governments. 
2)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 3, Table 1, Finances of County Governments. 
3)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 4, Table 1, Finances of  Municipal and Township Governments. 
 
Based on percentage change in ratio of revenue source to total revenue, internal revenue is 
decreasing in the general-purpose county and municipal governments, and especially in special 
districts.  The table also shows that revenue from other governments is increasing by the same 
level.  Table 3-5 shows two groups of governments; grantors and recipients.  The two groups are 
not exclusive, note that the three recipients together comprise the grantor level “local.”  Overall, 
of all government grantors, the federal level has increased its funding the most, and for all types 
of local governments.  For recipients, special districts have benefited the most from funding from 
other governments, although county and municipal funding to special district has declined.  
Peterson (1995) claimed that redistribution is favorable from higher order governments rather 
than lower levels of government, and local governments are preferable for development.  An 
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increase in the percentage change in the revenue source to total revenue ratio of federal and state 
funding of local governments could be seen as an indication of redistribution for economic 
development (Burns, 1994; Lewis,1996).  The table shows that special districts are benefiting the 
most of intergovernmental revenue from federal and state governments.  
 
That revenue source from local governments for counties and municipalities increased by 5.2% 
and 16.5% is apparently an indication of contracting out services to other local governments, 
whereas there is a decrease in local government funding for special districts.  This shows that the 
relationship between local governments in general is enhanced by the transfer payments, except 
for special districts.  The decrease in funding from local governments for special districts is 
13.3%, showing a decrease in strength of relationship between local governments, and loss of 
influence on special districts from the general purpose local governments that sponsored them. 
2. Expenditures 
The comparative position of county governments with municipal or special purpose governments 
is that counties generally exhibit more inclusive governance and the ability to capture 
“economies of scale, and a more stable and equitable tax base” (Berman, 1993: p. 137).  This can 
be seen in the major expenditure category for counties, which was social service and income 
maintenance in the periods 1991/92 and 2001/02 (Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2).  The largest 
expenditure increase can be seen in Public Safety function (see Appendix Table A-6).  Table 3-6 
shows expenditure by local governments and changes between 1991/92 and 2001/02. 
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[Table 3-6]:  Expenditure by Type of Local Government (in Mil.)  
 1991/92 2001/02 Change % Change    
County 110,037 184,640 74,603 67.8
Municipality 125,514 204,351 78,837 62.8
Special District 31,995 59,653 27,658 86.4
Sources: 
1)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 2, Table 1, Finances of  Special District Governments. 
2)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 3, Table 1, Finances of County Governments. 
3)  2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 4, Table 1, Finances of  Municipal and Township Governments. 
Note: Selected expenditure by function (see Appendix Table A-6). 
 
During 1991/92-2001/02, county government expenditure is slightly less than municipal 
government.  However the percentage change in expenditure in current dollar figure is higher 
than that of municipal government, although lagging behind special districts. 
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County Expenditure by Functions (%), 1991/92
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Figure 3-1:  Proportion of County Expenditure by Functions, 1991/92 
 
County Expenditure by Functions (%), 2001/02
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Figure 3-2:  Proportion of County Expenditure by Functions, 2001/02 
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Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 illustrate county proportional expenditure to total expenditure for six 
major service functions.  Although there are current dollar differences for expenditure, the 
proportion of expenditure for administration, library, environment and housing, public safety, 
and transportation account for nearly 50% of total expenditure.  However, social service and 
income maintenance functions represent more than 40% of expenditures during 1991/92 to 
2001/02. 
 
Municipality Expenditure by Functions (%),  1991/92
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Figure 3-3:  Proportion of Municipality Expenditure by Functions, 1991/92 
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Municipality Expenditure by Functions (%),  2001/02
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Figure 3-4:  Proportion of  Municipality Expenditure by Functions, 2001/02 
 
During the period between 1991/92 and 2001/02, the services in which municipal government 
spent the most are in two types of service categories.  They are public safety, and environment 
and housing, with proportional service level at nearly 30% for each function.  The least area is 
library service.  The largest expenditure increase can be seen in transportation, by 71.9% (See 
Appendix Table A-6, municipal column).  And the least increased area is social service and 
income maintenance (Also see Appendix Table A-6, municipal column). 
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Special District Expenditure by Functions (%), 1991/92
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Figure 3-5:  Proportion of Special District Expenditure by Functions, 1991/92 
 
Special District Expenditure by Functions (%), 2001/02
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Figure 3-6:  Proportion of Special District Expenditure by Functions, 2001-2002 
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The figures above show functions performed by special districts.  By comparing the proportions 
of special district to total area, county to total area, and municipal to total area expenditures to 
each other, a remarkable distinction can be seen in that the highest proportion of special district 
expenditure is in environment and housing as well as high proportion in social service and 
income maintenance (See Appendix Table A-6, special district column for details).  The most 
change has occurred in library, transportation, and public safety functions with more than 100% 
increase during 1991/92 and 2001/02 (See Appendix Table A-6, special district column for 
details). 
3.4.1 Division of Labor Between Local Governments  
Emile Durkheim (1933) states that a “division of labor” increases productive capacity and skill, 
and is a necessary condition for development in societies because specialization decreases 
competition, enabling individuals to live together in larger communities.  Division of labor for 
public management at the local level is of course performed by units within a government.  It can 
also be divided among the three types of local governments, but often isn’t because there is no 
institutional structure or strong incentive to do so.  It is important to develop a better 
understanding of the complex set of tasks involved in service provision for jurisdictionally 
fragmented metropolitan areas.  Miller’s “Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index,” MPDI, is 
designed to index of fragmentation in metropolitan regions, and in this paper I am using it to 
examine the division of service contribution by the different types of local governments. 
 
Miller’s MPDI is an elaboration of a calculation from Herfindal’s approach, from the number of 
governments and the expenditures of each one.  The scale of the MPDI is intended to show that 
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smaller values indicate more centralization, and the larger numbers show more decentralization 
in the metropolitan region.  The difference between the Herfindal and MPDI methods is in the 
weighting of the levels of service contribution from the governments.  Herfindal’s method is the 
square of the percentage of each government’s expenditure of the total expenditure within a 
region.  The MPDI uses the square root of the percentage contribution of each government’s 
expenditure of the total area expenditure, so it is more sensitive to the smaller units of 
government (Paytas, 2001). 
3.5 SUMMARY 
The three types of local government share responsibility to deliver services to the citizens, but 
their history, jurisdiction, revenue and expenditures, and relationship to the state government are 
different.  Taken as a whole, only the state administration services provided by counties can be 
identified with one type of government, all other services may be provided by any local 
government type. 
 
County governments take a large role within the network of intergovernmental relationships for 
service provision.  The county works to improve agricultural practices, and environment 
problems, and to expand partnerships with state and federal government.  Locally, county 
governments serve as a partner to local units of government, a service participant from the legal 
and fiscal arm of the state in dealing with townships and special district, as a participant in 
voluntary regional conferences, and an arbiter in disputes among municipal governments or 
special districts with regional impact. 
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Over the last half century, there has been a movement away from structural regionalism by 
establishment of regional governance structure such as annexation, consolidation or metropolitan 
council in some metropolitan areas.  Currently, regional service provision has been an important 
aspect to manage fiscal stress and promote equity.  Administrative regionalism has been adopted 
by some metropolitan areas such as in New Jersey.  Administrative and fiscal regionalism enable 
governments to close the gap of area wide service provision by creating a regional service 
organization. 
 
Property tax generation for both counties and municipalities has declined over the century, while 
there has been increasing rate of property tax generation in special district, indicating increasing 
importance of special districts in service provision.  During 1991/92-2001/02, although 
proportion of functions has remained steady for municipalities, there has been a fluctuation in 
levels of service functions for both counties and special districts. 
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4.0  BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURE GROWTH CONTROL 
In the previous chapter, the structure of local governments and trends of revenue and expenditure 
were discussed.  In this chapter, issues concerning budgeting and public management will be 
addressed to show how management of expenditures might indicate other positive governance 
traits. 
 
Service expenditures are a process which begins with budgeting.  The major role of budgeting is 
to plan for the allocation of resources for public service provision based on implied importance 
or priority.  However, most budget differs only incrementally1 from previous budgets, a practice 
which promotes stability and predictability.  Shafritz and Russell (2000: p. 442) state that 
budgeting is the single most important decision-making process in public institutions.  Budgets 
simultaneously record policy decision outcomes, cite policy priorities and program objectives, 
and delineate a government’s total service effort. 
                                                 
1 “Incrementalism” is Lindblom’s (1959) term for a style of public policy that changes in incremental ways, and 
which, over time, approaches effective and equitable policy.  Lindblom observed that many decision makers started 
with the issue and the history of previous policies, then made a choice between minor alternative changes to the 
current policy.  In practice the incremental method allows policy makers to disregard completely impractical 
alternatives, and encourages feedback, frequent re-evaluation, and further incremental policy adjustments. 
 
The budgetary process reinforces this tendency because the year-on-year budgets are most often based on previous 
years (Jones, Baumgartner, and True, 1998). 
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4.1 BUDGET MAXIMIZATION, FISCAL CONTROL, AND ROLE OF PUBLIC 
MANAGERS 
The behavior of budget maximization stems from bureaucrats’ attempt to increase their budget 
for their utility, such as salary, seniority, and promotion (Niskanen’s, 1974).  According to Lynn 
(1991), bureaucrats seek larger discretionary budgets and public managers are not goal or output 
oriented.  Given this situation, it appears that spending faces many pressures to continually 
increase.  It is assumed that citizen demand for services is at least constant, so in order to 
improve service delivery performance, it is necessary to limit expenditures.  Aucoin states that 
bureaucracies have not been influential at promoting budgetary restraint (1991).  Since the 
natural inclination is for budgets to increase, control of the increase can be attributed to 
professionalism and managerial competence. 
4.2 REFORM MOVEMENT AND PERFORMANCE: EFFECTIVE COST CONTROL 
American public administration is largely influenced by the systematic management of 
government, Germany’s Cameralism, which came to prominence in the U.S. with Woodrow 
Wilson’s “The Study of Administration,” in 1887 (Heady, 1996).  Since then, a sharp dichotomy 
between politics and administration made by Frank J. Goodnow (1893) and Leonard D. White 
(1955) has been prevalent in public administration to preserve administrative neutrality (Shafritz 
and Russell, 2000; Kemp, 2002).  In later years, adoption of scientific management contributed 
to rational management in public administration2 (Merkle, 1980).  Likewise, Max Weber’s ideal 
                                                 
2 Scientific management has contributed in three ways: 1) the idea of public efficiency became the core of a political 
program to solve social and economic distribution; 2) scientific management entered a powerful alliance with the 
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type bureaucracy3 had a similar effect for improving executive function (Gerth and Mills, 1946).  
These features are more likely to be found in council-elected executive or council-manager 
forms of government rather than commission governments. 
 
Along with the incentive for public managers to limit expenditures for their professional interest 
in their government, there is also a personal incentive to do so.  “City managers are highly 
mobile and participate in a highly competitive labor market.  A history of cost-efficient 
management should enhance the individual’s market value.  Although such an incentive may 
operate for elected officials in terms of electability, limited mobility and electoral politics are 
likely to reduce its importance severely” (Ferris, 1986: p. 294). 
 
Council-manager and council-elected executive forms of government are perceived as reformed 
government (Snider, 1957; DeSantis and Renner, 1994), and thus more professional.  “Reform 
agencies are more likely to routinize their program operation, adapt to redistributive program 
missions, and in the end, develop a modus vivendi that supports the redistributive goals.  Under 
these circumstances, policy stability tends to prevail” (Wong, 1988: p. 9).  It is assumed the 
metropolitan counties with the best expenditure management performance exhibit 
professionalism and accountability.  These characteristics are related to effectiveness because of 
expert knowledge, merit-based decision-making, and transparency. 
                                                                                                                                                             
progressive movement as it became the substance of doctrine of government reform; and 3) it played an important 
role in the campaign of the civil service reformers to define “administrative” problems as separate from political 
ones.  Hence impartial administration systems could be run scientifically for the benefit of society as a whole, for 
example, merit principles of staffing over patronage. 
 
3  German sociologist Max Weber defined bureaucracy to be hierarchical organizations that function to carry out 
policies.  The common usage of bureaucracy in a government implies 1) division of labor; 2) hierarchy; 3) written 
documentation; 4) staff of trained experts; 5) full working capacity of the official; and 6) general rules. 
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4.2.1 Professionalism 
In the modern progressive era, better performance is based largely on expert knowledge which 
implies that institutions recruit professionals.  Professionals can distinguish office from home 
affairs, hence promote accountable organizational bureaucracy.  An early definition of 
professionalism in bureaucracy stems from sociologist Max Weber’s (1946) writing in which he 
states that a professionally trained administrator is recruited on the basis of individual merit 
instead of a traditional system where officials gain and retain their positions by virtue of birth or 
political sponsorship.  A professional is “a member of an occupation requiring specialized 
knowledge that can be gained only after intensive preparation.  Professional occupations tend to 
possess three features; a body of academic and practical knowledge that is applied to the service 
of society, a standard of success theoretically measured by serving the needs of society rather 
than seeking purely personal gain, and a system of control over the professional practice” 
(Shafritz and Russell, 2000). 
 
To promote the practice of performance in the United States, the federal government created the 
Civil Service Commission in 1883 to separate federal recruitment from politics.  The role of 
public managers has been defined formally and in the public consciousness as an objective 
professional removed from policy or politics, focusing on administrative processes such as 
efficiency (Wilson, 1887; Ammons and King, 1983; Pammer, 1990).  In “The principle of public 
administration,” Woodrow Wilson (1887: p. 197) states that administration “… is the object of 
administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and 
secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least 
possible cost of either money or of energy.”  Application of expert knowledge in metropolitan 
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governance facilitates an increase in administrative capacity and effective process of policy 
choice because policy choice is likely to be based more on professional criteria rather than the 
competing demands of interest groups or elected officials (Pammer, 1990). 
 
“A jurisdiction’s merit system, if it has one, consists of all those members of the civil service 
who are selected by a formally established merit process”  (Shafritz and Russell, 2000: p. 372).  
State and local government began to institute civil service commission influenced by the 
Pendleton Act of 1883.  According to Shafritz and Russell (2000), by 1999 less than 10 percent 
of county governments had adopted a merit system.  One factor contributing to the adoption of 
new forms of government is recruitment or appointment to governance of professional personnel.  
“Professional control over public resources are reinforced by the merit system in personnel 
promotion and recruitment, task routinization, and shared professional identification with the 
organizational mission.  Professionalization of local administration has been fostered by both the 
local reform movement and the proliferation of federal programmatic guidance” (Wong, 1988: p. 
9). 
4.2.2 Accountability  
For effective management, performance should be evaluated within the context of the New 
Public Management.  According to Barzelay (2001), The New Public Management (NPM)4 is a 
                                                 
3 The New Public Management is defined as: 1) It refers to distinctive themes, styles, and patterns of public service 
management in the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand which appeared in the early 1990s.  These (NPM) ideas about 
management spread rapidly to other countries; 2) It is a valid framework for making decision about how to structure 
and manage public service, which is based on a theoretical idea about organization and management that is from a 
mainstream position in economics and political science; 3) It is an empirical style of organizing public services, 
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multidisciplinary technical approach which addresses both feasibility and desirability in terms of  
how public management should be conducted and coordinated through expenditure, planning and 
financial management, civil service and labor relations, audit and evaluation.  New Public 
Management recognizes the relationship between the effectiveness of the management strategy 
and the need for democratic accountability.  In the current complex environment with multiple 
clients and interest, accountability can be most effectively accomplished when the controlling 
instruments of performance measurement are directly linked to service providers as 
responsibility centers, and the public managers responsible for delivering specific goods and 
services are known to the citizens. 
4.3 INCREASING ROLES OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
County government is a dominant service provider by level of expenditure as well as level of 
services in the six functions described in Figures 3-1 and 3-2.  Although the total amount of 
expenditure and number of service functions of counties are lower than those of municipalities, 
growth rates for these items are higher for counties (Schneider and Park, 1989; Cigler, 2002; 
Bureau of Census Financial Data, 2002).  County government expenditures are growing faster 
than all local governments except for special districts (Park, 1996; Government Finances from 
Census Bureau, 2002).  Park (1996) states that metropolitan county governments are growing the 
fastest among all counties.  Identifying the determinants of county government growth could 
contribute to sound fiscal policy, help policy makers shape the future of their county; enhance 
                                                                                                                                                             
exemplified by the construction of quasi-markets in the health and education sectors.  Also it encompasses changes 
in government wide systems of financial management, personnel management, procurement, and auditing. 
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the ability of county leaders to plan and predict future government growth and respond more 
effectively to demands for service (Park, 1996). 
4.3.1 Performance Measurement 
According to Ammons (2001), in order to find effectiveness of government, measurement is 
needed to evaluate performance.  It is a direct and quantitative reinforcement mechanism which 
enables administrations to align their planning, budgeting, steering, and controlling activities 
according to output.  This should create a situation in which political decision making bodies will 
no longer debate itemized budgets, but planned and actual performance (Shafritz, 1998: p. 1638).  
Governments need to develop a benchmark, or a standard level of performance (i.e., outcome) 
with which to judge their service program. 
 
An analysis of performance measurement to the county service share in single metropolitan 
counties permits a demonstration of their roles in terms of efficiency, quality, and effectiveness 
which may ultimately determine their relative share of public services funding.  Additionally, the 
ability of the services to demonstrate their efficiency, quality, and effectiveness may ultimately 
determine its relative share of public funding relative to other governments. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
Budgeting and roles of public management interplay for efficient and effective performance in 
public governance.  Performance of expenditure management reflects the outcome of important 
decision-making processes in public institutions for policy priorities and program objectives. 
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 Professionalism facilitates expansion of administrative capacity and effective response to policy 
choice based on specialized knowledge criteria over the competing demands of interest groups or 
elected officials   Accountability in a democracy is when performance measurement are directly 
linked to service providers, which are linked to the public managers responsible, and the citizens 
can find the performance and the managers.  Reformed governments may utilize their 
professional expertise and establish accountability rules to improve governance. 
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5.0   SERVICE PROVISION:  
SINGLE METROPOLITAN COUNTY CASE 
For this study I use 66 economically unified, federal government-designated Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas, with a population over 50,000 that have been single metropolitan counties since 
the 1970s.  This chapter focuses on these small but cohesive single metropolitan counties to 
explore local government service expenditure and economic-demographic conditions within 
metropolitan areas.  Settlement patterns and other historical or geographic characteristics of the 
various regions of the United States make the metropolitan areas similar within regions, and the 
analysis includes some regional comparison. 
 
Single metropolitan counties are situated across all U.S. geographical regions, although there are 
more in the South and West.  Several of these single metropolitan counties are currently 
consolidated with other metropolitan areas, but they retain an individual MSA designation and 
there has been no restructuring (i.e. establishment of metropolitan government) in any of the 
areas. 
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[Table 5-1]:  Mean Number of Local Governments in Single Metropolitan Counties by Region, 
1997 
Region No. of MSA Counties Municipalities* 
Special 
Districts Total Gov’t 
Northeast 8 1 33 33 67 
Midwest 16 1 31 25 57 
South 21 1 11 17 29 
West 21 1 15 62 78 
Total 
(Mean)  1 18 35 54 
Source:  Government Organization, vol. 1, 1997. 
* Includes Cities, Townships 
 
Table 5-1 shows the West region has the largest average number of local governments by having 
the highest number of special districts.  The South region demonstrates the smallest mean 
number of local governments, in both special districts and municipalities.  The Northeast and 
Midwest have on average the highest number of municipalities, and they are also somewhat 
balanced between the number of municipalities and special districts.  The total number of 
government units represents levels of decentralization and the larger the average number of local 
government, in general the larger fiscal decentralization.  According to Nelson (1990), “greater 
fiscal decentralization should occur when citizen preferences for government services are more 
heterogeneous.”  Although the Northeast and Midwest share a similar historical heritage such as 
close proximity of population settlement and industrialization, the Northeast and West are 
considered more decentralized or heterogeneous regions than the Midwest and South by the 
number of local government as well as expenditure dispersion. 
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5.1 LIFE-CYCLE OF SINGLE METROPOLITAN COUNTIES 
As the United States regions were settled at different times, the counties are at different stages in 
the life-cycle regionally, and there are geographic and population density differences also.  For 
example, the Northeast and the Midwest settlement began with towns or townships and expanded 
to cities and municipalities starting in the early 1600s (i.e. the MSA for Poughkeepsie NY).  The 
South and West established cities but do not have townships, and their counties were established 
relatively later than other regions, except for a few such as Fayetteville NC MSA (Governmental 
Organization, 1972-1997; also County Websites).  One differences in the older manufacturing-
centered Northeast and Midwest “rust belt,” and the booming “sun belt” South and West regions 
are the ages of the counties. 
[Table 5-2]:  Life-Cycle of Single Metropolitan Counties by Region 
Central City Pop 
to MSA Pop. (%)3 
% Changes of 
Manufacturing 
Sector 
Employment 
1969-2000*
Towns and 
Township, 
19971
Mean Age 
of County, 
20002,Region 
No. of 
MSA     
% Changes of 
Agricultural 
Sector 
Employment,  
1969-2000* 
Northeast 8 20 222 27.7 -36.9 168.7 
Midwest 16 19 167 54.3 28.2 227.5 
South 21 0 151 48.7 63.7 111.9 
West 21 0 135 44.0 111.4 94.5 
Total 
(Mean)  18.4 158 46.0 58.1 141.2 
Sources: 
1) Government Organization, vol. 1, 1997. 
2) County websites. 
3) City population is from County and City Extra, 2002; metropolitan population is from BEA website. 
* Calculated from BEA website data. 
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The mean age shows that the Northeast and the Midwest single metropolitan counties are older 
than those of other regions.  The proportion of city population in the Northeast exhibits the 
lowest rate compared to other regions, following the life cycle of urban decay from exhaustion of 
natural resources and manufacturing sector plant closings which created population decline.  
Although the average age of counties in the Midwest is older than the South and West, the 
proportion of central city to metropolitan population is the largest (highest city population 
concentration) due to conservation of agricultural land (County and City Extra, 2002; National 
Geography Reference, 2003).  Although the declining manufacturing sector employment in the 
Northeast and Midwest is well understood based on the urban life cycle, the increasing 
agricultural sector employment in these regions is interesting since they have usually been 
known for their manufacturing prowess. 
5.2 DEMOGRAPHY 
Demographic conditions vary across regions for single metropolitan counties.  Northeast 
metropolitan areas maintain the highest density with “hollowing out” central city population.  
Land scale demonstrates the largest land size MSAs with the most population are in the West 
region. 
 
Between 1970 and 2000, population change in the single metropolitan counties increased faster 
than that of the U.S. total population, averaging nearly 60% population increase. 
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[Table 5-3]:  Population and Change in Single Metropolitan Counties by Region, 1970-2000 
 Population Land Size (Sq. Km.) Density 
Region 1970 2000 Change (%) 2000 2000     
Northeast 284,432 330,076 16.8 1,521 809
Midwest 148,484 187,953 25.5 1,735 122
South 166,773 332,029 76.0 2,830 123
West 709,222 1,162,324 84.6 8,168 204
Total (Mean) 349,198 561,049 59.3 4,104 232
Sources:  Census Bureau and County and City Extra, 2002. 
 
Demographic changes and number of governments differ regionally as well.  Although 
population increases can be seen throughout the regions in Table 5-3, most changes have 
occurred in the South and the West regions and the least change can be seen in the Northeast. 
 
In 2000, the largest population in the West region is more than three times the size of other 
regions, while the Midwest has the smallest population.  The Northeast experiences remarkably 
higher density than other regions.  The Midwest and South experience lower density than other 
regions. 
 
The number of governments varies with population, land size, and density measurements.  The 
relationship of numbers of governments to these three variables are shown below. 
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[Table 5-4]:  Correlation Matrix of Number of Governments1 with Demography in Single 
Metropolitan Counties 
Demography2 
No. of Governments, 
1972 
No. of Governments, 
1997 
Population  0.409** 0.717**
Land Size Sq Km 0.113 0.241*
Density 0.014 0.052
Ratio of Central City Pop. to Total Metro. 
Pop. -0.517** -0.355**
1. Includes county, cities, townships, and special districts. 
2. Used 1970 and 2000 data. 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
There is a significant relationship between the number of governments and population for both 
study periods.  The zero order correlation is 0.409 in 1972 and 0.717 in 1997, respectively, with 
significance level at 0.01.  However there is no distinguishable relationship between number of 
governments and land size at significance level less than 0.05, nor between number of 
governments and density.  Population concentration in the central cities has a negative 
relationship with the number of local governments, with significant correlation at -0.517 in 1972 
and –0.355 in 1997. 
5.3 FISCAL CONDITION AND GOVERNANCE 
The role of governments involve three major areas: stability and growth, redistribution, and 
allocation  (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1985 in Mikesell, 1995).  Peterson (1981) developed three 
types of public policies for economic well-being, recognizing that local public policies are 
different, depending on their impact on the economic vitality of the community.  First, 
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developmental policy, which enhances the economic position of the community because there 
are greater positive benefits to costs ratio in areas of land values and higher local governmental 
revenues.  Second, redistributive policy, which provides benefits to low-income residents but at 
the same time these residents negatively affect the local economy.  Third, allocational policy, 
which is more or less neutral in its economic effects because marginal expenditures have neither 
much of a positive nor negative effect on the local economy. 
 
On the whole, all members of the community benefit from the most valued aspects of services; 
policies.  Peterson (1981) states that there are three factors that affect public policies: 1) fiscal 
capacity which affects its level of expenditure because relatively higher local tax rates make a 
community relatively less attractive.  To protect a community’s economic resources from net 
outward flow, tax rates must not be significantly greater in any one community than they are in 
competing areas; 2) the cost of supplying the service which affects level of expenditure; and 3) 
the demand for the service which affects expenditure. 
[Table 5-5]:  Peterson’s Determinants of Local Government Expenditure 
Type of Policy Fiscal Capacity Demand Supply 
Redistributive High  Low 
Allocational Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Developmental Low High Moderate 
Source:  “City Limits” (Peterson, 1981: p. 48). 
 
In order to better understand and facilitate these three factors that affect expenditure, I explore 
two features.  One is revenue raising effort of local government in which community’s wealth 
(income) can represent the level of demand and supply for service provision.  Another is share of 
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service responsibility between local government types.  An understanding can be developed of 
how service provisions are structured in the metropolitan areas as well as local governments’ 
expenditure based on governance structure. 
5.3.1 Revenue Raising Effort 
Ladd and Yinger (1989) measured city’s revenue raising effort with the principle source of 
revenue being resident income.  This is because income represents individual taxpayers’ ability 
to pay, and all taxes are paid from resident’s income.  All counties depend mostly on local 
property tax, and property tax is the most stable local own revenue source for service provision 
(Oates, 2001).  In this paper I use property tax as the revenue source for the metropolitan areas. 
 
Property tax benefits service provision within the jurisdictional boundary (Musgrave in Oats, 
2001: p. 342).  However it is not a favorable revenue source, as there have been many incidents 
of residents’ property tax revolts (Chicoine and Waltzer, 1985: p. 94; Ladd and Yinger, 1989; 
Burns, 1994), and state mandates on property tax limit.  Examples are California’s Proposition 
13 and Massachusetts Proposition 2½.  As shown in the figures and correlation relationship in 
Table 5-6 and Table 5-7, property tax generation has declined across the regions over the past 
two and half decades. 
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[Table 5-6]:  Correlation of Per Capita Income1, Per Capita Property Tax2, and Property Tax 
Generating Effort, 1970 and 2000 
 1970  2000 
 
Per Capita 
Income
Property 
Tax 
Generating 
Effort
Property 
Tax 
Generating 
Effort 
Per 
Capita 
Income
Per Capita 
Property 
Tax
Per Capita 
Property 
Tax      
Per Capita 
Income 1.000 0.753** 0.486**  1.000 0.549** 0.039 
Per Capita 
Property Tax 0.753** 1.000 0.933**  0.549** 1.000 0.833** 
Property Tax 
Gen. Effort 0.486** 0.933 1.000  0.039 0.833** 1.000 
1 Used 1970 and 2000 figures. 
2 Used 1972 and 1997 figures. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
[Table 5-7]:  Property Tax Generating Effort and Change by Region, 1970-2000 
Region Per Capita Income 
Per Capita Property 
Tax 
Property Tax 
Generating Effort 
 1970
% 
Change 
1970-
2000
% 
Change 
1970- 
2000
% 
Change 
1970- 
20002000 1970 2000 1970 2000         
Northeast 4,129 28,632 589.6 199 962 389.9 0.048 0.033 -29.3 
Midwest 3,974 28,342 614.7 217 804 276.9 0.054 0.028 -47.0 
South 3,210 23,247 621.8 111 554 398.3 0.034 0.024 -30.5 
West 4,194 29,370 597.8 247 582 156.6 0.058 0.020 -62.9 
Total 
(Mean) 3,820 27,083 608.5 191 673 290.9 0.048 0.025 -44.7 
 
The change in per capita income in the Northeast is the smallest compared to other regions, and 
yet the percentage change in per capita property tax is relatively higher than the regional mean 
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figure.  This indicates they retain an ability to generate property tax revenue more than other 
regions. 
5.4 SERVICE SHARES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL FISCAL 
CONDITION 
In this section, the relationship between public service expenditure and shares of service 
responsibility  by each type of local government will be explored.  To quantify the service share, 
I use the MPDI calculation but convert the MDPI values for each type of local government into 
percentages of “responsibility share” of service contribution for each of the three types of local 
government in each region. 
 
According to correlations in Table 5-8, the share of service responsibility relationship between 
special districts and municipalities is the most sensitive with negative correlation at  -0.813.  The 
relationship between special district and county is also somewhat negatively sensitive with 
correlation at -0.385. 
[Table 5-8]:  Correlation of Service Responsibility Shares among Local Governments in Single 
Metropolitan Counties, 1992 
 County Municipality Special District1 
County 1.000 -0.196 -0.385*
Municipality -0.196 1.000 -0.813**
Special District -0.385* -0.813** 1.000
1. Includes 65 observations. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
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[Table 5-9]:  Share of Service Responsibility and Percentage Change by Local Governments in 
Single Metropolitan Counties, 1972-1992 
Region No. 
Share of Service Responsibility , 1992 Percentage Change 1972-1992 
County 
Special 
District  County Municipality Municipality     
Special 
District*  
Northeast 8 14.7 64.6 20.7 6.3 -11.1 74.2
Midwest** 16 19.2 64.1 16.7 -9.8 -7.0 333.1
South 21 23.0 56.0 22.0 6.5 -6.6 164.1
West 21 20.6 43.4 36.0 -10.2 -9.7 71.8
Total 
(Mean) 
 20.3 55.0 25.1 -2.8 -8.2 164.8
Source: Calculated from MPDI. 
* Based on 65 observations (excludes Monroe, LA) 
** Computed for Racine, WI and Kenosha, WI from 1977 to 1992 data 
 
Geographically, the Northeast illustrates the largest share of service responsibility for 
municipalities, and the smallest county share of service responsibility.  The Midwest has the 
second highest municipality share, and the smallest share for special districts.  The counties in 
the South have the most share of service responsibility compared to county shares of other 
regions, and the second highest special district share.  This is consistent with the incorporated 
power and responsibility of municipalities in the Northeast and Midwest, and the importance of 
counties in the South.  The trend is an interesting pattern.  County share of service responsibility 
has risen in both the Northeast and South, but it has decreased in the Midwest and West.  While 
the municipality share of responsibility has declined through all regions, special district share of 
responsibility has risen remarkably across all regions.   
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The trend of an increasing special district role throughout the regions reflects scholarly 
observation and discussion of public governance in responding to demographic conditions with 
its changes in socio-economic and political environment (Burns, 1994; Foster,1997b; Ladd, 
1998; Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000). 
[Table 5-10]:  Correlations between Service Shares and Demographic Conditions in Single 
Metropolitan Counties, 2000 
Service Share 
Total 
Population Land Size Sq. Km. Density 
Central City Pop. to 
Total MSA Pop. (%) 
County -0.235 0.129 -0.135 0.528**
Municipality 0.007 -0.522** 0.189 -0.184
Special District 0.128 0.403** -0.103 -0.162
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Some researchers state that there are greater opportunities for the use of special districts in areas 
that are less densely populated (Chicoine and Walzer, 1985: p. 11 and 77-81; Nelson, 1990).  
However Table 5-8 demonstrates that special district use is associated negatively with the service 
share of municipalities.  That is when the metropolitan areas have a large proportion of 
municipalities providing public services, the use of special districts is not as great as those 
metropolitan county areas with less proportion of municipal service share.  Nelson states that 
creation of new municipalities is difficult within large, well-established, cities (1990: p. 455). 
 
A notable factor from Table 5-10 is that as metropolitan areas maintain large populations in the 
central city, the county share of service responsibility has a positive correlation with percentage 
of central city population to total metropolitan population, at 0.528.  Another distinguishable 
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factor is the relationship between land size and special districts; as land size increases, the special 
district share of service responsibility is positively related with correlation at 0.403. 
 
Furthermore, some scholars hold that “special districts may be created to circumvent state-
imposed limits on local property tax rates and debt” (Chicoine and Walzer, 1985), and to cope 
with the inability of local governments to raise revenue and the rising cost of proving public 
services.  Nelson (1990) found there is little evidence that debt limitation is associated with local 
government growth in the metropolitan areas.  Also limiting effect of debt on public expenditure 
is difficult to identify due to institutional information oversight and monopoly power on 
information as well as federal governments de facto tax subsidy to municipalities by not taxing 
municipal bonds (Mikesell, 1995).  To provide a surrogate for the effect of levels of local 
governments’ service provision on expenditure, I correlate property tax information. 
[Table 5-11]:  Correlations between Service Shares and Fiscal Conditions in Single 
 Metropolitan Counties, 1997 
Service Share Per Capita Property Tax 
County -0.262* 
Municipality 0.332** 
Special District1 -0.188  
1.  Based on 65 observations. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 5-11 demonstrates there is a significant positive correlation between municipality service 
share and per capita property tax generation.  Special district use is negatively correlated with per 
capita property tax generation.  Also there is a negative relationship between county service 
share and per capita property tax generation.  It may be that county governments have less ability 
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to generate property tax revenue to meet service needs, hence the single metropolitan counties 
with large proportion of county share are likely to rely on other sources of revenue or alternative 
mechanism such as special districts, which are largely financed through user fees. 
 
Table 5-12 and 5-13 are correlation matrices to demonstrate the relationship among study areas 
in demography, number of local governments, property tax generating effort, and local 
governments’ service shares during 1970-2000. 
 
[Table 5-12]:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure with Demography, Number of Local 
Governments, Property Tax Generating Effort, and Service Shares of Local 
Governments, 1970 
Correlations
1 .343** .416** .174 .327** .783** -.019 -.476** .488**
. .005 .001 .162 .007 .000 .881 .000 .000
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
.343** 1 .211 .180 .409** .209 -.213 .011 .115
.005 . .088 .149 .001 .092 .086 .929 .358
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
.416** .211 1 -.143 .113 .257* .277* -.482** .319**
.001 .088 . .252 .366 .038 .025 .000 .009
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
.174 .180 -.143 1 .014 .156 -.149 .076 .013
.162 .149 .252 . .913 .212 .232 .546 .921
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
.327** .409** .113 .014 1 .191 -.615** -.067 .431**
.007 .001 .366 .913 . .124 .000 .595 .000
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
.783** .209 .257* .156 .191 1 -.001 -.281* .282*
.000 .092 .038 .212 .124 . .996 .022 .022
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
-.019 -.213 .277* -.149 -.615** -.001 1 -.298* -.294*
.881 .086 .025 .232 .000 .996 . .015 .017
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
-.476** .011 -.482** .076 -.067 -.281* -.298* 1 -.825**
.000 .929 .000 .546 .595 .022 .015 . .000
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
.488** .115 .319** .013 .431** .282* -.294* -.825** 1
.000 .358 .009 .921 .000 .022 .017 .000 .
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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[Table 5-13]:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure with Demography, Number of Local 
Governments, Property Tax Generating Effort, and Service Shares of Local 
Governments, 2000 
Correlations
1 .335** .258* .162 .306* .297* -.118 -.198 .235
. .006 .037 .194 .012 .015 .344 .111 .060
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
.335** 1 .261* .230 .717** -.117 -.235 .007 .128
.006 . .034 .063 .000 .351 .058 .959 .310
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
.258* .261* 1 -.140 .241 -.106 .129 -.522** .403**
.037 .034 . .261 .051 .396 .303 .000 .001
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
.162 .230 -.140 1 .052 .233 -.135 .189 -.103
.194 .063 .261 . .680 .059 .279 .129 .414
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
.306* .717** .241 .052 1 .002 -.563** -.057 .371**
.012 .000 .051 .680 . .984 .000 .649 .002
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
.297* -.117 -.106 .233 .002 1 -.213 .336** -.223
.015 .351 .396 .059 .984 . .086 .006 .074
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
-.118 -.235 .129 -.135 -.563** -.213 1 -.196 -.385**
.344 .058 .303 .279 .000 .086 . .115 .002
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
-.198 .007 -.522** .189 -.057 .336** -.196 1 -.813**
.111 .959 .000 .129 .649 .006 .115 . .000
66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65
.235 .128 .403** -.103 .371** -.223 -.385** -.813** 1
.060 .310 .001 .414 .002 .074 .002 .000 .
65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
 
For the period between 1970 and 2000, there are significant relationships between per capita 
expenditure and demographic conditions for population and land size, and also between the 
number of governments and expenditures.  Property tax generating effort and special district 
service share exhibit significant relationships with expenditure, by at least 0.1 level for both 
periods.   
 
 76
There are two parts to this finding of a relationship between property tax generating effort and 
service share of local government types; a proportional spending pattern between special district 
and county service share, and a disproportional spending pattern between special district and 
municipal service share.  Furthermore, the special district service share relationship with counties 
is apparent only in 2000, but the municipal relationship holds for both time periods. 
 
First, for the special district and municipal relationship, there appears to be a pendulum-like 
effect between expenditures by municipalities and special districts, as municipal governments 
tend to sponsor special districts in response to economic development or fiscal stress when 
property tax effort declines in response to political pressure.  The effect is to transfer the 
spending from one type of government to the other.  When special districts are no longer needed 
they are disbanded, thus moving the expenditures back to municipal governments, or if the 
service is no longer needed, the expenditure is no longer part of the special district service share.  
This finding provides some statistical evidence for this effect in part, which has been discussed 
for the special district usage for development and fiscal stress (Burns, 1994; Ladd, 1998; 
MacManus, 1981). 
 
Second, the relationship between metropolitan area (county) property tax generating effort and 
county and special district service share is similar.  County expenditures rise in response to 
economic development or fiscal stress as counties provide additional services in unincorporated 
areas, and likewise sponsor special districts in these areas in response to political pressures.  
Overall spending for counties rises for services already provided by the county for the region, 
resulting in a proportional spending service share between counties and special districts.  This 
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exists in the year 2000 but not 1970, more likely because suburban expansion in unincorporated 
areas was not as present in 1970 as it was several decades later. 
 
The positive correlation between the four explanatory variables and expenditure suggests 
generally that the metropolitan areas with larger population, land size, density, and number of 
governments have more service responsibility per capita in the case of single metropolitan 
counties.  Also, property tax generating effort and special district service share have a positive 
relationship with per capita expenditure.  I employ these variables to examine changes in 
expenditure for forms of county government and for types of local governments in the single 
metropolitan counties.  This result will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
5.5 SERVICE PROVISION AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
The forms of government in counties and municipalities are somewhat similar.  The traditional 
form of government is the commission for both counties and townships, and the changes from 
this form to a single executive (county executive or mayor) or professional county or municipal 
manager, between the 1970s and 2002 are also similar. 
 
During the period 1974-2002, nearly 25% of single metropolitan counties changed government 
form (Municipal Year Book 1975 and 2003).  Most changes have occurred in the Northeast 
region followed by the Midwest, with the least change in the South, followed by the West. 
 
Municipal central city government structures have also changed during 1971-2002.  By regional 
mean measure, 15.5% of central city governments have changed their form of government.  Most 
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changes have occurred in the Northeast and the South regions.  Table 5-14 illustrates the 
changes. 
[Table 5-14]:  Percentage of Forms of County and Central City Government in 2002 and 
Governmental Structure Change in Single Metropolitan Counties by Region 
 County Central City1 
Region No 
Council
-Elected 
Exec.
% 
Change, 
1970s-
2002
% 
Change, 
1970s-
2002
Council
-Mgr No 
Mayor-
Council
Council-
Mgr CommComm       
Northeast 8 75.0 0.0 25.0 37.5 7 87.5 12.5 0.0 28.6 
Midwest 16 43.8 12.5 43.8 31.2 15 50.0 43.8 6.3 6.7 
South 21 14.3 9.5 76.2 14.3 18 23.8 66.7 9.5 22.2 
West 21 14.3 61.9 23.8 23.8 18 9.5 90.5 0.0 11.1 
Mean (%)  28.8 25.8 45.5 24.2  33.3 62.1 4.5 15.5 
Sources:  The County Year Book, 1975 and The Municipal Year Book, 1979 and 2003. 
1.  Used 58 observations for municipality. 
 
The columns showing structural change in Table 5-14 are for any change in government form by 
2002.  The most changes are from the commission form of government to an elected executive 
for counties, at over 81%.  Within the changes of forms of central city form of governments 
between 1970s and 2002, the most change is adoption of mayor-council form of city government 
at over 55%.  
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[Table 5-15]:  Shares of Service Responsibility1 by Form of County Government2 in Single 
Metropolitan Counties by Region 
 Council-manager Council-elected Executive Commission 
Region County Muni SD County Muni SD County Muni SD         
Northeast n/a n/a n/a 15.6 65.3 19.1 12.2 62.5 25.3
Midwest 17.3 66.1 16.6 19.7 68.4 11.9 19.2 59.3 21.5
South 12.2 65.1 22.8 36.4 58.9 7.2 21.8 54.4 23.8
West 20.6 42.9 36.5 19.7 35.6 44.7 21.1 49.3 29.6
Total (Mean)  19.2 48.2 32.5 21.0 60.7 19.2 20.5 55.2 24.3
Sources: 1) Miller’s MPDI database with author’s calculation for year 1992. 
               2) Municipal Year Book, 2003 for year 2002 county government forms. 
 
Using the mean shares of service responsibility, the county share of service shows remarkable 
similarity regardless of the form of government.  The South stands out, with 36% service share 
for the counties which are council-elected executives, and 21% share for counties with a 
commission, which is in contrast to the numbers, because 76% of the southern counties have a 
commission form of government. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter is an exploration of MSA per capita expenditures for service provision and own 
source of property tax revenue generation, and the share of the services provided by type of local 
government in single county MSAs. 
 
This selection was made because for this group, there is a regional MSA-level government, the 
county.  Thus there can be an exploration of the relationships between service provision and 
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government structure, as well as changes in the government structure regionally, by using the 
county government.  In doing so, it lays the groundwork for future MSA studies with multiple-
county and consolidated MSAs.  There are historical, geographical, and demographic reasons to 
use regions of the United States to compare MSAs. 
 
The Northeast demonstrates the oldest county governments, with the most number of 
municipalities and with the lowest percentage of central city to county population.  This region 
has the lowest rate of population increase.  And although county government service share has 
been in decline between 1972 and 1992, positive change of county government service share has 
occurred in this region, unlike the Midwest and the West.  Property tax generating effort is in 
overall decline, but it remains the highest in the Northeast region in 2000 compared to other 
regions.  The West uses special districts the most, while changes in service share for special 
district is the highest in the Midwest.  In the Northeast, council-elected executive form of 
government is used the most in 2002.  In the 1970s to 2002, change in county government form 
is the highest in the Northeast.  
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6.0  METHODOLOGY 
In earlier chapters, characteristics of local government structure and issues related to service 
provision were discussed, including form of government, as well as revenue sources and 
expenditures for each type of local government.  The single metropolitan county case study in 
Chapter 5 further explored these characteristics in light of the economic-demographic conditions 
which may be associated with service provision.  The concept of service responsibility share was 
introduced.  This chapter explains how these factors are analyzed and prepares for the discussion 
and hypothesis testing in Chapter 7. 
 
Demographic conditions have long been a primary factor for service expenditure, and for the last 
several decades, there has been great pressure on public service providers due to increasing 
demand of services with low cost.  Citizen’s resistance to property taxation and increasing 
governmental unit fragmentation are persistent.  During the last half century the number of 
special districts has almost doubled.  Apparently this is to separate development from standard 
government services or to shift costs when general revenue is declining.  The public sector is 
seeking and applying new strategies to cope with these constraints, as the majority of counties 
use traditional commission form of governmental structure.  Some counties have changed 
governmental structure during the study period. 
 
As described in the introduction, this dissertation is organized with a two stage analysis.  The 
first stage is a study of service provision by way of public expenditure.  The influencing factors 
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that are considered are demography, government fragmentation, fiscal capacity, and proportional 
share of special district service responsibility for 1970 and 2000.  The first stage analysis will 
facilitate the second stage study for relationships between growth in service expenditure and 
economic-demographic conditions in two areas: 1) for governmental structure; and 2) when 
public services are divided into local governments’ proportional share of service responsibility. 
 
Studying the single metropolitan county MSAs as a set offers an opportunity to improve 
understanding of the complexity involved in the metropolitan areas because these MSAs are a 
single entity.  This enables metropolitan as well as county information to be used for a full 
representation of these MSAs.  The table below shows the major elements related to governance, 
and hypothesized assumptions. 
[Table 6-1]:  Hypothesized Assumptions and Controlled Variables on Expenditure Performance 
Variables  Assumption 
Demography and Fragmentation   
 Population  Positive 
 Land Size  Positive 
 Density  Positive/Negative 
 No. of Local Governments in MSAs  Negative 
Revenue Generation   
 Property Tax Generating Effort  Positive 
Service Share    
 County Service Share  Positive 
 Municipal Service Share  Negative 
 Special District Service Share  Positive 
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6.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1.  Is governmental structure associated with performance of area-wide expenditure? 
2.  Does local government’s share of service responsibility contribute to area-wide 
expenditure performance? 
6.1.1 Dependent and Independent Variables 
[Table 6-2]:  Dependent and Independent Variables 
First Stage Exploration Second Stage Exploration 
Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
 Per Capita Expenditure for Service Performed for 1970 
and 2000 
 Governmental Structure 
  Reformed:  Council-manager 
   Council-elected Executive 
  Unreformed: Commission 
  Governmental Structure Change 
  Change in Share of Service Responsibility by Types of 
Local Governments 
  County 
  Municipality 
  Special District 
  
Independent Variables  Independent Variables  
 Population  Growth of Expenditure (% change between 1970 and 
      2000) 
 Land Size  Economic Condition 
 Density  % Change in Services Sector Employment 
 Number of Local Governments (County, municipality,  
     and special district) 
 No. of Manufacturing Sector Establishment 
 Property Tax Generating Effort (Ratio of per capita  
    property tax to per capita income) 
 Demographic Condition 
 Special District Share of Service Responsibility  Percentage of City Pop. to Total MSA Pop. 
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6.2 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This study uses a combined analytical approach of a qualitative and quantitative nature, with a 
two time-point data analysis in the period 1970-2000.  Regression analysis is performed to 
observe service expenditure growth (percentage change).  In order to examine growth in service 
expenditure for reformed and unreformed metropolitan counties, and for metropolitan counties 
with more or less  use of each type of local government, a grid analysis based on mean values is 
adopted.  Hypothesis will be tested to substantiate mean differences using t-statistics. 
6.3 DATA SOURCE  
A research study on county governments from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations published in 1971 listed single county metropolitan areas.  I tracked the single county 
status into the year 2000 using the County and City Extra, 2002.  Over this time, three 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas experienced changes in their FIPS identification number.  In these 
cases, if an area matched by county name and geographic size in the earlier and later sources, the 
MSA is included in the study.  This data set also includes 15 MSAs that became part of a larger 
consolidated MSA during the study period.  Since the federal government maintained the 
identifying FIPS number for these urban county MSAs throughout the study period, they must 
have some cohesive economic activity apart from their inclusion in the consolidated MSA, and 
so they remain part of the study group for this paper (see Appendix Table A-2).  Single 
metropolitan counties in 1971 with discontinued FIPS numbers in later editions were excluded 
from the study.  The resulting data set is 66 Metropolitan Statistical Areas that remained single 
counties.  Other sources for information are listed in Table 6-3. 
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[Table 6-3]:  Data Sources for Variables 
Categories  Data Source Information 
Governance Structure  The County Year Book, 1975  
The Municipal Year Book, 1970 and 
2003 
 Governmental Structure for 
1970s and 2000s 
     
Demography  BEA from web 
(www.bea.gov/bea/regional/data.htm)
Bureau of Census (www.census.gov) 
County and City Data Book, 2002 
 Population, 1970 
Population, 2000 
Land Size, 1970 and 2000 
 
     
Economy  BEA from web 
(www.bea.gov/bea/regional/data.htm)
County and City Data Book, 2002 
 Industry and Employment, 
1969-2000 
No. of Manufacturing Sector 
Establishment, 1997 
     
Finance  2002 U.S. Census of Governments, 
vol. 4, no. 2-4, for Finances of Local 
Governments 
 
1972 and 1997 Census of 
Governments. Vol. 4, Government 
Finances.  No. 5, Compendium of 
Government Finances.   
 General Revenue and 
Expenditure 
 
 
Federal and State Grants 
     
Property Tax  
Generating Effort 
 County and City Data Book, 1977 
County and City Extra, 2002  
 
BEA for Income Data, 1970 and 2000 
(www.bea.gov/bea/regional/data.htm)
 
 Per Capita Property Tax; Per 
Capita Expenditure, 1972 and 
1997  
Per Capita Income, 1970 and 
2000 
     
Fragmentation  Governmental Organization, vol. 1; 
1977; Government Organization, vol. 
1, 1997 
 Number of Governments for 
1972 and 1997 
     
Service Provision of 
Local Governments 
 Miller’s MPDI Database, 1972-1992   Shares of Service 
Responsibility between Local 
Government Types, 1972-
1992 
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 All financial values are presented in constant dollars because the focus of the financial aspect of 
the study is to examine proportional expenditures at a particular point in time, and compare 
expenditure growth between two points in time.  Proportions are unaffected, and the comparative 
differences between the rates are the same, so conversion to real dollars was not performed. 
6.4 OPERATIONALIZATION 
1. Property Tax Generating Effort 
In the U.S., property tax has long been a primary revenue source for local governments 
(Bowman, MacManus, and Mikesell, 1992; Cigler, 1996: p. 175), and so it is used in this study.  
However, differences in assessment values, property tax rate, and other jurisdictional variables 
make comparisons of property tax revenues less desirable for comparison purposes.  Therefore, 
to operationalize tax generating effort, Ladd and Yinger’s (1989) concept that resident income is 
the principle determinant of revenue-generating capacity is used.  Income represents individual 
taxpayers’ ability to pay, because all taxes are paid from resident’s income, for example, citizens 
with higher incomes tend to live in higher-priced homes with higher valuations. 
 
Tax generating effort is a way to describe the availability of the tax.  Property tax generating 
effort is expressed as “ratio of per capita property tax to per capita income.”  The lower the ratio, 
the greater the revenue potential of per capita property tax generation in the metropolitan area.  
Distressed communities tend to have a higher value of the property tax generating effort. 
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PTGE=PT/Y, where 
PTGE=Property tax generating effort 
PT=Per capita property tax 
Y=Per capita income 
2. Share of Service Responsibility 
Miller’s Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index (MPDI) is computed as a proportional share of 
overall service contribution for each type of local government. 
 
a. County share of service responsibility:  County portion of total MPDI 
b. Municipality share of service responsibility:  Municipality portion of total MPDI 
c. Special district share of service responsibility: Special District portion of total MPDI 
 
The higher the percentage of service responsibility share for a particular government type within 
a Metropolitan area, the greater is the service provision role for that type of government in the 
area. 
[Table 6-4]:  Comparison Between MPDI and Proportional Service Share of Local Government 
in Metropolitan Areas 
MSA 
MPDI, 1992 Proportion (%) 
County
Special 
District
Special 
DistrictMunicipality Total County Municipality       
% 
Total  
Los Angeles-
-Long Beach   0.67 3.77 1.61 6.06 11.1 62.2 26.6 100.0
Source: Miller’s Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index. 
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Table 6-4 illustrates the proportional share of service responsibility for the local governments for 
the Los Angeles–Long Beach MSA.  By proportional measurement, it is clear that the 
municipality share of service responsibility is the largest in this metropolitan area, while special 
district’s role accounts for 26.6% and county’s role is 11.1%.  The proportional measurement 
also provides ease of interpretation of the relative use of government types for service provision. 
 
3. Governmental Structure 
 
a. Council-manager 1 = If council-manager form of government; 
 0 = Not council-manager form of government 
b. Council-elected executive: 1 = If council-elected executive form of government;  
 0 =Not council-elected executive form of government 
c. Commission 1 = If commission form of government; 
 0 = Not commission form of government 
4. Governmental Structure Change 
a. County governmental structure change: 1 = Changed; 
  0 = Not changed 
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6.5 MODEL EQUATIONS AND EXPLANATION 
There are three equations for evaluation of service expenditure in metropolitan counties; 1) 
expenditure performance for 1970 and 2000; 2) growth in expenditure expressed as rate of 
change or percentage change of predicted values between 1970 and 2000; and 3) percentage 
change in service share for each type of local government between 1972 and 1992. 
 
Expenditure Performance = ƒ(Pop, Land, Density, NoGovt, TaxEfft, SDSS), where 
 Expenditure Performance = Single metropolitan county per capita expenditure 
         (SMCtyPer) 
 Pop = Single metropolitan county population 
 Land = Single metropolitan county land size 
 Den = Single metropolitan county density 
 Gov = Single metropolitan county number of government 
 TaxEfft = Single metropolitan county property tax generating effort 
 SDSS = Single metropolitan county special district service share 
 
Estimation of expenditure performance for single metropolitan counties as dependent variable is 
expressed as; 
 Y = α +β1Pop + β2Land + β3Den + β4Gov +β5TaxEfft + β6SDSS +ε 
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6.5.1 Models 
Model 1 
Yt = α + β1Pop + β2Land + β3Den + β4Gov + ε, where  
 t = 1970 or 2000 
 
Model 2 
Yt = α + β1Pop + β2Land + β3Den + β4Gov + β5TaxEfft + ε, where  
 t = 1970 or 2000 
 
Model 3 
Yt = α + β1Pop + β2Land + β3Den + β4Gov +β5TaxEfft + β6SDSS + ε, where  
 t = 1970 or 2000 
 
6.5.2 Growth in Expenditure 
Growth in Expenditure = ƒ(Percentage change in predicted values), where  
 Percentage change in expenditure(1970-2000) =  
 197019702000 )(
∧∧∧
ΥΥ−Υ  
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6.5.3 Changes in Share of Service Responsibility by Each Type of Local Government 
1. Change in County Service Share(1972-1992) = (CtySS1992-CtySS1972)/CtySS1972, where 
(CtySS1992-CtySS1972)/CtySS1972 = Percentage change in proportion of county service share 
between 1972 and 1992 
2. Change in Municipal Service Share(1972-1992) = (MuniSS1992-MuniSS1972)/MuniSS1972, where 
(MuniSS1992-MuniSS1972)/MuniSS1972 = Percentage change in proportion of municipal 
service share between 1972 and 1992 
3. Change in Special District Service Share(1972-1992) = (SDSS1992-SDSS1972)/SDSS1972, where 
(SDSS1992-SDSS1972)/SDSS1972 = Percentage change in proportion of special district service 
share between 1972 and 1992 
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7.0  ANALYSIS OF COST CONTROL PERFORMANCE:  
SINGLE METROPOLITAN COUNTY CASE 
The major aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between growth in service 
expenditure and economic-demographic conditions for single metropolitan counties.  This 
relationship is explored in two areas.  One is comparing counties by reformed or unreformed 
government, which is done by direct comparison and by comparing the unreformed counties with 
those metropolitan counties that changed to a reformed government during the study period.  The 
second area is comparing the service provision relationships between expenditure growth and 
economic-demographic conditions when public services are divided into local governments’ 
proportional share of service responsibility. 
 
Hypothesis testing is performed in order to clarify previous researchers’ findings regarding the 
relationship between service expenditure and governmental structure, and the relationship 
between service expenditure and use of local governments.  By correlating expenditure growth 
and change in service share for each government type, negative relationships are exhibited 
between the expenditure growth and changes in both county and municipal service shares.  There 
is a positive relationship between expenditure growth and change in special district service share.  
The zero order correlation is not meaningful for the county service share finding, while the 
relationships are noteworthy for both the municipal service share and for special district service 
share changes (at -0.481 with significance level at 0.01 and 0.255 with significance level at 0.05, 
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respectively).  Since the correlations have a low level, I split the data into two groups for each 
type of government’s service share, Increase and Decrease service share. 
 
The two sample t-test with non-equal variance assumption will be performed using SPSS for all 
hypothesis testing5.  The relationships are examined using two-group mean analysis between 
growth in expenditure and economic-demographic conditions for metropolitan county 
governmental structure, and for the local governments share of service responsibility.  Table 7-1 
demonstrates regressed results for expenditure performance for years 1970 and 2000. 
                                                 
5  The equation used for hypothesis testing is: Τ = ( ) ( )222121
21
nsns
XX
+
−
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[Table 7-1]  Regression Results of Performance (Per Capita Expenditure for Service Performed) 
in Single Metropolitan Counties 
 1970  2000 
 
Beta 
Unstand.   Stand. t-stat  
Beta 
Unstand.   Stand. t-stat 
Model 1        
 Population 0.00001957 0.131 1.080  0.00006033 0.139 0.787 
 Land Size 0.01157 0.392 3.559***  0.02501 0.207 1.671** 
 Density 0.04345 0.204 1.856**  0.127 0.151 1.218 
 No. of Gov’t 0.832 0.226 1.945**  1.723 0.148 0.874 
        
 Intercept 303.575  11.719***  2302.347  19.262*** 
 R2 0.317    0.170   
 F 7.091    3.123   
 No. of Observation 66    66   
        
Model 2        
 Population 0.00001256 0.084 1.043  0.0001125 0.260 1.508* 
 Land Size 0.006601 0.224 2.964***  0.02630 0.218 1.859** 
 Density 0.01819 0.085 1.152  0.04234 0.050 0.411 
 No. of Gov’t 0.509 0.138 1.779**  0.740 0.064 0.391 
 Property Tax Gen. 
Effort 
5154.804 0.668 8.869***  21013.784 0.339 2.892*** 
        
 Intercept 96.376  3.323***  1820.553  9.045*** 
 R2 0.705    0.271   
 F 28.627    4.472   
 No. of Observation 66    66   
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 1970  2000 
Beta 
 
Beta 
Unstand.   Stand. t-stat  Unstand.   Stand. t-stat  
     Model 3   
 Population 0.00001806 0.121 1.564*  0.0001651 0.384 2.118** 
 Land Size 0.004788 0.162 2.177**  0.01439 0.120 0.950 
 Density 0.01575 0.074 1.053  0.02437 0.029 0.239 
 No. of Gov’t 0.145 0.040 0.486  -1.205 -0.104 -0.573 
 Property Tax Gen. 
Effort 
4884.694 0.633 8.761***  24734.998 0.398 3.302*** 
 Special District Share 215.350 0.226 2.852***  1061.181 0.267 1.965** 
        
 Intercept 92.602  3.374***  1595.740  6.731*** 
 R2 0.740    0.308   
 F 28.047    4.304   
 No. of Observations 66    65   
Note: One-tail test 
*       p-value ≤ 0.10 
**     p-value ≤ 0.05 
***   p-value ≤ 0.01 
 
Table 7-1 shows regressed results from demography, fragmentation, property tax generating 
effort, and share of special districts service responsibility.  By comparing outcomes from the 
three models, four major factors become apparent.  First, in general, land size is an important 
explanatory variable over the expenditure growth (using one-tail test with p-value ≤ 0.05) with 
the exception of Model 3 for 2000.  Second, property tax generating effort is statistically 
important with p-value ≤ 0.01, and increased the explanatory power of Model 2 by R2 
measurement for both 1970 and 2000.  A large coefficient value of the property tax generating 
effort demonstrates that increasing tax generating effort increases the expenditure dramatically.  
Third, use of special districts has a great impact on expenditure with p-value ≤ 0.05.  Finally, for 
all three models, the intercept has remained statistically meaningful with p-value ≤ 0.01.  The 
positive coefficient value is large also. 
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7.1 EXPENDITURE AND SERVICE COST CONTROL BY FORM OF COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT 
Kemp (2002) noted that the progressive reform era embraced government reforms to manage 
rapid urbanization with centralized administrative authority.  With these progressive values, 
American administration desired a separation between policy setting and implementation, with 
rational calculation for efficient administration, and responsiveness to the popular will (Benton, 
2002).  According to Sharp (1990), reformed governments result in higher developmental 
expenditures because they tend to rationalize the business development lobby’s effort without a 
political check on their decisions.  On the other hand, the commission form of government is 
considered to have a lack of professionalism, executive leadership, and accountability (DeSantis, 
2002: p. 128; Duncombe, 1966).  And unlike professional managers who are mobile, 
participatory, and cost-effective in a business environment, a commissioner usually is “either 
born in that county or …. born in the state” (Marando and Thomas, 1977: p. 9).  The life-long 
residency means there is more possibility for cronyism or other forms of patronage in the 
commission governments.  Modern public management is more likely to support pluralism and 
adopt scientific approaches to resolve tension between pressing social forces and control of 
industrial society.  And centralized control over the budget and personnel (in reformed 
government but rarely in commission government) results in efficiency (Pammer, 1990: p. 49). 
 
There are differences in research findings regarding the effect of reformed government on 
expenditures.  Some researchers found that reformed government is more prone to respond to 
socio-economic pressure, tending to lower tax rates and expenditures, provide more and better 
public service, and more professional administration than unreformed government (Lyons, 1978; 
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DeSantis and Renner, 1994; Benton, 2002; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; DeSantis and Renner, 
1996).  Others contend that government structure does not affect spending differences (Morgan 
and Kickham, 1999).  On the other hand, Schneider and Park (1989) report that reformed county 
governments spend more than unreformed county governments.  The first hypothesis tests this 
area. 
 
Hypothesis I 
Ha:  Mean of area expenditure growth is smaller with reformed metropolitan counties than 
the metropolitan counties with unreformed government. 
H0:  Mean of area expenditure growth is not smaller with reformed metropolitan counties 
than the metropolitan counties with unreformed government. 
 
Table 7-2 examines expenditure growth using council-manager and council-elected executive as 
reformed, and commission governments as unreformed government6.  The table shows that 
reformed metropolitan counties had smaller expenditure growth than unreformed metropolitan 
counties. 
[Table 7-2]:  Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change) for Governmental Structure, 1970-2000: 
Based on Model 3 
Governmental 
Structure* 
No. of 
Observation 
Mean Growth in 
Expenditure* 
Change in Population, 
1970 to 2000 (%) 
Density, 
2000 
Reformed 35 507.2 63.0 354.4
Unreformed 30 646.4 56.1 93.6
Total (Mean)  571.4 63.0 234.0
Note:  1) Based on 65 observation excluding Monroe, LA.; 2) Used 2002 form of government. 
* Difference of mean growth in expenditure is statistically significant at 0.1 level. 
                                                 
6 The mean comparison with T-test result for Model 3 shows that calculated T-statistic=-3.787 < the critical value of 
T=-1.282 with df=(65-2), α=0.1, and left tailed test (Table IV from Weiss, 1995). 
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 These results correlate with more economic activity in the reformed metropolitan counties, so it 
is premature to conclusively state that the reformed governments have controlled service 
expenditures more than unreformed county governments.  Table 7-3 shows the relationship 
between growth in public service expenditure and economic-demographic conditions for both 
groups. 
[Table 7-3]:  Relationship between Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change) and Economic 
Demographic Conditions for Governmental Structure: Based on Model 3 
 Expenditure1 Economy Demography2 
Governmental 
Structure* Mean Growth 
% Change in Service Sector 
Employment**, 1969-2000
No. of Manufacturing 
Sector Establishment, 1997
Central City  
Pop. (%), 2000    
Reformed – + + – 
Unreformed + – – + 
* Based on 2002 form of government. 
**Service sector employment is combined with FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) and service sector. 
+ indicates figures are above the mean. 
-  indicates figures are below the mean. 
Notes:   
1) (+/-) sign for mean growth in expenditure moves the same direction with percentage change in per capita property 
tax as well as percentage change in per capita debt. 
2) Mean population density and population growth are larger for metropolitan counties with reformed county 
government. 
 
The metropolitan counties with reformed governments tend to be more urban and with a higher 
density, but with a smaller proportion of population in the central cities.  It is not a surprise to 
find more economic vitality in the more populous areas, as they are more likely to have a larger 
labor force and more economic activity.  This implies that service cost should be larger because 
of the cost involved to support these conditions.  For example, infrastructure, emergency 
services, and others should require higher expenditure for greater service needs. 
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This result, as well as the larger expenditure growth for the unreformed commission county 
governments, is consistent with earlier discussion (based on Ladd, 1998) on the effect of density 
on expenditure.  Counties with unreformed governmental structure tend to be rural and sparsely 
populated, with a larger proportion of population residing in their central cities (these single 
metropolitan areas are not suburbanized).  For these areas, citizens’ cost for service expenditure 
appears to be growing.  This could be related to increased service needs caused by an increasing 
population, as shown in Table 7-2 where it can be seen the unreformed county population 
increased by 56.1%.  However, the population increased by 63.0% for the reformed county 
governments.  It appears that the unreformed governments are less capable to control service 
expenditures given less population growth. 
 
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is accepted.  Expenditure growth in single metropolitan 
counties with reform governments is less.  This may confirm that the reformed governments are 
more managerially competent. 
 
To explore the differences in metropolitan counties with reformed and unreformed governments 
further, the relationship between expenditure growth and governmental structure change will be 
examined in order to better understand the effect of government structure to expenditure growth. 
7.1.1 Service Cost Control and County Government Form Change 
Morgan and Kickham (1999) claimed that a reform reorganization of governmental structure can 
be a way of controlling taxes and spending, which may suggest that the lack of integrating policy 
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leadership or diffused power of multiple officials in a commission form of government is 
ineffective and inefficient for managing expenditures. 
 
Contemporary reforms in American counties are promoted to increase professionalism and 
centralize executive leadership to more effectively control and manage their expanding service-
delivery roles.  County reformers seek to change political structures to handle an expanding 
government (Desantis and Renner, 1996: p. 84). 
 
On the other hand, some researchers claim that in a changing demographic environment, 
unreformed governments tend to spend more as greater resources became available due to their 
responsiveness to citizens (Pammer,1990: p. 49).  If this idea is accepted, then more expenditure 
growth for the commission government must be judged in a positive light.  But however less 
responsive a reformed government may be, over time and in a democracy, the citizens demands 
must be heard and met, or else a new government will be formed or elected that can do so.  So it 
is assumed that all government forms are as responsive in the long term.  Reformed governments 
typically embrace the idea of efficiency, sound budgeting practices, and centralized control over 
the budget and personnel (Pammer, 1990: p. 49).  Therefore a result showing greater expenditure 
for metropolitan counties with commission governments is not a sign of increased response, but 
possibly an insufficient managerial competency, unsound budgeting practices, or less central 
control over expenditures and staff. 
 
Of all single metropolitan counties that changed government structure, 93.75% were to a 
reformed government, either council-manager or council-elected executive government (One 
metropolitan county government changed to a commission from a reformed government.)  This 
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section focuses on the metropolitan counties that changed from commission to reformed, and 
those that stayed commission during the study period. 
 
Hypothesis II 
Ha:  Mean of area expenditure growth with a change in form of county government to 
reformed from commission is lower than that of single metropolitan with 
commission form. 
H0:  Mean of area expenditure growth with a change in form of county government to 
reformed from commission is not lower than that of single metropolitan counties 
with commission form. 
 
The results of the analysis show that the alternative hypothesis appears to be correct.  In a similar 
manner to Table 7-2, Table 7-4 shows that metropolitan counties with reformed government 
experienced smaller expenditure growth than metropolitan county governments that remained 
unreformed7.  
                                                 
7 The test for two-population mean difference demonstrates that the calculated T-statistic=-1.172 is greater than the 
critical value of T=-1.282 with df=(38-2), α=0.1, and the left-tailed test (Table IV from Weiss, 1995).  This shows 
that recently changed reformed metropolitan counties have not experienced less expenditure growth than those with 
traditional government.  Information regarding when the change occurred is not available, so it is also possible that 
not enough time has elapsed to show any difference for the changed governments. 
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[Table 7-4]:  Comparison of Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change) between Metropolitan 
Counties with Commission Form of Government and Metropolitan Counties with 
Changed Form to a Reformed Government from Unreformed Commission 
Reform Status* 
No. of 
Observation 
Mean Growth in 
Expenditure* 
Change in Population, 
1970 to 2000 (%) 
Density
2000 
Changed to Reformed 
from Commission 9 578.8 23.5 101.4
Unreformed (Remained 
Commission) 29 646.1 55.6 91.2
Total (Mean)  630.5 48.0 93.6
Note: See Appendix Table A-32 for calculation of t-statistics for hypothesis testing. 
* Difference of mean growth in expenditure is not statistically significant at 0.1 level, but close to rejection area. 
 
However, the difference between the (change to) reformed, and the unreformed county 
governments is about half of the similar difference shown in Table 7-2.  Also, the population 
increased about twice the rate for the unreformed counties than the reformed, which could 
account for the higher expenditure of the unreformed counties.  An examination of expenditure 
growth to basic economic and demographic conditions for the two groups of counties shows 
slightly different results from Table 7-3. 
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[Table 7-5]:  Relationship between Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change) and Economic-
Demographic Conditions for Metropolitan Counties with Commission Form of 
Government, and Metropolitan Counties that Changed Form to a Reformed 
Government 
 Expenditure1 Economy Demography2 
Reform Status Mean Growth 
% Change in Service Sector 
Employment*, 1969-2000 
No. of Manufacturing 
Sector Establishment, 1997 
Central City  
Pop. (%), 2000 
Changed to 
Reformed from 
Commission  
– – + – 
Unreformed: 
Remained 
Commission 
+ + – + 
*Service sector employment is combined with FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) and service sector.  
+ indicates figures are above the mean. 
-  indicates figures are below the mean. 
Notes:  
1) (+/-) sign for mean growth in expenditure moves the same direction with percentage change in per capita property 
tax as well as percentage change in per capita debt. 
2) Mean population density is larger for metropolitan counties with reformed county government. 
 
In comparing Table 7-5 to Table 7-3, a difference can be seen in the service sector employment.  
Change in service sector employment was smaller for the change to reform government counties, 
whereas in Table 7-3 the reform metropolitan counties had a larger service sector employment.  
 
A plausible explanation for this finding could be that the counties changed form of government 
in response to a change in population demographics.  Despite the high population growth for the 
unreformed counties, the change to reform counties have a higher population density.  This is 
consistent with findings that counties with larger population tend to adopt reformed government 
structure (Duncombe, 1966; DeSantis, 2002).  Two of the major influencing factors of county 
government are socio-economic and demographic complexity (Marando, 1977).  However the 
development stage of the county that recently changed to a reform government may involve 
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more construction and manufacturing, which will be more than the service sector.  Once the 
population increases, the service sector will expand to meet the needs of the larger population 
and the changed reformed government metropolitan county will match the economic findings in 
Table 7-3. 
 
It is possible that the population growth of the unreformed counties will engender a change in 
county government form, which could have happened in the 8 years since the statistics for this 
study were tabulated.  A non-statistical review of the official web sites of the unreformed 
counties indicates that 10 of them have either reformed to a county executive or county council, 
or have made an adaptation to the commission form such as expand the role and prominence of 
the elected county judge to be a county executive, or have a legislative county council in addition 
to an administrative commission.   
 
Although the results are not statistically meaningful, the expenditure growth of the metropolitan 
counties with unreformed governmental structure is larger.  Since the change to reform 
metropolitan counties are a transitional group, and the results trend toward the clear results for 
the first comparison of reformed to unreformed, the alternate hypothesis is accepted; the 
expenditure growth for reformed county governments is smaller than that of single metropolitan 
counties with commission form of government.  This implies that the growth of property tax or 
debt for metropolitan counties with commission form is larger also which shows lack of 
openness or democratic process between public and government. 
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7.1.2 Difference Between Local Governments 
Many previous works on performance for service provision are based on municipal performance 
in context of policy outcome such as Peterson (1981), and fiscal stress in context of a major city 
such as Ladd and Yinger (1989).  However, citizens live in an environment where service needs 
can be met from any one of the three local government types.  It is reasonable to examine 
performance of service provision for the three types of government and compare. 
 
There are several major distinctions between the types of local governments.  First relates to 
legal standing and service scope between municipal, and county and special district 
governments.  Municipal governments are legally bonded by the state with discretionary power, 
and they are operated as business corporations.  A limitation of municipal governments serving 
area-wide is that municipalities serve citizens within their boundary.  County and special district 
governments are not incorporated and not as independent, but they share features such as quasi-
corporations and can serve across municipal boundary lines.  Morgan and Kickham (1999) state 
several differences between counties and municipalities; 1) larger dependency of county 
government on external financial assistance; and 2) (applies to commission only) multiple 
elected officials or row offices hinders administrative effectiveness due to lack of single chief 
executive to provide a unified administration and strong policy leadership (p. 316-7). 
 
The second distinction relates to service demand and population.  As described in Chapter 5, the 
mean population increase during the study period in single metropolitan counties is near 60%.  
Ladd (1998) described a dichotomy where increased population permits lower per capita 
spending due to the economy of scale of higher density, but a larger population increases costs of 
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service because of the impact on the environment (for example, congestion).  The increases may 
result in suburbanization because residents are more likely to move to other communities to 
avoid rising costs of public service. 
 
The third distinction is between counties with many or few municipalities or special districts.  
County expenditure levels depend on the range of functions that municipal (and special district) 
governments perform (Park, 1996: p. 48; Liebert, 1974; Dye and Garcia, 1978; Stein, 1982).  
Functional responsibilities represent the current scope of services and exhibit a tendency to 
expand existing services and adopt new ones.  Counties with more service functions are likely to 
have less municipalities and less population and therefore grow faster than counties with fewer 
service functions. 
 
The fourth distinction is between older and younger counties.  The county governments in older, 
established areas tend to provide more comprehensive services to residents because the residents 
demand more services (Liebert, 1974). 
 
The next section attempts to explore relationships between growth in expenditures and 
economic-demographic conditions for more or less share of service responsibility by types of 
local government. 
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7.2 EXPENDITURE AND SHARE OF SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY BY LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TYPE 
Changes in share of public service responsibility provided by each type of local government have 
a relationship with overall growth in area-wide expenditure.  Since the time period of the data 
points in this study is 28 to 30 years, these 7 election cycles are enough time for the citizens’ 
needs to be known and answered by the governments, or in other words, all governments provide 
the services and quality demanded by their citizens.  Therefore, this paper focuses on an 
administrative process measure, as advocated by Woodrow Wilson (1887).  The larger the 
expenditure growth rate, the inferior the fiscal performance on service cost control.  The less the 
growth rate of expenditure, the superior the fiscal performance.  For example, the metropolitan 
area (county) governments respond to service demands.  A response with an overall growth rate 
of 5 is less desirable than expenditure growth of 4, because a value of 4 satisfies the citizen’s 
service needs with less expenditure.  
 
To explore the relationship between shares of service responsibility of each local government 
type and the growth in expenditure, hypothesis testing will be performed by dividing the changes 
of service shares into two groups, decreased and increased. 
7.2.1 County Service Share Relation to Expenditure Growth 
Although the performance of county government’s primary services is area-wide and generally 
defined as state-purposed, service functions can expand in county areas with no municipality or 
special district.  According to Todd (1991), “a wide array of new responsibilities by counties 
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fulfilling the role of ‘urban service providers’ has elevated the importance of counties in an 
increasingly complex service-delivery structure” (quoted in Benton and Menzel, 1993).  Benton 
and Menzel state that the service role of counties is becoming similar to that of municipalities 
with per capita expenditures increasing at a rate faster than municipal expenditures (1993: p. 57). 
 
Furthermore, Martin (1993) claims that county governments were not adequately prepared to 
respond to the service demand, and were not structured or legally authorized to provide general 
public service (p. 11).  Also many counties are unreformed, and without professional personnel 
for administrative functions (Shafritz and Russell, 2000).  This makes it less likely that they 
would identify organizational goals or facilitate reform movement ideals such as rational 
operations in business, or objective decisions for development and policies.  For all these 
reasons, it would not be surprising that service provision (responsibility share) by county 
governments will be inefficient and ineffective, and contribute to a higher overall expenditure 
growth in the aggregate county or metropolitan area. 
 
Hypothesis III 
Ha:  Mean of area expenditure growth is greater when county service share increases. 
H0:  Mean of area expenditure growth is not greater when county service share increases. 
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[Table 7-6]:  Relationship between Change in County Service Share, 1972-1992 and Mean 
Growth in Expenditure (% change), 1970-2000  
Category of Change in County Share No of Observation 
Mean Growth in 
Expenditure*  
Decrease (Change rate<0) 42 559.8
Increase (Change rate>0) 23 592.6
Total Growth in Expenditure (Mean)  571.4
Note: See Appendix Table A-33 for calculation of t-statistics for hypothesis testing. 
* Difference of mean growth in expenditure is not statistically significant at 0.1 level 
 
Table 7-6 demonstrates that at the county level, the increased county service share resulted in a 
larger expenditure growth beyond the total mean expenditure growth.  In metropolitan areas with  
decreased county share of service, the expenditure growth is less than the total mean expenditure 
growth8. 
7.2.2 Municipal Service Share Relation to Expenditure Growth 
The competitive nature of municipal governments is reinforced by the adoption of the 
reinventing government movement at the federal level in the mid 1990s.  This program was an 
attempt to solve the declining revenues caused by tax revolt and the changes in federal funding 
of local governments introduced by the Reagan administration (Shafritz and Russell, 2000; 
Frederickson, 1996).   
 
                                                 
8  Hypothesis testing for the two sample t-test demonstrates that calculated T-statistic=0.777< critical value of 
T=1.282, with df=(65-2), α=0.1, and right tailed test (Table IV from Weiss, 1995).  This shows that those 
metropolitan counties with more use of county service share have not experienced higher expenditure growth than 
those metropolitan counties with less use of county service share. 
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Embracing pluralistic ideals as well as objective business values for administrative functions, 
such as production and distribution, and municipal competition, supports the economic public 
interest for the residents within each municipality.  This tends to lower service expenditure 
overall because service bundles can be economized by resident’s preferences (Tiebout, 1956; 
Tiebout, Ostrom, and Warren,1961; Bish and Ostrom, 1973; Ostrom, 1975).  Therefore 
utilization of municipal service share should contribute to lower overall growth in expenditure. 
 
Hypothesis IV 
Ha:  Mean of area expenditure growth is smaller when municipal service share increases. 
H0:  Mean of area expenditure growth is not smaller when county service share increases. 
[Table 7-7]:  Relationship between Change in Municipal Service Share, 1972-1992 and Mean 
Growth in Expenditure (% change), 1970-2000 
Category of Change in Municipal Share No. of Observation 
Mean Growth in 
Expenditure*  
Decrease (Change rate<0) 51 589.6
Increase (Change rate>0) 14 505.1
Total Growth in Expenditure (Mean)  571.4
Note: See Appendix Table A-34 for calculation of t-statistics for hypothesis testing. 
* Difference of mean growth in expenditure is statistically significant at 0.1 level 
 
A small number (14) of single metropolitan counties experienced an increase in municipal share 
of service responsibility, and their overall expenditure growth is smaller compared to the mean 
of the metropolitan areas which experienced a decrease in municipal service share9.  Table 5-8 
shows there is a negative relationship between municipal and special district responsibility share.  
                                                 
9  Hypothesis testing demonstrates that calculated T-statistic=-1.751 < critical value of T=-1.282, with df=(65-2), 
α=0.1, and left tailed test (Table IV from Weiss, 1995).  This shows that  those metropolitan counties with more use 
of municipal service share have experienced less expenditure growth than those metropolitan counties with less use 
of municipal service share. 
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The 51 metropolitan counties with a decreasing municipal responsibility share have an offsetting 
increase in special district share of service responsibility.  This finding is discussed in the next 
section on special district service share relationship. 
[Table 7-8]:  Relationship between Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change) and Economic-
Demographic Conditions for Use of Municipal Service, 1970-2000 
Municipal 
Service by 
Service Share 
Expenditure Economy Demography 
Mean Growth  
Change in Service Sector 
Employment (%)*, 1969-2000 
No. of Manufacturing 
Sector Establishment, 1997 
Central City 
Pop. (%), 2000 
Less Use + – + – 
More Use – + – + 
*Service sector employment is combined with FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) and service sector. 
+ indicates figures are above the mean. 
– indicates figures are below the mean. 
Note: (+/-) sign for mean growth in expenditure moves the same direction with percentage change in per capita 
property tax as well as percentage change in per capita debt. 
 
 
Table 7-8 shows that with more use of municipalities for service delivery, service expenditure is 
smaller than the overall mean, so the alternate hypothesis is accepted.  These metropolitan 
counties are also associated with a smaller number of manufacturing sector establishments, a 
larger increase in percentage of service sector employment, and a larger proportion of central 
city population.  Interestingly, the expansion of service sector employment appears to be related 
to lower levels of suburbanization, and the manufacturing sector appears to be related to higher 
levels of suburbanization or perhaps a steady rural metropolitan county.  An increase in 
manufacturing in these areas seems to imply factories are being developed in the countryside, 
and on the other hand, the service sector is being developed in urban centers.  This is sensible in 
an age where manufacturing does not need high labor resources, transportation is highly 
developed and does not depend on the geographical centrality of cities, and citizens would object 
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to manufacturing facilities.  The rural land is less expensive, and manufacturing requires more 
land than the service industry.  
7.2.3 Special District Service Share Relation to Expenditure Growth 
The increasing reliance on special districts as described in Chapters 1 and 2 is apparently due to 
their flexibility as a fiscal tool (Ladd, 1998), with lower costs and risks of development (Burns, 
1994).  Since special districts are often related to economic development and private sector 
capital investment (Burns, 1994; Lewis, 1996: p. 36; Nunn and Schoedel, 1997; Foster, 1997b), 
it is an important financing mechanism for rapid growth policies as well as creating public-
private partnerships (Nunn and Schoedel, 1997: p. 61-63).  It also helps municipalities or 
counties avoid state-imposed limits on local property tax rates and debt (Chicoine and Walzer, 
1985) by shifting funding and costs to the special district.  An empirical study by MacManus 
(1981) supports the view that utilization of special districts lowers the originating government’s 
operating expenditure, but this study did not address the combined effect of the expenditure of 
the originating government and special district.  Use of special districts implies that special 
districts are used to capture the debt, isolating the funding and costs, and using the property tax 
for remaining public services not related to the service of the special district. 
 
The use of special districts creates more governments serving the population than if the 
municipalities or counties provided the services directly.  Although use of special districts may 
contribute to fragmentation which renders budgetary inefficiency (Wildavsky, 1966), Lewis 
states that forming an area-wide special purpose government does not contribute to 
fragmentation because of its capability to capture regional-wide externalities (1996).  Even in a 
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situation where Wildavsky’s observation holds, the citizens obtain the benefits of the 
development and investment cited by Burns, Lewis, Nunn and Schoedel, and Foster.  Analysis of 
special district service share and overall expenditure growth is a more appropriate perspective 
than basic expenditure because of its sensitivity to the overall economic condition.  It is expected 
that despite the fragmenting nature of special districts, increased service by special districts is 
associated with smaller overall expenditure growth. 
 
Hypothesis V 
Ha: Mean of area expenditure growth is not greater when special district service share 
increases. 
H0: Mean of area expenditure growth is greater when special district service share 
increases. 
[Table 7-9]:  Relationship between Change in Special District Service Share, 1972-1992 and 
Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change), 1970-2000 
Category of Change in Special District 
Share 
No. of 
Observation 
Mean Growth in 
Expenditure* 
Decrease (Change rate < 0) 12 534.5
Increase (Change rate > 0) 53 579.8
Total Growth in Expenditure (Mean)  571.4
Note: See Appendix Table A-35 for calculation of t-statistics for hypothesis testing. 
* Difference of mean growth in expenditure is not statistically significant at 0.1 level 
 
As shown in Table 7-9, an increase in use of special districts contributes to a larger growth in 
overall expenditure for service provision10.  Thus the alternate hypothesis is rejected, and 
contrary to expectations, the null hypothesis is accepted.  Further analysis on economic and 
                                                 
10  Statistical assessment for hypothesis testing is that calculated T-statistic=0.870 > the critical value of T=-1.282, 
with df=(65-2), α=0.1, and left tailed test (Table IV from Weiss, 1995).  This result does not confirm the alternative 
hypothesis. 
 114
demographic conditions is useful to attempt to explain the result.  Although the difference of 
mean growth in expenditure is not statistically significant, it is important to examine its 
relationship to economic-demographic condition.  This is because special district usage is 
considered an important mechanism for economic growth.  It is also useful to compare the results 
to the results for municipal service share because of the apparent service expenditure 
substitutional relationship between municipal and special district service share, as shown in 
Table 5-8.   
[Table 7-10]:  Relationship between Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change) and Economic-
Demographic Conditions for Use of Special Districts, 1970-2000 
Special 
District 
Service by 
Service Share 
Expenditure Economy Demography
 
Mean Growth 
Change in Service Sector 
Employment (%)*, 1969-2000 
No. of Manufacturing 
Sector Establishment, 1997 
Central City 
Pop. (%), 2000 
Less Use – + – + 
More Use + – + – 
*Service sector employment is combined with FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) and service sector. 
+ indicates figures are above the mean. 
– indicates figures are below the mean. 
Note: (+/-) sign for mean growth in expenditure moves the same direction with percentage change in per capita 
property tax as well as percentage change in per capita debt. 
 
 
Table 7-10 shows the opposite of Table 7-8, as predicted by the disproportionate relationship 
between municipal and special district service shares in Table 5-8.  The larger growth in 
expenditure is associated with a larger number of manufacturing sector establishments for 
metropolitan counties with more use of special districts.  Less service sector employment and 
smaller central city population density are associated with an increasing overall county wide 
expenditure growth.  The metropolitan counties utilizing special districts for service provision 
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show low density, and based on Ladd’s study of 199811 (referenced in Chapter 2), may incur 
higher expenditures regardless of government type or fragmentation level. 
 
Since special district formation is associated largely with development, this finding suggests that 
for areas with increases in special district service share, there are other costs related to 
development.  For example, a developing metropolitan county that increases residential or retail 
units will need to increase government expenditures for other services.  This could explain the 
positive correlation between special district service share and per capita expenditure as shown in 
Tables 5-12 and 5-13. 
7.2.4 Shares of Service Responsibility and Effectiveness of Overall Service Cost 
Control Performance 
This section explores the relationship between service for each type of government and the 
overall service expenditures of the aggregate governments in the single county metropolitan 
areas.  The service measure used for this exercise is the responsibility service share.  The 
typology method is used, with four sets of effectiveness measures, from Most Effective to Most 
Ineffective; and two sets of aggregate metropolitan expenditure growth, above and below the 
mean growth.  A type of government with more responsibility service share associated with 
aggregate expenditure growth below the mean is considered more effective.  A government type 
with more responsibility service share associated with above mean expenditure growth for the 
aggregate single county metropolitan area is considered more ineffective.  The use of two 
                                                 
11 Ladd stated that sparsely populated and densely populated areas generate higher public sector costs than 
moderately dense areas (1998). 
 116
categories for below and above the mean of growth in overall metropolitan expenditure is 
consistent with the previous sections.  Table 7-11 illustrates a relationship between level of 
change of local government service share, and effectiveness measured as limiting growth in 
overall expenditure between 1970 and 2000. 
[Table 7-11]:  Effectiveness Analysis based on Change of Service Shares of Local Governments 
and Growth in Expenditure 
Expenditure 
Growth 
Category Most Effective Effective Ineffective 
Most 
Ineffective 
Below Mean 
(Growth rate < 5.7) 
[N=41] 
 
(–) Special 
District  
Mean=4.6 
 
(+) Municipality 
Mean=4.7 
 
(–) County 
Mean =4.7 
 
(–) Municipality 
Mean=4.8 
 
(+) Special District 
Mean=4.8 
 
(+) County  
Mean=4.9 
Above Mean 
(Growth rate > 5.7) 
[N=24] 
 
(–) County 
Mean=7.3 
 
(+) Municipality 
Mean=[7.36] 
 
(+) Special District 
Mean=7.4 
 
(–) Municipality 
Mean=[7.38] 
 
(–) Special District 
Mean=7.5 
 
(+) County 
Mean=7.6 
Note: 
–  sign indicates negative change (less use). 
+  sign indicates positive change (more use). 
 
Table 7-11 shows that more use of county service is associated with most ineffective 
contribution to the growth in expenditure.  Conversely, less use of county service is associated 
with effective (lower) expenditure growth regardless of level of expenditure growth.  More use 
of municipal service appears to be effective for both below and above mean categories of the 
growth in expenditure, and less use of municipal service provision is related to overall 
ineffective expenditure growth management. 
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 Service share for municipal and special district governments are both effective, and the table 
shows this from two perspectives.  More use of both governments are associated with lower 
aggregate metropolitan area expenditure growth, and less service  from these governments is 
associated with above mean expenditure growth. 
 
Adjustment effects from special districts are mixed.  The most effective expenditure growth is 
seen when use of special districts is below the mean of the overall expenditure category.  Also, 
more use of special districts was somewhat effective with above mean growth in the expenditure 
category.  However, higher special district share is ineffective for cost control when the 
expenditure growth is below the mean.  Less use of special district is shown to be unrelated to 
expenditure growth when the overall expenditure growth is above the mean.  Apparently special 
districts are useful as a balancing mechanism when service needs fluctuate (Ladd, 1998). 
 
The results for the expenditure growth for the metropolitan counties with more or less use of 
types of local government for service provision show mixed results.  Contrary to expectations, an 
increase in special district service share is not necessarily associated with a lower overall growth 
in expenditure (see the discussion regarding Hypothesis V and Tables 7-9 and 7-10).  But as 
expected, the overall assessment is that increase of municipal service share is most effective and 
increases of county service share are less effective for service cost control (Hypothesis III and 
IV, and Tables 7-6 through 7-8). 
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7.2.5 Study Findings and Suggestions for Legislative Consideration 
Table 7-12 shows the results for the exploration of expenditure growth for metropolitan counties 
with reformed or unreformed governments.  It shows that for metropolitan counties, reform 
governments are associated with less expenditure growth than unreformed counties. 
[Table 7-12]:  Relationship Between Mean Growth in Expenditure and Performance of Service 
Cost Control for Reformed and Unreformed Metropolitan Counties 
 Governmental Structure  
 Reformed Unreformed Difference* 
Mean Expenditure Growth 5.1 6.5 –1.4
* – indicates competent performance of reformed governmental structure for cost control. 
 
There seems to be positive results to the observation that reformed governments embrace the 
progressive ideals of professional, expert knowledge, effective budgeting practices, and 
centralized control and capacity to resolve tension between pressing social forces in modern 
industrial society (Pammer, 1990: p. 49; Lyons,1978). 
 
Table 7-13 is a summary for the results of the service expenditure growth analysis by types of 
local government.  The area expenditure growth is shown for each type of government’s service 
share and whether that government type is increasing or decreasing its service share.  The table 
shows that expenditures increase whether the service responsibility share for that type of 
government is increasing or decreasing.  
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[Table 7-13]:  Effect of Expenditure by Government Type on Area-Wide Expenditure 
 Area Wide Expenditure Growth 
When Service Share is: 
 
Hypothetical Single Service Share Increase Decrease Difference* 
County 5.9 5.6 +0.3
Municipality 5.1 5.9 –0.8
Special District 5.8 5.3 +0.5
 *+ indicates ineffective performance for cost control when services are provided more by that type of government. 
 - indicates effective performance for cost control when services are provided more by that type of government. 
 
 
To highlight the expenditure growth, the table values are calculated for each type of local 
government as if only that particular government type is providing services.  The conclusion for 
decreasing service share for municipal governments matches that of increasing municipal service 
share, that municipal service is most effective.  This is because when municipal service share 
decreases, the area-wide expenditure growth is the largest.  This is most likely due to service 
being provided by less effective types of government in those single metropolitan counties with 
lower municipal service share.   
 
For special district or county service share, special district service provision appears to be more 
effective than county provision for both the increasing and decreasing service share.  However, 
the difference between the increase and decrease for county service share is smaller than 
difference for special district service share, indicating that county service provision expenditures 
are more stable. 
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The difference between service provision by county and any other local government type is that 
county service is generally area-wide for the single metropolitan counties.  Municipal 
governments do not provide area-wide service, and special districts can provide area-wide 
service but usually do not, because they can only be area-wide when sponsored by the county.  
The difference between increasing and decreasing service responsibility share for county service 
provision is closest to zero, which seems to imply less fluctuation in, or more stable, service 
provision.  This puts county service provision in a more positive light, especially when 
considering their ineffectiveness may be due to servicing unincorporated parts of the county.  
Another consideration in favor of counties is that their apparent ineffective expenditure control 
may be short term, as unincorporated areas receiving services become more populated and less 
costly to serve, or incorporate to municipalities and no longer require county services.  Or, the 
county service may expand service to municipal areas and become a true area-wide and more 
cost effective provider.  At the same time, the less effective results for special districts in the 
difference analysis may be due to their dual role as area-wide or municipal-specific. 
 
Special districts appear to be a pragmatic approach to fund additional service needs in the current 
political and cultural climate of citizens’ unwillingness to pay for development, or to manage a 
declining revenue base.  For this reason the increasing trend of service delivery through special 
districts is expected to continue.  Special districts ability to provide area-wide service could be 
used to create area-wide service delivery for services that benefit from efficiency or equity 
reasons by being provided area-wide, but are not feasible to be provided by the county.  They 
could also be used to span multiple counties, as oversight board structure permits representation 
from the various constituencies, as well as for economic development and revenue generation. 
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 Further analysis of area-wide service provision from county and special district governments is 
shown in Table 7-14.  This examines the relationship between growth in expenditure and 
economic-demographic conditions for the types of local government for service provision. 
[Table 7-14]:  Relationship between Mean Growth in Expenditure (% change) and Economic-
Demographic Conditions, 1970-2000 for More Use of Local Governments for Area-
Wide Service Provision, 1972-1992 
Service Share 
(More use) 
Expenditure Economy Demography
Mean Growth 
Change in Service Sector 
Employment (%)*, 1969-2000 
No. of Manufacturing 
Sector Establishment, 1997 
Central City 
Pop. (%), 2000 
County + + – – 
Special District + – + – 
*Service sector employment is combined with FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) and service sector. 
Note: +/- signs are based on mean comparison of service share from each of the same local government type. 
 
The table shows that larger expenditure growth is associated with greater service share of both 
county and special district, and with a smaller proportion of central city population.  But county 
service share is associated with higher service sector employment which may be associated with 
growth in unincorporated areas.  The expansion of service sector employment, or a homogeneous 
population (e.g., by income level) may be associated with suburbanization.  As Benton and 
Menzel (1993) explained regarding areas similar to this group, with rapid growth of population 
or development, affluent residents may have relocated to unincorporated areas outside of 
municipal boundaries.  Since affluent communities desire more growth oriented services such as 
police and education (Schneider, 1989), expenditures from such unincorporated county areas 
may be fueling the expansive growth in county service share for this group. 
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The larger growth in expenditure is associated with a larger number of manufacturing sector 
establishments for metropolitan counties with more use of special districts (see discussion for 
Hypothesis V).  Less service sector employment and smaller central city population density are 
associated with an increasing overall county wide expenditure growth.  The metropolitan 
counties utilizing special districts for service provision show low density, and based on Ladd’s 
study of 199812 (referenced in Chapter 2), may incur higher expenditures growth regardless of 
government type or fragmentation level. 
 
This suggests that economic development may not be directly associated with suburbanization 
regardless of the industrial focus the metropolitan county adopts.  Lower density in a central city 
indicates that citizens prefer suburban residency over city residency, beyond their economic tie 
to the city through work.  The cost that city residents have to bear may be larger due to the cost 
of maintaining decaying infrastructure or other intangible quality such as centrally located 
amenities. 
 
There are several actions that can be taken regarding public service provision.  Since the benefits 
of reform governments are clear, state governments should give counties the option of using 
reform government, for states that only permit commission form of government (Duncombe, 
1966), and provide discretionary authority to strengthen counties’ role in area-wide executive 
leadership such as more capacity for debt issuance in order to provide more development 
funding.  County governments should consider reform government in order to more 
professionally manage and lead service demand or development activities as a municipal 
                                                 
12 Ladd stated that sparsely populated and densely populated areas generate higher public sector costs than 
moderately dense areas. 
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coordinator and arbiter.  Municipalities and counties should engage in discussion to evaluate 
services to see where area-wide provision is beneficial, and where municipal differentiation is 
beneficial.  Federal government should consider awarding more grants at the county level, which 
would reduce the independence of municipalities receiving federal funds and engender more 
holistic development for the areas.  The Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO; Miller, 
2002) can be a model for this type of grant program. 
 
Finally, the results indicate service efficiencies for areas with a higher proportion of population 
in the central cities, as well as efficiencies for services provided by municipalities.  Annexation 
activity or municipal formation for unincorporated land should be encouraged to give those 
citizens representation for planning area-wide services, and to provide services that should be 
provided at the municipal level.  Maintaining central cities prominence should be seen as 
beneficial for the region for the overall expenditure performance benefits.  Central cities tend to 
identify the area nationally or even internationally, and this leadership role is also beneficial.  
Area identity-related amenities (museums, professional sporting arenas, botanical gardens, zoos, 
and cultural organizations) tend to be located centrally.  This may require resources from MSA’s 
as a whole to augment city funding for maintenance and beautification. 
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7.3 SUMMARY OF STUDY 
[Table 7-15]:  Summary of Hypothesis Assessment for Expenditure and its Growth 
Category  Test Methods Finding 
The public service expenditure is 
associated with shares of service 
responsibility by each type of local 
government. 
Correlation for service share by 
types of local governments 
County and municipal shares have 
negative relationship with per  capita 
expenditure, and special district share has 
positive relationship with expenditure 
both 1970 and 2000 periods. 
Hypothesis I: Mean of area 
expenditure growth is smaller with 
reformed metropolitan counties than 
the metropolitan counties with 
unreformed government. 
Two sample t-test with non-
equal variance assumption to 
examine difference between the 
metropolitan areas with 
reformed (council-manger and 
council-elected executive) and 
the metropolitan areas with 
traditional form (commission) 
of county government. 
Metropolitan counties with reformed 
county government experienced lower 
expenditure growth than those 
metropolitan counties with unreformed 
county government. 
Hypothesis II: Mean of area 
expenditure growth with a change in 
form of county government to 
reformed from commission is lower 
than that of single metropolitan with 
commission form. 
Two sample t-test with non-
equal variance assumption 
Reformed metropolitan counties from 
traditional government have not 
experienced less expenditure growth than 
those remained with traditional 
government.  However reformed 
metropolitan counties tend to embrace 
the progressive ideals of professional and 
centralized budgeting practices.  
Hypothesis III: Mean of area 
expenditure growth is greater when 
county service share increases, than 
the mean of area expenditure growth 
when there is a decrease in county 
service share. 
Two sample t-test with non-
equal variance assumption 
Metropolitan counties with more use of 
county service provision have not 
experienced significantly higher 
expenditure growth than those 
metropolitan counties with less use of 
county service provision. 
Hypothesis IV: Mean of area 
expenditure growth is smaller when 
municipal service share increases, 
than the mean of area expenditure 
growth when there is a decrease in 
municipal service share. 
Two sample t-test with non-
equal variance assumption 
Metropolitan counties with more use of 
municipal service provision have 
experienced significantly less 
expenditure growth than those 
metropolitan counties with less use of 
municipal service provision. 
Hypothesis V: Mean of area 
expenditure growth is smaller when 
special district service share 
increases, than the mean of area 
expenditure growth when there is a 
decrease in special district service 
share. 
Two sample t-test with non-
equal variance assumption 
Metropolitan counties with more use of 
special district service provision have not 
experienced smaller expenditure growth 
than those metropolitan counties with 
less use of special district service 
provision. 
Note: All tested at 0.1 significance level. 
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[Table 7-16]:  Summary of Results by Region 
Metropolitan Areas Characteristics Northeast Midwest South West 
Demography in 2000  
 MSA Population  330,076 187,953 332,029 1,162,32
 Land Size by Sq Km 1,521 1,735 2,830 8,168
 Density  809.1 121.9 123.4 204.2
 Mean Age of County 222 167 151 135
 Central city pop to MSA pop (%) 27.7 54.3 48.7 44.0
No of Governments in MSAs in 1997 67 52 29 78
 No. of County 1 1 1 1
 No. of Municipality 34 25 11 15
 No. of Special District 33 25 17 62
Fiscal Condition in 1997  
 MSAs Per Capita Expenditure 2,742 2,457 2,353 2,783
 Property Tax Generating Effort 0.033 0.028 0.024 0.020
  Per Capita Property Tax 962 804 554 582
  Per Capita Income, 2000 28,632 28,342 23,247 29,370
 Per Capita Expenditure for Service Performed, 2000 (Predicted)
 With Model 1 2,579 2,462 2,458 2,736
 With Model 2 2,667 2,522 2,455 2,659
 With Model 3 2,637 2,466 2,489 2,702
Local Government Service Share, 1992 (%)  
  County Share  14.7 19.2 23.0 20.6
  Municipality Share 64.6 64.1 56.0 43.4
  Special District Share 20.7 16.7 22.0 36.0
 Total MPDI 4.53 3.21 2.65 3.46
Overall Expenditure Growth (%), 1970-2000  
 Model 1 525.3 569.4 581.8 494.9
 Model 2 578.4 513.0 736.1 455.3
 Model 3 605.5 524.0 715.1 457.7
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[Table 7-17]:  Relationship between Mean Growth in Expenditure (% Change), 1970-2000 and 
Economic-Demographic Conditions by Region 
 Expenditure Economy Demography 
Region Mean Growth 
% Change in 
Service Sector 
Employment, 
1969-2000 
No. of Manufacturing 
Sector Establishment, 1997 
Central City 
Pop. (%), 
2000 
% Change in  
Ratio of City 
Pop. to Total 
MSA Pop., 
1970-2000 
Northeast 605.5 155.8 498 27.7 –20.7 
Midwest 524.0 189.6 238 54.3 –9.7 
South 715.1 237.8 307 48.7 –14.0 
West 457.7 284.5 1,850 44.0 5.8 
Total 
(Mean) 571.4 231.7 804 46.0 –7.4 
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8.0  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDY 
The major objective of this study is to explore the relationship between public service and 
metropolitan conditions, using service expenditure as a proxy for service provision.  Growth of 
expenditure is compared within government structure relations to such influencing factors as 
economic and demographic conditions during 1970 and 2000.  Service expenditure is studied for 
metropolitan county government structure by comparing reformed, council-manager and council-
elected executive, to unreformed commission, and proportional share of service responsibility of 
each government type (county, municipal, and special district).  
 
Comparison of expenditure growth between reform vs. unreformed single MSA county 
governments shows that the reformed metropolitan counties tend to have lower growth in service 
expenditure.  This suggests that the governmental structural difference in authority, leadership, 
and decision making (Menzel, 1996: p. 205) may be a driving force for different facets of 
organizational development as well as government accountability to public service.  In general, 
utilization of municipal service provision and increased managerial competency of public 
administration are related to lower increases in service expenditures.   
 
During the period 1972-1992, the aggregated share of service responsibility for both county and 
municipal governments has declined.  There has been a corresponding increase in special district 
service share.  The service share relationships between municipality and special district, and  also 
between county and special district, are negatively related, as shown in Table 5-8, with zero 
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order correlation at -0.813 and -0.385 respectively.  This study shows that in general, the service 
share from special district use is rather associated with larger cost related development.  The 
increase in special district service share, then, is likely due to increasing complexity and financial 
demand from changes in demography, as well as fiscal constraints from residents’ resistance of 
property taxation and state imposed mandates limiting debt issuance or property tax.  Use of 
special districts appears to be a pragmatic approach to respond to increasing service without 
additional municipal or county government taxes to fund the additional cost.  That is, to protect 
current residents from the new development and to avoid possibly higher property taxation for 
rising service cost, municipality may be transferring development cost to special districts.   
 
Metropolitan county wide service expenditure has risen considerably during this study period.  
This may be because of the expansion of service sector employment and relocation of affluent 
residents to unincorporated areas outside of municipal boundaries.  Expenditures from such 
unincorporated county areas may be fueling the expansive growth in county service share.  These 
service expenditures may not truly be systemic to county governments ability to provide service, 
as they may represent inefficiencies of newly providing services to the more dispersed and rural 
areas of the county.  As these areas incorporate, the new municipalities could be providing the 
services, or perhaps the county will begin to provide the service in municipalities and realize 
area-wide aggregate cost savings. 
 
Even though more use of special districts may create rising expenditure growth, given the 
desirability of economic development in local communities and suburbanization in the MSAs, 
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and generally increasing demand for service provision, the trend of service delivery through 
special districts is expected to continue. 
 
However attractive special districts may be, critics contend that direct service provision through 
an elected government is more responsive to citizens and their leadership, and finances are more 
transparent, because of the check and balance mechanism of multiple areas of these types of 
government, and more public involvement.   
 
Table 3-5 shows increasing funding of special districts from federal sources and special districts’ 
increasing ability to generate larger internal revenue, combined with a corresponding decline in 
funding from local (municipal and county) governments.  This financial independence of special 
districts may tend to accelerate their relationship to increased overall service expenditure, 
through the inter-governmental funding sources, and because their independence means their 
staff may keep the special district in operation longer than needed to perform their service.  
Finally, the apparent ease with which municipalities can sponsor special districts may make it 
less likely that the municipalities will explore multiple-jurisdiction or county-wide service 
provision. 
 
For area-wide service provision when the metropolitan county government is unable to provide 
such service, economies of scale may be obtained by means of fiscal or administrative 
mechanism.  Coordinating service provision through one of these alternate regionalizing 
mechanisms can be done with governments, community organizations, or sponsored by the 
county or set up similar to a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO).  Special districts can be 
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used as an area-wide coordinating mechanism, as they are when utilized for special purposes 
such as cultural or business districts, because of the wide geographical scope and multi-
sponsoring government capabilities of special districts. 
 
Since special districts have some correlation to development, another advantage to using a 
county mechanism is the coordination effect counties can bring to both the decision, and the 
development process.  For example, when choosing a site for a needed development, a 
municipality has a much smaller area within which to choose, and increased need for 
transportation and utility services across nearby municipal boundaries may not be fully explored.  
Having the county involved may take away some independence from municipalities, but it 
contributes to more comprehensive planning approach and may reduce overall costs by spreading 
related development issues across a larger population.  The county can also coordinate transfer 
payments or other mechanisms to compensate, for example, for a development which the county 
input results in being placed within two or more municipalities rather than being situated in only 
one. 
 
Although the results are mixed, there are several cases where a more populous central city is a 
characteristic of metropolitan areas with effective expenditure control.  This finding, even though 
it is a mixed result, combined with the primary role of central cities in identifying metropolitan 
areas, should give reason for stakeholders in the metropolitan area to support central city 
amenities and the city to pursue projects to create a more livable environment for global 
awareness, and attraction of employers and a competent labor force.   
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Suggestions for future studies are discussed, to further explore those items which have been 
identified as limitations of this study, or interesting findings of this study. 
8.1 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
The focus on single county metropolitan areas is a small sample size which can limit 
comprehensive understanding of metropolitan conditions because there are many more complex 
metropolitan areas in the United States.  However, the choice of single metropolitan counties was 
purposeful in order to create a normalized benchmark from which further study of heterogeneous 
metropolitan areas could be performed.  This is discussed more in the Future Study section. 
 
An example of the limitations of the single metropolitan county can be seen in the results that 
there is no considerable difference in expenditure growth between metropolitan counties which 
remained traditional form and those that changed to reformed governments during 1970-2000.  
However, single metropolitan counties which had governmental structural change of any kind 
exhibited a higher tendency for utilization of special districts and more decline in municipal 
service share than those counties retaining the same government form.  In order to clarify the 
effects on expenditure growth and form of county governments, a larger sample size with 
comparative quasi-experimentation approach may be helpful. 
 
New England was excluded from this study because the municipal government structure is 
unique.  Future studies should develop methods to include New England. 
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Overall assessment of expenditure and expenditure change during 1970 and 2000 show that 
expenditure is less influenced by the study variables in 2000 than 1970.  This indicates there may 
be other factors influencing expenditure for service provision which have not been explored in 
this study.  These variables can be divided into four categories, socioeconomic, relationships 
between governments and agencies, development, and capacity.  It is important to note that the 
study did not study outcome of service provided, or about governments ability to incorporate 
modern governance models such as New Public Management.  Information regarding any of 
these types of variables would be an interesting addition.  Examples and further discussion 
follow. 
 
The category of socioeconomic variables of interest include racial composition, age 
differentiation, geographical location (suburbanization), education attainment, income level, and 
immigration status. 
 
The second type of uncontrolled variables are about relationships, such as 1) between the local 
governments themselves, that is the level of cooperation for service delivery through tax sharing, 
cultural asset district, or others; 2) between governments and non-profit institutions, volunteer 
organizations, or other social organizations participating in service provision; and 3) between the 
local governments and higher-level governments, such as from mandates and grants. 
 
The category of development include variables such as level of employment in different 
industrial sectors or industrial earnings.  This information, in combination with socioeconomic 
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trends and the fiscal (funding) relationships of higher-level governments on local governments, 
may shed light on the increase in special districts, and other factors that influence fragmentation. 
 
The fourth and last category of uncontrolled variables are capacity, of revenue generation and 
cost control.  Although legal mandates imposed by federal and state government on raising taxes, 
and debt limits are central to budgetary decisions, research shows that revenue availability is 
among the most important factors affecting expenditure.  With rapidly changing demographic 
and socioeconomic conditions due to domestic, world wide labor movement, and immigration, 
attention can be paid more to tax generating effort.  The capacity of cost control was represented 
in the current study by the reformed vs. unreformed county government analysis.  Other 
information of this type could incorporate the government form of the municipalities, the 
inclusion of information about program adoption such as New Public Management, and subtle 
distinctions of government forms such as a commission that has a public manager that were not 
captured by the simplistic reformed and unreformed variable values of the study.   
8.2 FUTURE STUDY 
This study hopes to provide a benchmark for future studies that examine metropolitan areas as if 
they are a single entity.  This is not currently feasible since most MSAs are comprised of 
multiple counties, some of them within different states.  This study can be a benchmark because, 
with the use of single county MSAs, the county is the MSA.  Some of these MSAs maintain their 
own MSA identifying number, but they are also part of a consolidated MSA.  Perhaps studies 
that examine different ways of combining county data for consolidated MSAs compared to the 
single county MSAs within the consolidated MSAs can provide a check on statistical methods 
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that will show valid methods of creating consolidated information about the consolidated and 
multi-county MSAs. 
 
One of the dichotomies of modern U.S. governance is the economic health of the metropolitan 
areas compared to their central cities.  Studies in this area should be conducted on the single-
county MSA set to provide similar benchmarks for studies of all MSAs compared to their central 
cities.  This study focused on the local effect, and did not consider the relationship to the state or 
federal level.  Studies that examine these relationships could also potentially be useful in 
expanding the study focus to larger MSAs.  There are some interesting areas that could also be 
explored, or to further develop the explanatory power of this method for use in examining all 
national MSAs. 
 
First, the larger political and economic context of the metropolitan areas needs to be explored.  
The political context includes state legislation governing the creation and legal actions possible 
to the local governments and special districts, as well as incentives or disincentives for regional 
cooperation.  The economic context includes tax sharing, transfer payments, and other funding 
from state governments to local governments, which appears to be an attribute of service 
provision in the metropolitan areas. 
 
Second, further study is needed to explore the continuum of forms of governments and the 
relationship of central city and county governments.  Many traditional county governments have 
adopted a manager, creating a “commission-manager” form of government, an adaptation which 
permits better performance (Benton and Menzel, 1993).  Official county web sites often show an 
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executive prominence given to the county judge position, which moves the commission form 
closer to a council-elected executive form of government.  These nuances were not captured in 
the data available for this dissertation, but it should be studied.  Also, for a future study 
comparing metropolitan areas with their central cities that include the government structure of 
cities, those with a weak mayor should not be categorized as a Mayor-council government, since 
these ceremonial mayors have no functional role.  They should be included with the council-
manager cities, as that is what they are; or kept in a separate category to see if the office of the 
mayor, even a weak mayor, provides benefits of leadership. 
 
Third, more research and data at the operational agency level are needed to demonstrate service 
provision in which local government is the best for the particular service, especially area wide or 
municipal, and to clarify the governmental structure and metropolitan conditions within the 
political and cultural climate.  Some studies have been conducted in this area, but they tend to be 
case studies or geared for specific service functions.  The “School District and Municipal 
Reorganization: Research Findings & Policy Proposals” presentation to the Michigan legislature 
in 2007 is a meta analysis of earlier studies.  The results of this study provide a useful guide to 
future studies in this area.  Although many specific service areas were presented, the overriding 
theme of the findings is that services that are capital-intensive tend to benefit from aggregated 
service provision, and services which are labor-intensive tend to benefit from disaggregated 
service provision.  Along similar lines, an investigation of the relationship between overall MSA 
expenditures and the different government types in more detail could shed light on service 
provision in the MSAs.  For example, is there any correlation between service responsibility of 
local government types and the county government form?  For those counties which changed 
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their government, does the change in governmental form have any relation to the service shares 
of any particular government type?  There may be value in placing the service shares and 
government forms study within the framework of regionalism (Miller, 2002: p. 54-57). 
 
Finally, it should be said that lower expenditure growth does not always mean good fiscal 
performance in governing metropolitan areas.  Future studies on the relationship of socio-
economic conditions should be conducted to determine if there are underlying reasons for the 
expenditure increases that are not related to the government form, such as a general slowing 
down of the economy being related to lower service expenditures.  Higher levels of performance 
as captured in the study can indicate managerial competency and cost effectiveness, or effective 
leadership which may also improve socio-economic conditions in the metropolitan areas.  The 
presence or absence of a regional council, and the service areas discussed by its members, should 
be tracked and included in future studies.  Improving the ability of the public sector to properly 
deal with the changing metropolitan environment is the key element toward better governance in 
the metropolitan areas. 
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APPENDIX  
 
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Table A-1: Literature Review on Expenditure and Government Structures 
Author Study Findings 
Lineberry and Fowler, 
1967 
Studied for contribution to the 
notion of reformed and unreformed 
government structures; the notion 
that council-manager are associated 
with socially homogeneous middle-
class, mobile, and growing 
populations, and the notion that 
unreformed governmental 
structures are associated with 
socially heterogeneous cities with 
large proportion of working class 
residents, and stable or declining 
growth rates. 
Reformed governments (council-
manager) taxed and spent at 
lower levels than unreformed 
government (Mayor-Council).  
Political structure had a 
significant interactive impact on 
the relationship between the 
socioeconomic environment of 
municipalities and their public 
policies.  Unreformed 
jurisdictions tended to be more 
responsive to the socioeconomic 
characteristics of their 
constituencies than reformed 
jurisdictions. 
Lyons (1978) Investigated reformed and 
unreformed cities’ response to 
socio-economic pressures with 242 
observation.  Employed quasi-
experimentation. 
Reformed government is prone to 
respond to pressures which tends 
to reduce spending. 
Schneider and Park, Examined the total, developmental, 
and redistributive per capita 
County-executive jurisdictions 
spend the most and perform the 
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1989 expenditures and number of 
functions performed by 162 
counties in fifty of the largest 
MSAs using expenditure and form 
of government data from 1977. 
most functions among the three 
basic forms of county 
government.  The traditional 
commission counties were 
consistently last. 
Dye and MacManus, 
1990 
Studied longitudinal state and local 
public sector growth over 33 years 
using ordinary least squares 
regression estimates.  Examined 
factors influencing state and local 
expenditure using six variables; age 
of population, per capita income, 
federal transfers; reliance on state 
personal income tax revenues, and 
the size of the governmental 
bureaucracy per capita. 
Found that the size of the public 
employee bureaucracy is the 
most significant predictor of state 
growth but not local growth.  For 
local growth, the size of the 
youth population is the most 
significant variable, and this is 
also true for states. 
Herbert Duncombe, 
William Duncombe, 
and Richard Kinney, 
1992 
Analyzed national survey of county 
officials for budget systems.  They 
developed a model in which county 
budget outcomes are affected by 
four major categories of influence; 
1) the priorities of officials such as 
county legislators, executives, 
managers, administrative officers, 
and department heads; 2) revenue 
availability and status of federal 
and state grants; 3) pressure from 
external players such as interest 
groups, public opinion, party 
leaders, and the media; and 4) legal 
Revenue availability is one of the 
most important factors affecting 
the size of the budget.  Other 
important factors affecting 
budgetary decisions are federal 
and state mandates, tax and debt 
limitation, and the priorities of 
county officials.  In particular, 
county officials responded that 
increases in revenues from 
property taxes or other revenue 
sources are limited by state law. 
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constraints such as limitation on 
increasing taxes, mandated 
expenditure increases, and reduced 
flexibility from earmarked funds.   
DeSantis and Renner, 
1994 
Conducted multiple regression 
analysis with yr 1989 pooled 
sample to examine expenditure 
patterns between different forms of 
county government.  Included 
regions as independent variables in 
the models. 
Difference in expenditures exists 
between different forms of 
government.  Counties in the 
South, North Central, and 
Northeast tends to spend less 
than Western counties. 
DeSantis and Renner, 
1996 
1295 counties are studied for 
government structure, political 
culture, socioeconomic 
environment, and expenditure for 
the period 1987-88. 
Reformed counties were 
expected to spend more and be 
more responsive to population 
characteristics than unreformed 
counties. Democratic presidential 
vote had a positive and 
significant effect on county 
expenditures only among county-
administrator governments.  
Socioeconomic factors were not 
more powerful determinants of 
expenditures in reformed 
counties than in unreformed 
counties. 
Park (1996) 
 
Examined the relationship between 
county government structure and 
expenditure growth among 
counties with data for 244 counties 
in the metropolitan areas for 1972, 
Expenditure growth in total 
spending as well as in four 
specific service areas 
(developmental, redistributive, 
allocational, and public safety) 
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1977, 1982 and 1987. was greater for appointed county 
administrator governments. 
Morgan and Kickham 
(July-August, 1999) 
 
Conducted a quasi-experimentation 
using an interrupted pooled time-
series design.  20 sample size is 
used, 10 for experimental group 
and 10 for control group between 
1979 and 1992. 
Changes in the form of county 
government had no effect on 
fiscal behavior.  Spending  
differences for types of 
government was not statistically 
significant during the time 
period.  Also, reformed counties 
have been less dependent on state 
and federal aid than unreformed 
counties. 
Benton (2002) 
 
Examined 413 counties for the 
spending behavior of all counties 
for 1992 with population of 
100,000 or more.  Tested spending 
between reformed and unreformed 
county governments by 
differentiating with chartered and 
non-charter county government 
types. 
There is a strong association 
between the structure of county 
government and per capita 
spending. Reformed county 
governments with charter spent 
more than reformed county 
government without charter for 
all county services. Regardless of 
chartered or not, reformed 
government spent more than 
unreformed county government. 
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Table A-2: Single Metropolitan County FIPS Identification and County Names 
Fips MSAs State County 
Fips Identification 
Change by 2002  
Consolidated 
MSA by 2000 
280 Altoona PA MSA                PA           Blair   
360 Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM     CA           Orange 5945 Y 
680 Bakersfield CA MSA            CA           Kern   
880 Billings MT MSA               MT          Yellowstone   
1040 Bloomington--Normal IL M      IL           McLean   
1240 Brownsville--Harlingen T      TX           Cameron   
1260 Bryan--College Station T      TX           Brazos   
1360 Cedar Rapids IA MSA           IA           Linn   
1400 Champaign--Urbana--Rantou     IL           Champaign   
1720 Colorado Springs CO MSA       CO           El Paso   
1740 Columbia MO MSA               MO          Boone   
2040 Decatur IL MSA                IL           Macon   
2200 Dubuque IA MSA                IA           Dubuque   
2320 El Paso TX MSA                TX           El Paso   
2360 Erie PA MSA                   PA           Erie   
2400 Eugene--Springfield OR M      OR           Lane   
2560 Fayetteville NC MSA           NC           Cumberland   
2680 Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo     FL           Broward  Y 
2880 Gadsden AL MSA                AL           Etowah   
2920 Galveston--Texas City TX      TX           Galveston  Y 
3040 Great Falls MT MSA            MT          Cascade   
3080 Green Bay WI MSA              WI           Brown   
3200 Hamilton--Middletown OH       OH          Butler  Y 
3520 Jackson MI MSA                MI           Jackson   
3640 Jersey City NJ PMSA           NJ           Hudson  Y 
3800 Kenosha WI PMSA               WI           Kenosha  Y 
3960 Lake Charles LA MSA           LA           Calcasieu Parish   
4000 Lancaster PA MSA              PA           Lancaster   
4080 Laredo TX MSA                 TX           Webb   
4200 Lawton OK MSA                 OK          Comanche   
4360 Lincoln NE MSA                NE           Lancaster   
4480 Los Angeles--Long Beach       CA           Los Angeles  Y 
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4600 Lubbock TX MSA                TX           Lubbock   
4720 Madison WI MSA                WI           Dane   
4880 Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     TX           Hidalgo   
5170 Modesto CA MSA                CA           Stanislaus   
5200 Monroe LA MSA                 LA           Quachita Parish   
5280 Muncie IN MSA                 IN           Delaware   
5990 Owensboro KY MSA              KY          Daviess   
6000 Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA      CA           Ventura 8735 Y 
6240 Pine Bluff AR MSA             AR           Jefferson   
6460 Poughkeepsie NY MSA           NY          Dutchess 2281 Y 
6520 Provo--Orem UT MSA            UT           Utah   
6560 Pueblo CO MSA                 CO           Pueblo   
6600 Racine WI PMSA                WI           Racine  Y 
6680 Reading PA MSA                PA           Berks   
6720 Reno NV MSA                   NV          Washoe   
6820 Rochester MN MSA              MN          Olmsted   
7120 Salinas--Seaside--Montere     CA           Monterey   
7200 San Angelo TX MSA             TX           Tom Green   
7320 San Diego CA MSA              CA           San Diego   
7400 San Jose CA PMSA              CA           Santa Clara  Y 
7480 Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     CA           Santa Barbara   
7500 Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       CA           Sonoma  Y 
7640 Sherman--Denison TX MSA      TX           Grayson   
7840 Spokane WA MSA                WA          Spokane   
8120 Stockton CA MSA               CA           San Joaquin   
8200 Tacoma WA PMSA                WA          Pierce  Y 
8440 Topeka KS MSA                 KS           Shawnee   
8480 Trenton NJ PMSA               NJ           Mercer  Y 
8520 Tucson AZ MSA                 AZ           Pima   
8600 Tuscaloosa AL MSA             AL           Tuscaloosa   
8640 Tyler TX MSA                  TX           Smith   
8760 Vineland--Millville--Brid     NJ           Cumberland  Y 
8800 Waco TX MSA                   TX           McLennan   
8960 West Palm Beach--Boca Rat     FL           Palm Beach   
Sources: “Bureau of Census” and “County and City Extra,” edited by Deirdre A. Gaguin and Katherine A. DeBrandt 
and published by Bernan Press, 2002. 
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Table A-3: Number of Local Governments in Single Metropolitan Counties, 1997 
MSAs County 
Municipality 
Special Districts Total Cities Township 
Altoona PA MSA                1 9 15 26 51 
Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM      1 31  86 118 
Bakersfield CA MSA            1 11  105 117 
Billings MT MSA               1 3  34 38 
Bloomington--Normal IL M      1 21 31 67 120 
Brownsville--Harlingen T      1 18  35 54 
Bryan--College Station T      1 3  8 12 
Cedar Rapids IA MSA           1 17  10 28 
Champaign--Urbana--Rantou     1 23 30 107 161 
Colorado Springs CO MSA       1 8  62 71 
Columbia MO MSA               1 9  15 25 
Decatur IL MSA                1 12 17 51 81 
Dubuque IA MSA                1 21  4 26 
El Paso TX MSA                1 6  19 26 
Erie PA MSA                   1 17 22 51 91 
Eugene--Springfield OR M      1 12  55 68 
Fayetteville NC MSA           1 8  4 13 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo     1 28  35 64 
Gadsden AL MSA                1 12  11 24 
Galveston--Texas City TX      1 13  39 53 
Great Falls MT MSA            1 4  22 27 
Green Bay WI MSA              1 8 16 23 48 
Hamilton--Middletown OH       1 11  5 17 
Jackson MI MSA                1 7 19 2 29 
Jersey City NJ PMSA           1 10 2 2 15 
Kenosha WI PMSA               1 5 7 10 23 
Lake Charles LA MSA           1 6  4 11 
Lancaster PA MSA              1 19 41 61 122 
Laredo TX MSA                 1 3  3 7 
Lawton OK MSA                 1 10  9 20 
Lincoln NE MSA                1 13  23 37 
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Los Angeles--Long Beach       1 88  196 285 
Lubbock TX MSA                1 8  7 16 
Madison WI MSA                1 25 34 26 86 
Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     1 21  39 61 
Modesto CA MSA                1 9  64 74 
Monroe LA MSA                 1 4  0 5 
Muncie IN MSA                 1 7 12 15 35 
Owensboro KY MSA              1 2  3 6 
Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA       1 10  55 66 
Pine Bluff AR MSA             1 6  28 35 
Poughkeepsie NY MSA           1 10 20 29 60 
Provo--Orem UT MSA            1 22  29 52 
Pueblo CO MSA                 1 3  27 31 
Racine WI PMSA                1 9 9 21 40 
Reading PA MSA                1 32 44 59 136 
Reno NV MSA                   1 2  18 21 
Rochester MN MSA              1 6 18 2 27 
Salinas--Seaside--Montere     1 12  59 72 
San Angelo TX MSA             1 1  10 12 
San Diego CA MSA              1 18  113 132 
San Jose CA PMSA              1 15  42 58 
Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     1 7  49 57 
Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       1 9  50 60 
Sherman--Denison TX MSA       1 16  18 35 
Spokane WA MSA                1 11  48 60 
Stockton CA MSA               1 7  103 111 
Tacoma WA PMSA                1 21  57 79 
Topeka KS MSA                 1 5 12 25 43 
Trenton NJ PMSA               1 5 8 19 33 
Tucson AZ MSA                 1 5  25 31 
Tuscaloosa AL MSA             1 4  14 19 
Tyler TX MSA                  1 9  7 17 
Vineland--Millville--Brid     1 4 10 14 29 
Waco TX MSA                   1 20  13 34 
West Palm Beach--Boca Rat     1 38  41 80 
Source: Government Organization, vol. 1, 1997. 
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Table A-3: Form of County Government and Change in Single Metropolitan Counties, 1970s-
2000 
MSAs 
Form of County 
Government*, 1970s 
Form of County 
Government*, 2000 
Changes in Form of 
Government**,1970s-2000 
Altoona PA MSA                3 3 0 
Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM    1 1 0 
Bakersfield CA MSA            1 1 0 
Billings MT MSA               3 3 0 
Bloomington--Normal IL M      3 2 1 
Brownsville--Harlingen T      3 3 0 
Bryan--College Station T      3 3 0 
Cedar Rapids IA MSA           3 3 0 
Champaign--Urbana--Rantou    3 1 1 
Colorado Springs CO MSA       3 3 0 
Columbia MO MSA               3 3 0 
Decatur IL MSA                3 3 0 
Dubuque IA MSA                3 3 0 
El Paso TX MSA                3 3 0 
Erie PA MSA                   3 2 1 
Eugene--Springfield OR M      1 1 0 
Fayetteville NC MSA           1 2 1 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo     1 1 0 
Gadsden AL MSA                3 3 0 
Galveston--Texas City TX      3 3 0 
Great Falls MT MSA            3 1 1 
Green Bay WI MSA              2 2 0 
Hamilton--Middletown OH       1 2 1 
Jackson MI MSA                3 2 1 
Jersey City NJ PMSA           2 2 0 
Kenosha WI PMSA               3 2 1 
Lake Charles LA MSA           3 2 1 
Lancaster PA MSA              3 2 1 
Laredo TX MSA                 3 3 0 
Lawton OK MSA                 3 3 0 
Lincoln NE MSA                3 3 0 
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Los Angeles--Long Beach       1 1 0 
Lubbock TX MSA                3 3 0 
Madison WI MSA                2 2 0 
Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     3 3 0 
Modesto CA MSA                1 1 0 
Monroe LA MSA                 1 2 1 
Muncie IN MSA                 3 3 0 
Owensboro KY MSA              3 3 0 
Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA     1 1 0 
Pine Bluff AR MSA             3 3 0 
Poughkeepsie NY MSA           2 2 0 
Provo--Orem UT MSA            3 3 0 
Pueblo CO MSA                 3 3 0 
Racine WI PMSA                2 2 0 
Reading PA MSA                3 3 0 
Reno NV MSA                   1 1 0 
Rochester MN MSA              1 1 0 
Salinas--Seaside--Montere     1 2 1 
San Angelo TX MSA             3 3 0 
San Diego CA MSA              1 1 0 
San Jose CA PMSA              1 1 0 
Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     1 1 0 
Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       1 1 0 
Sherman--Denison TX MSA     3 3 0 
Spokane WA MSA                3 2 1 
Stockton CA MSA               1 2 1 
Tacoma WA PMSA                1 3 1 
Topeka KS MSA                 3 3 0 
Trenton NJ PMSA               2 2 0 
Tucson AZ MSA                 1 1 0 
Tuscaloosa AL MSA             3 3 0 
Tyler TX MSA                  3 3 0 
Vineland--Millville--Brid     1 2 1 
Waco TX MSA                   3 3 0 
West Palm Beach--Boca Rat     1 1 0 
Sources: County Year Book, 1975 and The Municipal Year Book, 2003. 
  *1=Council-Manager; 2=Council-elected executive; 3=Commission 
**1=Changed; 0=Not changed 
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Table A-4: Form of County Government and Change in Single Metropolitan Counties, 1970s-
2000 
MSAs 
Form of County 
Government*, 1970s 
Form of County 
Government*, 2000 
Changes in Form of 
Government**,1970s-2000 
Altoona PA MSA                3 3 0 
Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM    1 1 0 
Bakersfield CA MSA            1 1 0 
Billings MT MSA               3 3 0 
Bloomington--Normal IL M      3 2 1 
Brownsville--Harlingen T      3 3 0 
Bryan--College Station T      3 3 0 
Cedar Rapids IA MSA           3 3 0 
Champaign--Urbana--Rantou    3 1 1 
Colorado Springs CO MSA       3 3 0 
Columbia MO MSA               3 3 0 
Decatur IL MSA                3 3 0 
Dubuque IA MSA                3 3 0 
El Paso TX MSA                3 3 0 
Erie PA MSA                   3 2 1 
Eugene--Springfield OR M      1 1 0 
Fayetteville NC MSA           1 2 1 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo     1 1 0 
Gadsden AL MSA                3 3 0 
Galveston--Texas City TX      3 3 0 
Great Falls MT MSA            3 1 1 
Green Bay WI MSA              2 2 0 
Hamilton--Middletown OH       1 2 1 
Jackson MI MSA                3 2 1 
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 Jersey City NJ PMSA           2 2 0 
Kenosha WI PMSA               3 2 1 
Lake Charles LA MSA           3 2 1 
Lancaster PA MSA              3 2 1 
Laredo TX MSA                 3 3 0 
Lawton OK MSA                 3 3 0 
Lincoln NE MSA                3 3 0 
Los Angeles--Long Beach       1 1 0 
Lubbock TX MSA                3 3 0 
Madison WI MSA                2 2 0 
Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     3 3 0 
Modesto CA MSA                1 1 0 
Monroe LA MSA                 1 2 1 
Muncie IN MSA                 3 3 0 
Owensboro KY MSA              3 3 0 
Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA     1 1 0 
Pine Bluff AR MSA             3 3 0 
Poughkeepsie NY MSA           2 2 0 
Provo--Orem UT MSA            3 3 0 
Pueblo CO MSA                 3 3 0 
Racine WI PMSA                2 2 0 
Reading PA MSA                3 3 0 
Reno NV MSA                   1 1 0 
Rochester MN MSA              1 1 0 
Salinas--Seaside--Montere     1 2 1 
San Angelo TX MSA             3 3 0 
San Diego CA MSA              1 1 0 
San Jose CA PMSA              1 1 0 
Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     1 1 0 
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 Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       1 1 0 
Sherman--Denison TX MSA     3 3 0 
Spokane WA MSA                3 2 1 
Stockton CA MSA               1 2 1 
Tacoma WA PMSA                1 3 1 
Topeka KS MSA                 3 3 0 
Trenton NJ PMSA               2 2 0 
Tucson AZ MSA                 1 1 0 
Tuscaloosa AL MSA             3 3 0 
Tyler TX MSA                  3 3 0 
Vineland--Millville--Brid     1 2 1 
Waco TX MSA                   3 3 0 
West Palm Beach--Boca Rat     1 1 0 
Sources: County Year Book, 1975 and The Municipal Year Book, 2003. 
  *1=Council-manager; 2=Council-elected Executive; 3=Commission 
**1=Changed; 0=Not changed 
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Table A-5: Property Tax Revenue in the United States, 1927-2002 
Year % of Property Tax to Total Tax Revenue % of Property Tax to Total Local Government Revenue 
1927 97.3 68.8 
1932 97.3 67.2 
1940 92.7 54.0 
1946 91.9 49.5 
1950 88.2 43.7 
1955 86.9 42.7 
1960 87.4 42.3 
1965 86.9 40.8 
1966 87.4 40.2 
1967 86.6 39.0 
1968 86.1 38.2 
1969 85.4 37.5 
1970 84.9 37.0 
1971 84.6 36.4 
1972 83.7 36.2 
1973 82.9 34.0 
1974 82.2 32.4 
1975 81.6 31.3 
1976 81.2 30.8 
1977 80.5 30.7 
1978 79.9 29.9 
1979 77.5 26.6 
1980 75.9 25.4 
1981 76.0 25.0 
1982 76.1 25.0 
1983 76.0 25.4 
1984 75.0 25.3 
1985 74.2 24.8 
1986 74.0 24.7 
1987 73.6 24.7 
1988 74.1 25.7 
1989 74.3 25.8 
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1990 74.5 25.8 
1991 75.3 26.4 
1992 75.6 26.5 
1993 75.7 26.7 
1994 74.8 26.2 
1995 74.2 25.6 
1996 73.7 24.8 
1997 73.3 24.6 
1998 72.9 24.1 
1999 72.3 23.9 
2000 71.6 23.5 
2001 71.5 23.7 
2002 72.9 24.9 
Sources: Ladd, 1998; 2002 Census of Governments, Government Finances, Table 1. 
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Table A-6:  Local Government Expenditure by Function in the United States, 1991/92-2001/02 (in Mil.) 
 County Municipality Special Districts 
 2001/02 1991/92 
% 
Change 
% to 
Total 
01/02 
% to 
Total 
91/92 2001/02 1991/92
% 
Change
% to 
Total 
01/02 
% to 
Total 
91/92 2001/02 1991/92 
% 
Change
% to 
Total 
01/02 
% to 
Total 
91/92 
Government Administration 
Financial 
admin 6,086 3,861 57.6  6,649 4,259 56.1    
Judicial and 
legal 13,079 7,598 72.1  3,712 2,403 54.5    
General public 
building 3,780 2,435 55.2  3,795 1,941 95.5    
Other govt 
admin 5,785 3,116 85.7  7,287 3,937 85.1    
Sub Total 28,730 17,010 68.9 15.6 15.5 21,443 12,540 71.0 10.5 10.0      
Social Service and Income Maintenance  
Public 
Welfare 33,533 23,249 44.2 12,904 9,574 34.8   
Hospitals 23,086 15,543 48.5 10,012 7,581 32.1 17,767 10,749 65.3  
Health 21,418 10,378 106.4 5,940 2,909 104.2 2,453 607 304.1  
Sub Total  78,037 49,170 58.7 42.3 44.7 28,856 20,064 43.8 14.1 16 20,220 11,356 78.1 33.9 35.5
Transportation 
Highway 16,394 10,337 58.6 22,132 13,350 65.8 2,144 658 225.8
Air 
Transportation 2,799 1,713 63.4 6,978 3,590 94.4 5,296 2,054 157.8
Transit 
subsidies 532 553 -3.8 1,575 1,050 50  
Other 
transportation 290 211 37.4 2,173 1,128 92.6  
Parking 
Facilities   52 134 -61.2
Water 
Transport and 
Terminals 
  1,152 816 41.2
Sub Total  20,015 12,814 56.2 10.8 11.6 32,858 19,118 71.9 16.1 15.2 8,644 3,662 136 14.5 11.4
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 Public Safety 
Police 
protection 16,019 8,155 96.4 36,910 20,946 76.2  
Fire protection 3,662 1,910 91.7 17,790 10,622 67.5 3,127 1,350 131.6
Correction 15,375 8,389 83.3 3,118 2,191 42.3  
Protective 
inspection and 
regulation 
974 458 112.7 2,497 1,590 57  
Sub Total 36,030 18,912 90.5 19.5 17.2 60,315 35,349 70.6 29.5 28.2 3,127 1,350 131.6 5.2 4.2
Environment and Housing 
Natural 
resources 2,569 1,562 64.5 355 196 81.1 2,463 1,169 110.7
parks and 
recreation 5,535 2,810 97 15,606 8,418 85.4 3,267 1,624 101.2
Housing and 
community 
development 
2,848 1,269 124.4 12,563 8,632 45.5 12,397 6,025 105.8
Sewerage 4,449 2,406 84.9 19,322 12,425 55.5 6,276 5,375 16.8
Solid Waste 
Management 4,302 2,711 58.7 9,674 6,605 46.5 1,177 724 62.6
Sub Total  19,703 10,758 83.1 10.7 9.8 57,520 36,276 58.6 28.1 28.9 25,580 14,917 71.5 42.9 46.6
Educational 
Library 2,125 1,373 54.8 1.2 1.2 3,359 2,167 55 1.6 10 2,082 710 193.2 3.5 2.2
Total 184,640 110,037 67.8   204,351 125,514 62.8   59,653 31,995 86.4   
Sources:  
1) 2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 2, Table 1, Finances of  Special District Governments. 
2) 2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 3, Table 1, Finances of County Governments.  
3) 2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 4, Table 1, Finances of  Municipal and Township Governments. 
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Table A-7: MPDI for Single Metropolitan Counties, 1972-1992 
    1972 MPDI 1992 MPDI 
Fips Areas County Municipality Special District Total County Municipality Special District Total
280 Altoona PA MSA    0.55 2.53 0.43 3.51 0.62 2.40 1.21 4.23
360 
Anaheim--Santa 
Ana CA PM      0.62 3.15 1.28 5.06 0.62 3.09 1.67 5.38
680 
Bakersfield CA 
MSA            0.80 1.07 2.42 4.29 0.77 1.07 2.70 4.54
880 Billings MT MSA   0.58 1.00 0.34 1.92 0.59 0.99 0.47 2.05
1040 
Bloomington--
Normal IL M      0.54 3.20 0.64 4.38 0.51 3.18 1.32 5.01
1240 
Brownsville--
Harlingen T      0.43 1.81 1.51 3.75 0.39 2.17 0.85 3.41
1260 
Bryan--College 
Station T      0.31 1.28 0.13 1.72 0.38 1.27 0.40 2.06
1360 
Cedar Rapids IA 
MSA           0.57 1.69 0.05 2.31 0.56 1.74 0.05 2.35
1400 
Champaign--
Urbana--Rantou     0.41 3.11 1.11 4.64 0.42 3.25 1.34 5.02
1720 
Colorado Springs 
CO MSA       0.60 1.29 0.56 2.44 0.57 1.30 0.82 2.70
1740 
Columbia MO 
MSA               0.65 1.00 0.54 2.18 0.38 1.26 0.79 2.43
2040 Decatur IL MSA      0.50 2.24 0.90 3.64 0.49 2.21 1.57 4.27
2200 Dubuque IA MSA   0.61 1.50 0.02 2.14 0.55 1.62 0.17 2.34
2320 El Paso TX MSA     0.33 0.84 0.71 1.88 0.59 0.93 0.52 2.04
2360 Erie PA MSA          0.50 2.97 0.50 3.98 0.66 2.64 1.03 4.32
2400 
Eugene--
Springfield OR M    0.57 1.48 0.67 2.72 0.48 1.49 1.10 3.08
2560 
Fayetteville NC 
MSA           0.65 1.00 0.01 1.66 0.73 0.92 0.17 1.82
2680 
Fort Lauderdale--
Hollywoo     0.41 2.81 0.94 4.16 0.51 2.88 1.18 4.57
2880 Gadsden AL MSA   0.40 1.57 0.60 2.56 0.43 1.91 0.61 2.95
2920 
Galveston--Texas 
City TX      0.67 1.52 0.43 2.63 0.60 1.83 1.34 3.77
3040 
Great Falls MT 
MSA            0.68 0.86 0.21 1.75 0.63 0.88 0.61 2.12
3080 
Green Bay WI 
MSA              0.64 2.21 0.16 3.01 0.63 2.08 0.51 3.21
3200 
Hamilton--
Middletown OH      0.48 2.43 0.10 3.02 0.59 2.14 0.13 2.86
3520 Jackson MI MSA    0.69 2.16 0.02 2.87 0.77 2.03 0.15 2.95
3640 
Jersey City NJ 
PMSA           0.54 2.19 0.67 3.40 0.59 2.33 0.45 3.37
3800 Kenosha WI PMSA 0.63 1.64 0.00 2.28 0.70 1.62 0.19 2.51
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3960 
Lake Charles LA 
MSA           0.68 1.28 0.74 2.69 0.76 1.34 0.11 2.21
4000 Lancaster PA MSA 0.54 4.57 0.51 5.62 0.58 4.37 1.81 6.76
4080 Laredo TX MSA     0.44 0.87 0.29 1.60 0.53 0.98 0.16 1.68
4200 Lawton OK MSA    0.73 1.01 0.24 1.98 0.89 0.89 0.21 1.99
4360 Lincoln NE MSA    0.40 1.16 0.13 1.70 0.39 1.12 0.65 2.17
4480 
Los Angeles--Long 
Beach       0.69 3.55 1.07 5.31 0.67 3.77 1.61 6.06
4600 Lubbock TX MSA  0.37 1.18 0.16 1.71 0.63 1.02 0.38 2.03
4720 Madison WI MSA   0.57 3.28 0.29 4.14 0.54 2.96 0.82 4.32
4880 
Mcallen--Edinburg-
-Missio     0.40 2.40 1.65 4.45 0.44 2.32 1.41 4.16
5170 Modesto CA MSA  0.69 0.99 2.13 3.82 0.67 1.00 1.91 3.58
5200 Monroe LA MSA    0.45 1.20 0.14 1.78 0.61 1.15 Null. 1.75
5280 Muncie IN MSA      0.64 1.52 0.30 2.47 0.61 1.51 0.46 2.59
5990 
Owensboro KY 
MSA              0.29 0.98 0.12 1.38 0.31 0.99 0.14 1.44
6000 
Oxnard--Ventura 
CA PMSA       0.77 1.45 1.23 3.45 0.72 1.61 1.42 3.75
6240 
Pine Bluff AR 
MSA             0.55 1.14 0.21 1.89 0.52 1.15 0.29 1.95
6460 
Poughkeepsie NY 
MSA           0.60 3.26 0.36 4.22 0.76 2.87 0.59 4.22
6520 
Provo--Orem UT 
MSA            0.37 2.82 0.14 3.33 0.40 2.73 0.71 3.84
6560 Pueblo CO MSA     0.59 0.83 0.31 1.74 0.69 0.68 0.85 2.22
6600 Racine WI PMSA    0.62 2.18 0.00 2.79 0.60 2.07 0.12 2.79
6680 Reading PA MSA    0.54 4.74 0.79 6.07 0.65 4.52 1.46 6.63
6720 Reno NV MSA        0.77 0.84 0.32 1.93 0.70 0.89 0.66 2.26
6820 
Rochester MN 
MSA              0.64 1.64 0.02 2.30 0.54 1.38 0.13 2.06
7120 
Salinas--Seaside--
Montere     0.75 1.48 1.24 3.46 0.71 1.35 2.09 4.16
7200 
San Angelo TX 
MSA             0.45 0.89 0.07 1.41 0.49 0.85 0.27 1.61
7320 
San Diego CA 
MSA              0.61 1.73 2.03 4.37 0.65 1.88 2.31 4.85
7400 
San Jose CA 
PMSA              0.69 2.02 0.66 3.37 0.70 1.96 0.74 3.40
7480 
Santa Barbara--
Santa Mari     0.76 1.06 1.27 3.08 0.76 1.13 1.63 3.52
7500 
Santa Rosa--
Petaluma CA       0.77 1.32 0.91 3.00 0.77 1.26 1.05 3.09
7640 
Sherman--Denison 
TX MSA       0.45 1.70 0.84 2.98 0.40 1.83 1.24 3.46
7840 Spokane WA MSA  0.54 1.30 0.71 2.55 0.54 1.23 1.43 3.20
8120 Stockton CA MSA  0.77 1.06 1.62 3.45 0.80 1.15 1.25 3.20
8200 Tacoma WA 0.47 1.80 0.83 3.10 0.50 1.77 1.36 3.62
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PMSA                
8440 Topeka KS MSA     0.89 2.09 0.63 3.62 0.79 2.56 1.06 4.41
8480 Trenton NJ PMSA   0.52 2.27 0.70 3.49 0.54 2.24 0.81 3.60
8520 Tucson AZ MSA     0.63 0.88 0.06 1.56 0.71 0.92 0.47 2.10
8600 
Tuscaloosa AL 
MSA             0.39 1.08 0.15 1.62 0.31 0.64 1.35 2.30
8640 Tyler TX MSA        0.53 1.29 0.06 1.88 0.58 1.29 0.43 2.30
8760 
Vineland--
Millville--Brid     0.55 2.05 0.24 2.84 0.60 2.09 0.44 3.13
8800 Waco TX MSA       0.40 1.83 0.28 2.51 0.44 2.08 0.94 3.46
8960 
West Palm Beach--
Boca Rat     0.49 3.08 1.20 4.77 0.63 3.17 0.93 4.73
Source: Miller’s MPDI Database. 
 157
Table A-8: Local Government Service Shares in 1992 and Percentage Change*, 1972-1992 and 
Number of Local Governments in 1997 and Percentage Change, 1972-1997 
 County Municipality Special District No. of Government 
 Share %Change Share %Change Share %Change 1997 %Change 
Altoona PA MSA                0.15 -6.3 0.57 -21.2 0.29 131.8 51 -10.5 
Anaheim--Santa Ana CA 
PM      0.12 -5.7 0.57 -8.0 0.31 22.4 118 53.3 
Bakersfield CA MSA            0.17 -9.5 0.24 -5.3 0.59 5.5 117 30.0 
Billings MT MSA               0.29 -4.3 0.48 -7.3 0.23 28.7 38 40.7 
Bloomington--Normal IL M    0.10 -17.8 0.63 -13.2 0.26 81.2 120 18.8 
Brownsville--Harlingen T      0.12 0.3 0.63 31.8 0.25 -38.1 54 5.9 
Bryan--College Station T      0.19 4.1 0.62 -17.3 0.20 165.1 12 100.0 
Cedar Rapids IA MSA           0.24 -4.5 0.74 1.6 0.02 -0.4 28 3.7 
Champaign--Urbana--
Rantou     0.08 -6.0 0.65 -3.3 0.27 11.5 161 12.6 
Colorado Springs CO MSA     0.21 -12.7 0.48 -9.0 0.31 34.4 71 51.1 
Columbia MO MSA               0.16 -46.6 0.52 13.5 0.32 30.7 25 78.6 
Decatur IL MSA                0.12 -16.0 0.52 -16.0 0.37 48.7 81 6.6 
Dubuque IA MSA                0.24 -17.3 0.69 -1.6 0.07 518.8 26 8.3 
El Paso TX MSA                0.29 66.3 0.45 1.7 0.25 -32.6 26 136.4 
Erie PA MSA                   0.15 20.4 0.61 -18.3 0.24 88.0 91 19.7 
Eugene--Springfield OR M     0.16 -25.3 0.49 -10.9 0.36 45.9 68 15.3 
Fayetteville NC MSA           0.40 2.7 0.50 -16.4 0.09 1712.2 13 18.2 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo     0.11 11.4 0.63 -6.5 0.26 14.4 64 45.5 
Gadsden AL MSA                0.14 -7.5 0.65 6.0 0.21 -10.8 24 41.2 
Galveston--Texas City TX      0.16 -38.2 0.49 -16.4 0.36 117.7 53 89.3 
Great Falls MT MSA            0.30 -23.3 0.41 -15.8 0.29 142.7 27 200.0 
Green Bay WI MSA              0.20 -7.9 0.65 -11.8 0.16 189.2 48 65.5 
Hamilton--Middletown OH     0.20 28.1 0.75 -7.1 0.05 34.4 17 -41.4 
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 Jackson MI MSA                0.26 8.3 0.69 -8.8 0.05 802.3 29 3.6 
Jersey City NJ PMSA           0.18 10.6 0.69 7.3 0.13 -32.0 15 -51.6 
Kenosha WI PMSA               0.28 0.3 0.64 -10.7 0.08 370.6 23 64.3 
Lake Charles LA MSA          0.34 36.4 0.61 28.3 0.05 -81.8 11 -68.6 
Lancaster PA MSA              0.09 -11.1 0.65 -20.4 0.27 193.6 122 0.8 
Laredo TX MSA                 0.32 16.0 0.59 7.1 0.10 -46.2 7 40.0 
Lawton OK MSA                 0.45 20.8 0.45 -12.5 0.11 -11.2 20 5.3 
Lincoln NE MSA                0.18 -22.9 0.52 -24.7 0.30 285.8 37 19.4 
Los Angeles--Long Beach       0.11 -14.0 0.62 -6.8 0.27 31.6 285 106.5 
Lubbock TX MSA                0.31 43.8 0.50 -27.4 0.19 105.2 16 23.1 
Madison WI MSA                0.12 -10.2 0.69 -13.5 0.19 174.3 86 26.5 
Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     0.11 18.1 0.56 3.3 0.34 -9.2 61 27.1 
Modesto CA MSA                0.19 3.7 0.28 7.2 0.53 -4.5 74 -5.1 
Monroe LA MSA                 0.35 37.9 0.65 -2.5 Null . 5 -50.0 
Muncie IN MSA                 0.24 -8.7 0.58 -5.5 0.18 45.8 35 12.9 
Owensboro KY MSA              0.22 4.1 0.69 -3.0 0.10 15.1 6 -14.3 
Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA   0.19 -14.1 0.43 2.2 0.38 6.3 66 22.2 
Pine Bluff AR MSA             0.26 -8.3 0.59 -2.5 0.15 35.8 35 52.2 
Poughkeepsie NY MSA          0.18 26.2 0.68 -11.8 0.14 62.0 60 9.1 
Provo--Orem UT MSA            0.11 -5.1 0.71 -16.2 0.18 341.7 52 62.5 
Pueblo CO MSA                 0.31 -9.7 0.31 -36.0 0.38 114.3 31 40.9 
Racine WI PMSA                0.21 -2.9 0.74 -4.6 0.04 1900.0 40 42.9 
Reading PA MSA                0.10 10.5 0.68 -12.8 0.22 69.7 136 -11.1 
Reno NV MSA                   0.31 -22.2 0.39 -9.2 0.29 77.7 21 61.5 
Rochester MN MSA              0.26 -5.5 0.67 -5.9 0.06 798.7 27 3.9 
Salinas--Seaside--Montere     0.17 -20.4 0.33 -23.6 0.50 40.3 72 18.0 
San Angelo TX MSA             0.31 -4.3 0.53 -15.9 0.16 222.6 12 100.0 
San Diego CA MSA              0.13 -3.5 0.39 -1.8 0.48 2.6 132 26.9 
San Jose CA PMSA              0.20 0.7 0.58 -3.8 0.22 10.7 58 52.6 
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 Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     0.21 -12.8 0.32 -6.4 0.46 13.1 57 26.7 
Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       0.25 -3.3 0.41 -6.7 0.34 12.4 60 11.1 
Sherman--Denison TX MSA   0.11 -23.5 0.53 -7.3 0.36 27.4 35 12.9 
Spokane WA MSA                0.17 -21.3 0.38 -24.7 0.45 61.9 60 -24.1 
Stockton CA MSA               0.25 12.0 0.36 16.9 0.39 -16.8 111 1.8 
Tacoma WA PMSA               0.14 -8.4 0.49 -16.0 0.37 39.3 79 27.4 
Topeka KS MSA                 0.18 -27.7 0.58 0.4 0.24 37.6 43 13.2 
Trenton NJ PMSA               0.15 0.9 0.62 -4.1 0.23 12.6 33 6.5 
Tucson AZ MSA                 0.34 -15.9 0.44 -21.8 0.22 496.9 31 416.7 
Tuscaloosa AL MSA             0.14 -43.4 0.28 -58.4 0.59 531.5 19 171.4 
Tyler TX MSA                  0.25 -10.5 0.56 -18.1 0.19 445.2 17 70.0 
Vineland--Millville--Brid     0.19 -0.9 0.67 -7.7 0.14 68.3 29 11.5 
Waco TX MSA                   0.13 -20.0 0.60 -17.5 0.27 141.0 34 36.0 
West Palm Beach--Boca Rat   0.13 29.8 0.67 3.9 0.20 -22.0 80 9.6 
Source: Miller’s MPDI Database with author’s calculation. 
*Used 1977 and 1992 data for changes for Kenosha and Racine, WI.  
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Table A-9: Fiscal Condition in Single Metropolitan Counties, 1997 
MSAs  Per Capita Expenditure, 1997 Per Capita Property Tax, 1997 
Altoona PA MSA                1,849         430 
Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM     2,615         637 
Bakersfield CA MSA            3,336         618 
Billings MT MSA               1,948         613 
Bloomington--Normal IL M      1,931         903 
Brownsville--Harlingen T      2,161         367 
Bryan--College Station T      2,060         712 
Cedar Rapids IA MSA           2,480         924 
Champaign--Urbana--Rantou     2,099         780 
Colorado Springs CO MSA       2,385         492 
Columbia MO MSA               1,775         424 
Decatur IL MSA                2,316         658 
Dubuque IA MSA                2,175         688 
El Paso TX MSA                2,200         557 
Erie PA MSA                   2,352         598 
Eugene--Springfield OR M      2,810         689 
Fayetteville NC MSA           2,627         407 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo     3,161         921 
Gadsden AL MSA                1,698         152 
Galveston--Texas City TX      2,900       1,437 
Great Falls MT MSA            1,843         514 
Green Bay WI MSA              3,041         946 
Hamilton--Middletown OH       2,096         645 
Jackson MI MSA                2,552         432 
Jersey City NJ PMSA           2,821       1,191 
Kenosha WI PMSA               3,179       1,108 
Lake Charles LA MSA           2,548         449 
Lancaster PA MSA              2,217         677 
Laredo TX MSA                 2,811         543 
Lawton OK MSA                 2,278         208 
Lincoln NE MSA                2,525         924 
Los Angeles--Long Beach       3,482         573 
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Lubbock TX MSA                2,461         586 
Madison WI MSA                3,283       1,306 
Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     2,172         421 
Modesto CA MSA                3,067         412 
Monroe LA MSA                 2,036         353 
Muncie IN MSA                 1,816         670 
Owensboro KY MSA              2,050         299 
Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA      2,867         668 
Pine Bluff AR MSA             1,835         343 
Poughkeepsie NY MSA           3,359       1,391 
Provo--Orem UT MSA            1,805         405 
Pueblo CO MSA                 2,249         517 
Racine WI PMSA                2,584         814 
Reading PA MSA                2,560         880 
Reno NV MSA                   2,869         668 
Rochester MN MSA              2,927         812 
Salinas--Seaside--Montere     4,016         585 
San Angelo TX MSA             1,786         553 
San Diego CA MSA              3,088         544 
San Jose CA PMSA              3,341         826 
Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     3,022         672 
Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       3,166         665 
Sherman--Denison TX MSA      2,265         680 
Spokane WA MSA                2,287         456 
Stockton CA MSA               3,139         458 
Tacoma WA PMSA                2,510         551 
Topeka KS MSA                 2,540         836 
Trenton NJ PMSA               3,641       1,678 
Tucson AZ MSA                 2,598         654 
Tuscaloosa AL MSA             2,682         206 
Tyler TX MSA                  1,768         601 
Vineland--Millville--Brid     3,134         853 
Waco TX MSA                   2,914         575 
West Palm Beach--Boca Rat     2,997       1,256 
Source: County and City Extra, 2002. 
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Table A-10: Demography in 2000 with Percentage Change in Single Metropolitan Counties,  
1970-2000 
MSAs 
 
 Population   % Change 
 
Land (Sq. Km.)  %Change Density    % Change 
Altoona PA MSA                129,144 -4.7 1,362 -0.8 94.8 -3.9 
Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM   2,846,289 98.7 2,045 0.9 1391.8 96.8 
Bakersfield CA MSA            661,645 100.0 21,085 -0.2 31.4 100.3 
Billings MT MSA               129,352 47.3 6,825 -0.3 19.0 47.7 
Bloomington--Normal IL M     150,433 43.2 3,065 0.9 49.1 42.0 
Brownsville--Harlingen TX  335,227 137.4 2,346 1.1 142.9 134.9 
Bryan--College Station TX  152,415 162.4 1,517 -0.1 100.5 162.6 
Cedar Rapids IA MSA           191,701 17.3 1,858 0.0 103.2 17.3 
Champaign--Urbana--Rantou   179,669 10.0 2,582 -0.3 69.6 10.4 
Colorado Springs CO MSA      516,929 117.1 5,507 -21.6 93.9 176.7 
Columbia MO MSA               135,454 67.1 1,775 0.0 76.3 67.0 
Decatur IL MSA                114,706 -8.2 1,504 0.4 76.3 -8.6 
Dubuque IA MSA                89,143 -1.8 1,575 -0.7 56.6 -1.2 
El Paso TX MSA                679,622 88.5 2,624 -4.2 259.0 96.8 
Erie PA MSA                   280,843 6.3 2,077 -1.4 135.2 7.8 
Eugene--Springfield OR M      322,959 49.2 11,795 0.0 27.4 49.2 
Fayetteville NC MSA           302,963 43.0 1,691 -0.2 179.2 43.2 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo     1,623,018 158.5 3,122 -1.1 519.9 161.5 
Gadsden AL MSA                103,459 9.9 1,385 -3.7 74.7 14.1 
Galveston--Texas City TX      250,158 46.8 1,032 -0.2 242.4 47.0 
Great Falls MT MSA            80,357 -2.3 6,988 1.4 11.5 -3.6 
Green Bay WI MSA              226,778 42.6 1,369 0.9 165.7 41.4 
Hamilton--Middletown OH      332,807 46.7 1,210 -0.8 275.1 47.9 
Jackson MI MSA                158,422 10.6 1,830 1.2 86.6 9.3 
Jersey City NJ PMSA           608,975 0.4 121 -0.6 5032.9 1.0 
Kenosha WI PMSA               149,577 26.7 707 0.3 211.6 26.2 
Lake Charles LA MSA           183,577 26.4 2,774 -3.1 66.2 30.4 
Lancaster PA MSA              470,658 46.5 2,458 0.3 191.5 46.1 
Laredo TX MSA                 193,117 162.6 8,694 1.5 22.2 158.7 
Lawton OK MSA                 114,996 6.5 2,770 -1.4 41.5 7.9 
Lincoln NE MSA                250,291 48.3 2,173 -0.7 115.2 49.4 
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Los Angeles--Long Beach       9,519,338 35.2 10,518 -0.2 905.1 35.5 
Lubbock TX MSA                242,628 34.6 2,330 0.7 104.1 33.6 
Madison WI MSA                426,526 46.5 3,113 0.3 137.0 46.1 
Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     569,463 211.1 4,066 1.7 140.1 205.9 
Modesto CA MSA                446,997 128.6 3,869 -1.2 115.5 131.2 
Monroe LA MSA                 147,250 27.5 1,581 -4.4 93.1 33.3 
Muncie IN MSA                 118,769 -8.2 1,019 -0.7 116.6 -7.6 
Owensboro KY MSA              91,545 15.1 1,198 0.1 76.4 15.0 
Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA    753,197 97.6 4,779 -1.0 157.6 99.6 
Pine Bluff AR MSA             84,278 -0.9 2,292 1.3 36.8 -2.2 
Poughkeepsie NY MSA           280,150 25.3 2,076 -1.4 135.0 27.2 
Provo--Orem UT MSA            368,536 165.0 5,176 -0.8 71.2 167.2 
Pueblo CO MSA                 141,472 19.3 6,187 -0.7 22.9 20.2 
Racine WI PMSA                188,831 10.5 863 -1.2 218.8 11.8 
Reading PA MSA                373,638 25.9 2,224 -0.4 168.0 26.4 
Reno NV MSA                   339,486 177.9 16,426 -0.4 20.7 179.1 
Rochester MN MSA              124,277 47.3 1,691 -0.5 73.5 48.1 
Salinas--Seaside--Montere     401,762 61.9 8,604 -0.1 46.7 62.0 
San Angelo TX MSA             104,010 45.9 3,942 1.4 26.4 43.9 
San Diego CA MSA              2,813,833 106.0 10,878 -1.5 258.7 109.0 
San Jose CA PMSA              1,682,585 57.0 3,343 -0.7 503.3 58.2 
Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     399,347 50.5 7,089 0.0 56.3 50.6 
Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       458,614 122.6 4,082 -1.8 112.4 126.6 
Sherman--Denison TX MSA    110,595 33.8 2,418 -0.7 45.7 34.8 
Spokane WA MSA                417,939 44.6 4,568 0.3 91.5 44.1 
Stockton CA MSA               563,598 93.4 3,624 -0.9 155.5 95.2 
Tacoma WA PMSA                700,820 69.8 4,348 0.1 161.2 69.6 
Topeka KS MSA                 169,871 9.2 1,424 -68.9 119.3 250.7 
Trenton NJ PMSA               350,761 15.0 585 -1.0 599.6 16.1 
Tucson AZ MSA                 843,746 137.0 23,792 -0.6 35.5 138.5 
Tuscaloosa AL MSA             164,875 41.6 3,430 -0.7 48.1 42.6 
Tyler TX MSA                  174,706 79.4 2,405 -0.6 72.6 80.5 
Vineland--Millville--Brid     146,438 19.7 1,267 -2.2 115.6 22.4 
Waco TX MSA                   213,517 44.5 2,698 4.1 79.1 38.8 
West Palm Beach--Boca Rat    1,131,184 221.0 5,113 -2.4 221.2 229.0 
Sources: 
1) 1970 population from “www.bea.gov/bea/regional/data.htm” and  2000 population from “www.census.gov.” 
2) Land size from “City and County Data Book,” 1977 and “County and City Extra,” 2002. 
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Table A-11: Property Tax Generating Effort* and Percentage Change in Single Metropolitan 
Counties, 1970-2000 
MSAs 
Property Tax Generating Effort, 
1970 
Property Tax Generating Effort, 
2000 
% 
Change 
Altoona PA MSA                0.025 0.018 -28.0 
Anaheim--Santa Ana CA 
PM      0.061 0.017 -72.1 
Bakersfield CA MSA           0.086 0.030 -65.1 
Billings MT MSA               0.062 0.023 -62.9 
Bloomington--Normal IL 
M      0.053 0.031 -41.5 
Brownsville--Harlingen T    0.044 0.025 -43.2 
Bryan--College Station T     0.031 0.036 16.1 
Cedar Rapids IA MSA         0.069 0.029 -58.0 
Champaign--Urbana--
Rantou     0.032 0.031 -3.1 
Colorado Springs CO 
MSA       0.048 0.017 -64.6 
Columbia MO MSA             0.042 0.016 -61.9 
Decatur IL MSA                0.042 0.024 -42.9 
Dubuque IA MSA                0.056 0.027 -51.8 
El Paso TX MSA                0.044 0.030 -31.8 
Erie PA MSA                   0.039 0.024 -38.5 
Eugene--Springfield OR 
M      0.072 0.027 -62.5 
Fayetteville NC MSA           0.018 0.017 -5.6 
Fort Lauderdale--
Hollywoo     0.035 0.030 -14.3 
Gadsden AL MSA                0.013 0.007 -46.2 
Galveston--Texas City TX   0.066 0.049 -25.8 
Great Falls MT MSA           0.057 0.021 -63.2 
Green Bay WI MSA             0.067 0.032 -52.2 
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 Hamilton--Middletown OH       0.045 0.023 -48.9 
Jackson MI MSA                0.046 0.017 -63.0 
Jersey City NJ PMSA           0.064 0.041 -35.9 
Kenosha WI PMSA               0.068 0.040 -41.2 
Lake Charles LA MSA           0.038 0.020 -47.4 
Lancaster PA MSA              0.029 0.024 -17.2 
Laredo TX MSA                 0.038 0.036 -5.3 
Lawton OK MSA                 0.018 0.010 -44.4 
Lincoln NE MSA                0.060 0.032 -46.7 
Los Angeles--Long Beach       0.068 0.020 -70.6 
Lubbock TX MSA                0.035 0.024 -31.4 
Madison WI MSA                0.059 0.039 -33.9 
Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio     0.051 0.031 -39.2 
Modesto CA MSA                0.070 0.018 -74.3 
Monroe LA MSA                 0.027 0.015 -44.4 
Muncie IN MSA                 0.055 0.027 -50.9 
Owensboro KY MSA              0.026 0.012 -53.8 
Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA       0.078 0.020 -74.4 
Pine Bluff AR MSA             0.028 0.017 -39.3 
Poughkeepsie NY MSA           0.061 0.044 -27.9 
Provo--Orem UT MSA            0.036 0.021 -41.7 
Pueblo CO MSA                 0.056 0.022 -60.7 
Racine WI PMSA                0.060 0.028 -53.3 
Reading PA MSA                0.034 0.031 -8.8 
Reno NV MSA                   0.038 0.019 -50.0 
Rochester MN MSA              0.066 0.025 -62.1 
Salinas--Seaside--Montere     0.053 0.019 -64.2 
San Angelo TX MSA             0.033 0.023 -30.3 
San Diego CA MSA              0.056 0.017 -69.6 
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 San Jose CA PMSA              0.069 0.015 -78.3 
Santa Barbara--Santa Mari     0.065 0.021 -67.7 
Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA       0.067 0.018 -73.1 
Sherman--Denison TX MSA       0.034 0.030 -11.8 
Spokane WA MSA                0.030 0.018 -40.0 
Stockton CA MSA               0.069 0.019 -72.5 
Tacoma WA PMSA                0.032 0.020 -37.5 
Topeka KS MSA                 0.050 0.030 -40.0 
Trenton NJ PMSA               0.060 0.043 -28.3 
Tucson AZ MSA                 0.055 0.027 -50.9 
Tuscaloosa AL MSA             0.012 0.008 -33.3 
Tyler TX MSA                  0.037 0.021 -43.2 
Vineland--Millville--Brid     0.068 0.037 -45.6 
Waco TX MSA                   0.036 0.025 -30.6 
West Palm Beach--Boca Rat     0.052 0.029 -44.2 
Sources: 
*1) Used 1970 and 2000 income data from “www.bea.gov/bea/regional/data.htm.” 
  2) Used 1972 and 1997 per capita property tax data from “City and County Data Book,” 1977 and “County and  
       City Extra,” 2002. 
 167
Table A-12: Expenditure  and Expenditure Growth (% change)* from Model 1 Ranked by 
Expenditure Growth, 1970-2000 
Rank MSA Expenditure, 1970 Expenditure, 2000 
Expenditure Growth 
(% Change) 
1 Bryan--College Station T     329 2,383 624.5 
2 Owensboro KY MSA             328 2,358 619.5 
3 Kenosha WI PMSA              333 2,396 619.5 
4 Columbia MO MSA              339 2,408 609.5 
5 Gadsden AL MSA               339 2,394 606.1 
6 Galveston--Texas City TX     349 2,465 605.7 
7 Monroe LA MSA                336 2,371 605.1 
8 Fayetteville NC MSA          342 2,408 604.3 
9 Tyler TX MSA                 344 2,412 602.0 
10 Green Bay WI MSA             352 2,454 597.9 
11 Racine WI PMSA               349 2,432 597.2 
12 El Paso TX MSA               357 2,487 596.2 
13 Vineland--Millville--Brid    347 2,408 594.4 
14 Lubbock TX MSA               348 2,416 594.1 
15 Dubuque IA MSA               346 2,399 593.1 
15 Rochester MN MSA             349 2,408 590.6 
17 Tuscaloosa AL MSA            353 2,437 590.2 
18 Muncie IN MSA                349 2,410 590.1 
19 Pine Bluff AR MSA            352 2,430 589.9 
20 San Angelo TX MSA            356 2,431 583.5 
21 Jackson MI MSA               354 2,419 583.2 
21 Cedar Rapids IA MSA          355 2,422 583.0 
21 Hamilton--Middletown OH      354 2,417 582.1 
21 Waco TX MSA                  360 2,451 581.5 
21 Lawton OK MSA                356 2,418 579.9 
26 Lincoln NE MSA               361 2,450 578.1 
27 Trenton NJ PMSA              365 2,471 577.7 
28 Sherman--Denison TX MSA      361 2,436 575.4 
28 Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo    398 2,655 567.6 
30 Brownsville--Harlingen T     378 2,492 558.9 
31 Altoona PA MSA               374 2,444 553.8 
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32 Poughkeepsie NY MSA          383 2,492 551.1 
33 Lake Charles LA MSA          371 2,410 549.9 
34 San Jose CA PMSA             409 2,651 548.3 
35 Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio    395 2,561 547.9 
35 Provo--Orem UT MSA           394 2,553 547.2 
35 Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM     450 2,905 545.9 
38 Great Falls MT MSA           393 2,530 543.8 
38 Decatur IL MSA               390 2,496 539.7 
40 Pueblo CO MSA                397 2,522 535.1 
41 Madison WI MSA               406 2,572 533.6 
42 Erie PA MSA                  402 2,545 533.5 
43 Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA      403 2,550 533.1 
44 Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA      415 2,601 526.4 
45 Billings MT MSA              408 2,549 525.4 
46 Tacoma WA PMSA               418 2,610 525.0 
47 Laredo TX MSA                409 2,546 523.1 
48 Topeka KS MSA                393 2,437 520.8 
49 West Palm Beach--Boca Rat    435 2,664 512.8 
50 Modesto CA MSA               420 2,568 511.8 
51 Bloomington--Normal IL M     426 2,601 510.1 
51 Santa Barbara--Santa Mari    430 2,609 506.9 
53 Colorado Springs CO MSA      430 2,606 505.9 
54 Spokane WA MSA               430 2,557 494.0 
55 Stockton CA MSA              446 2,638 491.8 
56 Lancaster PA MSA             445 2,627 490.8 
57 Champaign--Urbana--Rantou    458 2,664 481.1 
58 Salinas--Seaside--Montere    460 2,672 480.7 
58 Reading PA MSA               468 2,636 462.9 
60 Eugene--Springfield OR M     494 2,737 454.0 
61 San Diego CA MSA             550 3,004 446.3 
62 Reno NV MSA                  508 2,772 445.8 
63 Jersey City NJ PMSA          559 3,007 437.8 
63 Los Angeles--Long Beach      707 3,746 429.6 
65 Tucson AZ MSA                593 3,006 406.8 
66 Bakersfield CA MSA           630 3,075 388.2 
* Based on regressed predicted values. 
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Table A-13: Expenditure and Expenditure Growth (% change)* from Model 2 Ranked by 
Percentage Change, 1970-2000 
Rank MSAs Expenditure, 1970 Expenditure, 2000 
Expenditure Growth 
(% Change) 
1 Tuscaloosa AL MSA            184 2,122 1,051.8 
2 Gadsden AL MSA               185 2,039 1,004.8 
3 Fayetteville NC MSA          210 2,274 980.4 
4 Bryan--College Station T     268 2,650 887.6 
5 Lawton OK MSA                 221 2,127 862.1 
6 Owensboro KY MSA             244 2,125 771.4 
7 Monroe LA MSA                255 2,207 764.2 
8 Altoona PA MSA               269 2,294 752.1 
9 Pine Bluff AR MSA            272 2,285 741.5 
10 Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo    333 2,785 737.2 
11 Sherman--Denison TX MSA      307 2,544 727.7 
12 San Angelo TX MSA            294 2,433 726.8 
13 Lubbock TX MSA               303 2,432 702.8 
14 Laredo TX MSA                354 2,834 700.4 
15 Waco TX MSA                   315 2,476 686.7 
15 Lancaster PA MSA             330 2,531 667.9 
17 Tyler TX MSA                 310 2,369 665.0 
18 Tacoma WA PMSA               330 2,499 658.1 
19 Champaign--Urbana--Rantou    354 2,674 655.1 
20 El Paso TX MSA                352 2,627 646.6 
21 Provo--Orem UT MSA           333 2,473 642.1 
21 Spokane WA MSA               328 2,404 634.0 
21 Reading PA MSA               371 2,671 619.2 
21 Lake Charles LA MSA          333 2,344 603.7 
21 Erie PA MSA                   356 2,492 600.7 
26 Brownsville--Harlingen T     365 2,483 579.8 
27 Decatur IL MSA               363 2,442 573.7 
28 Columbia MO MSA              333 2,238 572.1 
28 Hamilton--Middletown OH      360 2,388 563.9 
30 Reno NV MSA                   410 2,696 558.1 
31 Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio    414 2,694 551.1 
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32 Trenton NJ PMSA              439 2,819 542.6 
33 Galveston--Texas City TX     462 2,951 539.3 
34 Topeka KS MSA                404 2,540 528.2 
35 West Palm Beach--Boca Rat    440 2,763 527.8 
35 Poughkeepsie NY MSA          460 2,884 527.4 
35 Jackson MI MSA               363 2,275 526.2 
38 Madison WI MSA               461 2,838 516.0 
38 Muncie IN MSA                408 2,468 504.2 
40 Bloomington--Normal IL M     441 2,658 502.6 
41 Dubuque IA MSA               410 2,456 498.4 
42 Lincoln NE MSA               439 2,602 492.4 
43 Kenosha WI PMSA              461 2,722 490.4 
44 Racine WI PMSA               429 2,498 481.9 
45 Colorado Springs CO MSA      418 2,429 481.7 
46 Tucson AZ MSA                544 3,134 476.4 
47 Pueblo CO MSA                437 2,496 470.7 
48 Vineland--Millville--Brid    472 2,664 463.9 
49 Great Falls MT MSA           440 2,474 462.9 
50 Los Angeles--Long Beach      687 3,829 457.4 
51 Jersey City NJ PMSA          539 2,981 453.5 
51 Salinas--Seaside--Montere    462 2,557 453.1 
53 Green Bay WI MSA             472 2,591 449.4 
54 Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM     492 2,702 449.3 
55 San Diego CA MSA             528 2,880 445.0 
56 Billings MT MSA              478 2,531 429.7 
57 Cedar Rapids IA MSA          481 2,535 427.3 
58 Rochester MN MSA             462 2,426 425.7 
58 Santa Barbara--Santa Mari    505 2,534 401.4 
60 San Jose CA PMSA             513 2,482 383.9 
61 Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA      500 2,412 382.3 
62 Eugene--Springfield OR M     578 2,786 382.2 
63 Modesto CA MSA               524 2,401 358.1 
63 Stockton CA MSA              538 2,466 358.0 
65 Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA      562 2,505 345.9 
66 Bakersfield CA MSA           731 3,158 332.1 
* Based on regressed predicted values. 
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Table A-14: Expenditure and Expenditure Growth (% change)* from Model 3 Ranked by 
Percentage Change, 1970-2000 
Rank MSAs Expenditure, 1970 Expenditure, 2000 
Expenditure Growth 
(% Change) 
1 Tuscaloosa AL MSA            189 2,481 1,212.0 
2 Fayetteville NC MSA          197 2,179 1,007.3 
3 Bryan--College Station T     268 2,732 921.4 
4 Gadsden AL MSA               219 2,002 814.2 
5 Altoona PA MSA               262 2,330 787.9 
6 Lawton OK MSA                227 1,986 775.3 
7 San Angelo TX MSA            284 2,404 747.1 
8 Lancaster PA MSA             291 2,433 737.2 
9 Owensboro KY MSA             247 2,025 721.0 
10 Fort Lauderdale--Hollywoo    349 2,860 719.0 
11 Waco TX MSA                  312 2,545 714.8 
12 Lubbock TX MSA               301 2,446 712.5 
13 Pine Bluff AR MSA            271 2,190 707.1 
14 Tyler TX MSA                 296 2,370 701.1 
15 Sherman--Denison TX MSA      339 2,717 700.4 
15 Provo--Orem UT MSA           308 2,376 670.5 
17 Reading PA MSA               328 2,520 668.3 
18 Laredo TX MSA                362 2,739 657.3 
19 Spokane WA MSA               340 2,570 656.5 
20 Champaign--Urbana--Rantou    337 2,511 644.4 
21 Tacoma WA PMSA               347 2,575 642.6 
21 Erie PA MSA                  338 2,420 615.7 
21 Galveston--Texas City TX     464 3,179 585.5 
21 Decatur IL MSA               371 2,527 581.2 
21 Hamilton--Middletown OH      339 2,261 566.9 
26 El Paso TX MSA               410 2,734 566.0 
27 Reno NV MSA                  397 2,633 562.8 
28 Poughkeepsie NY MSA          435 2,842 553.4 
28 Trenton NJ PMSA              450 2,929 550.9 
30 Madison WI MSA               427 2,776 550.2 
31 Columbia MO MSA              363 2,351 547.4 
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32 Lincoln NE MSA               422 2,729 547.2 
33 Topeka KS MSA                404 2,589 541.4 
34 Jackson MI MSA               335 2,098 525.5 
35 Bloomington--Normal IL M     413 2,566 521.6 
35 Mcallen--Edinburg--Missio    452 2,803 519.6 
35 Kenosha WI PMSA              433 2,678 518.6 
38 Dubuque IA MSA               383 2,342 511.8 
38 Muncie IN MSA                404 2,460 509.6 
40 Lake Charles LA MSA          361 2,200 509.5 
41 West Palm Beach--Boca Rat    442 2,695 509.0 
42 Brownsville--Harlingen T     414 2,497 502.5 
43 Tucson AZ MSA                490 2,948 502.1 
44 Pueblo CO MSA                438 2,636 501.2 
45 Racine WI PMSA                398 2,341 488.2 
46 Vineland--Millville--Brid    457 2,659 481.9 
47 Great Falls MT MSA           431 2,500 480.5 
48 Colorado Springs CO MSA      421 2,413 472.7 
49 Green Bay WI MSA             449 2,552 468.3 
50 Salinas--Seaside--Montere    485 2,716 460.2 
51 Los Angeles--Long Beach      676 3,764 456.7 
51 Jersey City NJ PMSA          540 2,964 448.8 
53 Anaheim--Santa Ana CA PM     501 2,742 447.4 
54 Rochester MN MSA             429 2,295 434.5 
55 San Diego CA MSA              559 2,980 433.0 
56 Cedar Rapids IA MSA          451 2,374 427.0 
57 Billings MT MSA              474 2,486 424.9 
58 Santa Barbara--Santa Mari    544 2,703 396.5 
58 Eugene--Springfield OR M     566 2,786 392.3 
60 Santa Rosa--Petaluma CA      518 2,475 378.2 
61 San Jose CA PMSA             518 2,472 377.1 
62 Modesto CA MSA               587 2,638 349.3 
63 Oxnard--Ventura CA PMSA      587 2,608 344.0 
63 Stockton CA MSA              572 2,492 335.9 
65 Bakersfield CA MSA            756 3,230 327.3 
66 Monroe LA MSA                255 Null Null 
* Based on regressed predicted values. 
 Table A-15:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of Council-Manager in the Single Metropolitan  Counties, 1970 
Correlations
1 .240 .325 .074 .559** .777** -.087 -.697** .694**
. .282 .140 .743 .007 .000 .700 .000 .000
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.240 1 .112 .749** .603** .158 -.326 .187 -.006
.282 . .620 .000 .003 .483 .139 .404 .978
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.325 .112 1 -.221 .090 .235 .340 -.407 .203
.140 .620 . .323 .692 .293 .122 .060 .364
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.074 .749** -.221 1 .417 .055 -.435* .373 -.123
.743 .000 .323 . .054 .806 .043 .088 .586
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.559** .603** .090 .417 1 .485* -.635** -.383 .684**
.007 .003 .692 .054 . .022 .002 .079 .000
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.777** .158 .235 .055 .485* 1 -.242 -.428* .523*
.000 .483 .293 .806 .022 . .279 .047 .012
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.087 -.326 .340 -.435* -.635** -.242 1 -.139 -.387
.700 .139 .122 .043 .002 .279 . .537 .075
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.697** .187 -.407 .373 -.383 -.428* -.139 1 -.859**
.000 .404 .060 .088 .079 .047 .537 . .000
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.694** -.006 .203 -.123 .684** .523* -.387 -.859** 1
.000 .978 .364 .586 .000 .012 .075 .000 .
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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 Table A-16:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of Council-Manager in the Single Metropolitan Counties, 2000 
Correlations
1 .426 .086 .213 .271 -.202 -.227 -.086 .222
. .088 .743 .411 .293 .436 .381 .744 .391
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
.426 1 .038 .674** .834** -.254 -.421 .304 -.079
.088 . .883 .003 .000 .325 .092 .235 .763
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
.086 .038 1 -.314 -.016 .212 .393 -.487* .289
.743 .883 . .220 .952 .414 .119 .047 .260
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
.213 .674** -.314 1 .518* -.322 -.503* .427 -.161
.411 .003 .220 . .033 .208 .039 .087 .536
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
.271 .834** -.016 .518* 1 -.009 -.699** .241 .149
.293 .000 .952 .033 . .974 .002 .351 .567
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
-.202 -.254 .212 -.322 -.009 1 -.210 .284 -.179
.436 .325 .414 .208 .974 . .419 .270 .492
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
-.227 -.421 .393 -.503* -.699** -.210 1 -.374 -.183
.381 .092 .119 .039 .002 .419 . .139 .483
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
-.086 .304 -.487* .427 .241 .284 -.374 1 -.844**
.744 .235 .047 .087 .351 .270 .139 . .000
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
.222 -.079 .289 -.161 .149 -.179 -.183 -.844** 1
.391 .763 .260 .536 .567 .492 .483 .000 .
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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 Table A-17:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of Council-elective Executive in the Single Metropolitan Counties, 1970 
Correlations
1 .580 .064 .404 .452 -.363 -.860* -.251 .592
. .227 .905 .427 .369 .479 .028 .631 .216
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
.580 1 -.436 .944** -.078 .027 -.453 -.688 .766
.227 . .387 .005 .884 .960 .367 .131 .076
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
.064 -.436 1 -.600 .908* -.285 -.356 .786 -.483
.905 .387 . .208 .012 .585 .489 .064 .332
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
.404 .944** -.600 1 -.307 .240 -.167 -.683 .633
.427 .005 .208 . .554 .647 .752 .135 .177
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
.452 -.078 .908* -.307 1 -.445 -.675 .578 -.169
.369 .884 .012 .554 . .377 .141 .230 .749
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
-.363 .027 -.285 .240 -.445 1 .417 -.277 .038
.479 .960 .585 .647 .377 . .411 .596 .942
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
-.860* -.453 -.356 -.167 -.675 .417 1 .177 -.594
.028 .367 .489 .752 .141 .411 . .737 .213
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
-.251 -.688 .786 -.683 .578 -.277 .177 1 -.897*
.631 .131 .064 .135 .230 .596 .737 . .015
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
.592 .766 -.483 .633 -.169 .038 -.594 -.897* 1
.216 .076 .332 .177 .749 .942 .213 .015 .
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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 Table A--18:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of Council-elective Executive in the Single Metropolitan Counties, 2000 
Correlations
1 .230 .286 .045 -.017 .471* -.104 -.302 .252
. .343 .236 .854 .945 .042 .672 .208 .314
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
.230 1 .248 .520* .345 .040 -.342 -.401 .511*
.343 . .306 .022 .148 .872 .152 .089 .030
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
.286 .248 1 -.327 .452 -.423 -.178 -.771** .788**
.236 .306 . .172 .052 .071 .467 .000 .000
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
.045 .520* -.327 1 -.251 .365 -.113 .185 -.121
.854 .022 .172 . .299 .125 .644 .447 .631
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
-.017 .345 .452 -.251 1 -.011 -.675** -.312 .639**
.945 .148 .052 .299 . .964 .002 .194 .004
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
.471* .040 -.423 .365 -.011 1 -.440 .463* -.259
.042 .872 .071 .125 .964 . .059 .046 .300
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
-.104 -.342 -.178 -.113 -.675** -.440 1 -.102 -.441
.672 .152 .467 .644 .002 .059 . .678 .067
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
-.302 -.401 -.771** .185 -.312 .463* -.102 1 -.822**
.208 .089 .000 .447 .194 .046 .678 . .000
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
.252 .511* .788** -.121 .639** -.259 -.441 -.822** 1
.314 .030 .000 .631 .004 .300 .067 .000 .
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 177
 Table A-19:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of Commission in the Single Metropolitan Counties, 1970 
Correlations
1 .154 .149 .290 .014 .766** .213 -.151 -.009
. .356 .372 .077 .932 .000 .198 .367 .955
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
.154 1 -.029 .561** .540** .009 -.448** .067 .282
.356 . .863 .000 .000 .957 .005 .690 .086
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
.149 -.029 1 -.638** -.103 .112 .297 -.395* .181
.372 .863 . .000 .537 .501 .070 .014 .277
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
.290 .561** -.638** 1 .313 .207 -.316 .314 -.082
.077 .000 .000 . .055 .212 .053 .055 .626
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
.014 .540** -.103 .313 1 -.081 -.650** .298 .197
.932 .000 .537 .055 . .628 .000 .069 .235
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
.766** .009 .112 .207 -.081 1 .261 -.121 -.078
.000 .957 .501 .212 .628 . .113 .470 .641
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
.213 -.448** .297 -.316 -.650** .261 1 -.436** -.327*
.198 .005 .070 .053 .000 .113 . .006 .045
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
-.151 .067 -.395* .314 .298 -.121 -.436** 1 -.707**
.367 .690 .014 .055 .069 .470 .006 . .000
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
-.009 .282 .181 -.082 .197 -.078 -.327* -.707** 1
.955 .086 .277 .626 .235 .641 .045 .000 .
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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 Table A-20:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of Commission in the Single Metropolitan Counties,2000 
Correlations
1 .247 .146 .291 .216 .442* -.094 -.217 .265
. .189 .440 .119 .251 .014 .622 .248 .156
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
.247 1 .252 .662** .471** .179 -.232 -.098 .258
.189 . .179 .000 .009 .344 .218 .605 .169
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
.146 .252 1 -.381* -.024 -.007 .290 -.309 .068
.440 .179 . .038 .901 .969 .120 .097 .720
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
.291 .662** -.381* 1 .415* .483** -.316 .067 .170
.119 .000 .038 . .023 .007 .089 .724 .370
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
.216 .471** -.024 .415* 1 .167 -.545** .106 .301
.251 .009 .901 .023 . .377 .002 .577 .106
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
.442* .179 -.007 .483** .167 1 -.115 .161 -.062
.014 .344 .969 .007 .377 . .544 .394 .745
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
-.094 -.232 .290 -.316 -.545** -.115 1 -.266 -.488**
.622 .218 .120 .089 .002 .544 . .155 .006
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
-.217 -.098 -.309 .067 .106 .161 -.266 1 -.711**
.248 .605 .097 .724 .577 .394 .155 . .000
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
.265 .258 .068 .170 .301 -.062 -.488** -.711** 1
.156 .169 .720 .370 .106 .745 .006 .000 .
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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 Table A-21:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 50 Single Metropolitan Counties in 1970 which Did Not Change County 
Government Form Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 .375** .434** .191 .446** .783** -.053 -.442** .463**
. .007 .002 .184 .001 .000 .717 .001 .001
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.375** 1 .204 .173 .533** .232 -.241 .029 .111
.007 . .154 .229 .000 .105 .092 .844 .444
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.434** .204 1 -.155 .163 .265 .315* -.476** .285*
.002 .154 . .283 .257 .063 .026 .000 .045
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.191 .173 -.155 1 .043 .165 -.173 .084 .017
.184 .229 .283 . .768 .252 .229 .560 .906
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.446** .533** .163 .043 1 .359* -.574** -.105 .433**
.001 .000 .257 .768 . .011 .000 .470 .002
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.783** .232 .265 .165 .359* 1 -.027 -.299* .309*
.000 .105 .063 .252 .011 . .854 .035 .029
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
-.053 -.241 .315* -.173 -.574** -.027 1 -.259 -.322*
.717 .092 .026 .229 .000 .854 . .070 .022
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
-.442** .029 -.476** .084 -.105 -.299* -.259 1 -.831**
.001 .844 .000 .560 .470 .035 .070 . .000
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.463** .111 .285* .017 .433** .309* -.322* -.831** 1
.001 .444 .045 .906 .002 .029 .022 .000 .
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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 Table A-22:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 50 Single County MSAs in 2000 which Did Not Change County Government 
Form Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 .381** .271 .185 .451** .340* -.205 -.127 .244
. .006 .057 .198 .001 .016 .153 .381 .088
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.381** 1 .252 .220 .840** -.130 -.261 .035 .119
.006 . .077 .125 .000 .367 .068 .809 .411
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.271 .252 1 -.153 .277 -.096 .208 -.503** .367**
.057 .077 . .290 .052 .506 .147 .000 .009
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.185 .220 -.153 1 .074 .245 -.156 .216 -.118
.198 .125 .290 . .612 .086 .279 .133 .414
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.451** .840** .277 .074 1 -.042 -.481** -.038 .319*
.001 .000 .052 .612 . .774 .000 .791 .024
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.340* -.130 -.096 .245 -.042 1 -.166 .327* -.221
.016 .367 .506 .086 .774 . .248 .020 .124
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
-.205 -.261 .208 -.156 -.481** -.166 1 -.255 -.338*
.153 .068 .147 .279 .000 .248 . .074 .016
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
-.127 .035 -.503** .216 -.038 .327* -.255 1 -.823**
.381 .809 .000 .133 .791 .020 .074 . .000
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.244 .119 .367** -.118 .319* -.221 -.338* -.823** 1
.088 .411 .009 .414 .024 .124 .016 .000 .
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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 Table A-23::  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 16 Single Metropolitan Counties in 1970 which Changed County 
Government Form Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 .069 .318 -.144 .104 .782** .090 -.590* .571*
. .799 .230 .596 .701 .000 .739 .016 .021
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
.069 1 .206 .266 .432 -.329 -.387 -.180 .444
.799 . .444 .320 .094 .213 .139 .505 .085
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
.318 .206 1 -.693** .134 .109 .161 -.669** .609*
.230 .444 . .003 .622 .689 .551 .005 .012
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
-.144 .266 -.693** 1 -.147 -.065 -.156 .567* -.505*
.596 .320 .003 . .588 .812 .565 .022 .046
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
.104 .432 .134 -.147 1 -.103 -.747** -.047 .537*
.701 .094 .622 .588 . .704 .001 .863 .032
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
.782** -.329 .109 -.065 -.103 1 .079 -.189 .150
.000 .213 .689 .812 .704 . .771 .484 .579
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
.090 -.387 .161 -.156 -.747** .079 1 -.406 -.218
.739 .139 .551 .565 .001 .771 . .118 .418
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
-.590* -.180 -.669** .567* -.047 -.189 -.406 1 -.803**
.016 .505 .005 .022 .863 .484 .118 . .000
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
.571* .444 .609* -.505* .537* .150 -.218 -.803** 1
.021 .085 .012 .046 .032 .579 .418 .000 .
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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 Table A-24:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 16 Single Metropolitan Counties in 2000 which Changed County Government 
Form Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 .250 .257 .064 -.086 .143 .091 -.399 .212
. .351 .336 .814 .752 .597 .738 .125 .449
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
.250 1 .265 .399 .353 -.367 -.325 -.465 .562*
.351 . .322 .125 .180 .162 .219 .069 .029
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
.257 .265 1 -.577* .187 -.352 -.156 -.812** .772**
.336 .322 . .019 .489 .181 .563 .000 .001
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
.064 .399 -.577* 1 -.130 .143 .015 .351 -.369
.814 .125 .019 . .630 .597 .956 .183 .176
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
-.086 .353 .187 -.130 1 .203 -.807** -.132 .564*
.752 .180 .489 .630 . .452 .000 .625 .029
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
.143 -.367 -.352 .143 .203 1 -.349 .416 -.270
.597 .162 .181 .597 .452 . .186 .109 .330
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
.091 -.325 -.156 .015 -.807** -.349 1 -.078 -.491
.738 .219 .563 .956 .000 .186 . .774 .063
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
-.399 -.465 -.812** .351 -.132 .416 -.078 1 -.786**
.125 .069 .000 .183 .625 .109 .774 . .001
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
.212 .562* .772** -.369 .564* -.270 -.491 -.786** 1
.449 .029 .001 .176 .029 .330 .063 .001 .
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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 Table A-25:  Expenditure and Expenditure Growth (% change) by Form of County Government which Did Not Change Government 
Form, 1970s-2000 
Forms 
No
. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1970 2000 % Change 1970 2000 % Change 1970 2000 % Change 
Council-manager 15 479 2,797 494.28 521 2,766 444.18 528 2,789 441.95
Council-elected 
Executive 6 402 2,571 549.24 466 2,769 495.15 450 2,734 509.97
Commission 29 370 2,464 569.76 345 2,461 649.55 348 2,482 646.51
Total (Mean)  406 2,577 544.65 412 2,589 569.41 414 2,604 568.76
 
 
Table A-26:  Expenditure and Expenditure Growth (% change) by Form of County Government which Changed Government Form 
between 1970s and 2000 
Forms No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1970 2000 % Change 1970 2000 % Change 1970 2000 % Change 
Council-manager 2 426 2,597 512.45 397 2,574 559.00 384 2,505 562.47 
Council-elected 
Executive 
13 388 2,498 549.18 378 2,460 585.30 370 2,439 578.06 
Commission 1 418 2,610 524.98 330 2,499 658.09 347 2,575 642.64 
Total (Mea)n  395 2,517 543.08 377 2,477 586.56 371 2,457 580.29 
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 Table A-27:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 29 Single Metropolitan Counties in 1970 which Remained Commission Form 
Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 .330 .237 .255 .134 .778** .114 -.232 .145
. .081 .215 .183 .489 .000 .555 .226 .453
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.330 1 .008 .587** .487** .231 -.385* -.068 .345
.081 . .966 .001 .007 .228 .039 .728 .067
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.237 .008 1 -.623** -.099 .152 .243 -.308 .127
.215 .966 . .000 .610 .432 .205 .104 .512
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.255 .587** -.623** 1 .402* .236 -.316 .141 .091
.183 .001 .000 . .031 .217 .095 .465 .640
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.134 .487** -.099 .402* 1 .098 -.529** .200 .187
.489 .007 .610 .031 . .611 .003 .298 .332
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.778** .231 .152 .236 .098 1 .167 -.187 .062
.000 .228 .432 .217 .611 . .386 .331 .748
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.114 -.385* .243 -.316 -.529** .167 1 -.343 -.388*
.555 .039 .205 .095 .003 .386 . .068 .038
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
-.232 -.068 -.308 .141 .200 -.187 -.343 1 -.732**
.226 .728 .104 .465 .298 .331 .068 . .000
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.145 .345 .127 .091 .187 .062 -.388* -.732** 1
.453 .067 .512 .640 .332 .748 .038 .000 .
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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 Table A-28:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 29 Single Metropolitan Counties in 2000 which Remained Commission Form 
Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 .202 .128 .268 .184 .461* -.074 -.204 .242
. .294 .507 .160 .338 .012 .704 .288 .205
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.202 1 .212 .656** .398* .260 -.184 -.046 .178
.294 . .270 .000 .033 .174 .340 .811 .355
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.128 .212 1 -.425* -.066 .005 .317 -.297 .040
.507 .270 . .021 .732 .981 .093 .117 .839
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.268 .656** -.425* 1 .378* .516** -.294 .095 .129
.160 .000 .021 . .043 .004 .121 .623 .503
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.184 .398* -.066 .378* 1 .200 -.530** .145 .258
.338 .033 .732 .043 . .298 .003 .452 .177
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.461* .260 .005 .516** .200 1 -.130 .153 -.045
.012 .174 .981 .004 .298 . .502 .428 .817
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
-.074 -.184 .317 -.294 -.530** -.130 1 -.288 -.473**
.704 .340 .093 .121 .003 .502 . .129 .010
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
-.204 -.046 -.297 .095 .145 .153 -.288 1 -.708**
.288 .811 .117 .623 .452 .428 .129 . .000
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
.242 .178 .040 .129 .258 -.045 -.473** -.708** 1
.205 .355 .839 .503 .177 .817 .010 .000 .
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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 Table A-29:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 9 Single Metropolitan Counties in 1970 which Changed to Reformed from 
Commission Form Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 -.630 -.171 .230 -.730* .776* .684* -.118 -.511
. .069 .659 .552 .025 .014 .042 .762 .160
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.630 1 -.136 .431 .514 -.762* -.549 .252 .217
.069 . .727 .247 .157 .017 .126 .514 .575
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.171 -.136 1 -.761* -.147 -.052 .478 -.691* .393
.659 .727 . .017 .705 .894 .193 .039 .295
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
.230 .431 -.761* 1 .021 .078 -.272 .632 -.519
.552 .247 .017 . .958 .843 .479 .068 .152
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.730* .514 -.147 .021 1 -.685* -.911** .385 .401
.025 .157 .705 .958 . .042 .001 .307 .285
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
.776* -.762* -.052 .078 -.685* 1 .606 .027 -.616
.014 .017 .894 .843 .042 . .084 .944 .077
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
.684* -.549 .478 -.272 -.911** .606 1 -.610 -.207
.042 .126 .193 .479 .001 .084 . .081 .592
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.118 .252 -.691* .632 .385 .027 -.610 1 -.649
.762 .514 .039 .068 .307 .944 .081 . .059
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.511 .217 .393 -.519 .401 -.616 -.207 -.649 1
.160 .575 .295 .152 .285 .077 .592 .059 .
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1972
MSA Pop., 1970
MSA Land, 1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 1970
Total No. of Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 1970
County Service Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1972 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1972 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1972
MSA Pop.,
1970
MSA Land,
1970 ( Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
1970
Total No. of
Gov't, 1972
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 1970
County
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1972 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 187
 Table A-30:  Correlations for Per Capita Expenditure of 9 Single Metropolitan Counties in 2000 which Changed to Reformed from 
Commission Form Between 1970s and 2000 
Correlations
1 -.029 -.714* .689* -.504 .361 .449 .368 -.639
. .942 .031 .040 .167 .339 .225 .329 .064
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.029 1 -.096 .494 .333 -.295 -.515 -.143 .504
.942 . .806 .176 .382 .440 .156 .714 .167
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.714* -.096 1 -.701* -.128 -.483 .142 -.844** .585
.031 .806 . .035 .742 .188 .715 .004 .098
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
.689* .494 -.701* 1 .048 .439 -.167 .405 -.207
.040 .176 .035 . .903 .237 .667 .279 .594
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.504 .333 -.128 .048 1 .271 -.953** .278 .488
.167 .382 .742 .903 . .480 .000 .469 .182
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
.361 -.295 -.483 .439 .271 1 -.200 .416 -.191
.339 .440 .188 .237 .480 . .605 .265 .623
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
.449 -.515 .142 -.167 -.953** -.200 1 -.192 -.594
.225 .156 .715 .667 .000 .605 . .620 .092
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
.368 -.143 -.844** .405 .278 .416 -.192 1 -.675*
.329 .714 .004 .279 .469 .265 .620 . .046
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
-.639 .504 .585 -.207 .488 -.191 -.594 -.675* 1
.064 .167 .098 .594 .182 .623 .092 .046 .
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
MSA Per Capita
Expenditure, 1997
MSA Pop., 2000
MSA Land,  2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density, 2000
Total No. of Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating Effort, 2000
County Service Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal Service
Share, 1992 (%)
Special District Service
Share, 1992 (%)
MSA Per
Capita
Expenditure,
1997
MSA Pop.,
2000
MSA Land, 
2000 (Sq.
Km.)
MSA Density,
2000
Total No. of
Gov't, 1997
Property Tax
Generating
Effort, 2000
County
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Municipal
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Special
District
Service
Share,
1992 (%)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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 Table A-31:  Statistical Testing for Hypothesis I:  Mean Comparison for Growth in Expenditure (Used Model 3) between 
Metropolitan Counties with Reformed County Government and Metropolitan Counties with Commission Form of County 
Government in 2000 
Group Statistics
35 5.0716 1.34171 .22679
30 6.4638 1.62205 .29614
Category 
of Reform 
of
Governme
nt
Governme
Reformed
Unreformed
Growth in
Expenditure,
1970-2000
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Reformed (X1)  
Unreformed (X2)  
Independent Samples Test
1.233 .271 3.787 63 .000 1.3922 .36758 .77855 2.00583
3.732 56.434 .000 1.3922 .37301 .76841 2.01598
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Growth in Expenditure
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
90% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
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 Notes 
1) Equal variance assumption test: 
Ha:   21σ ≠
=
2
2σ
H0:   
 
2
1σ
2
2σ
Since Levene’s test for equality of variances with α=0.1 exhibits significance level at 0.271, the null hypothesis is not rejected 
which means the two sample mean variances are equal.  Therefore the “standard error difference for equal variances assumed,” 
0.36758, was used for two sample t-test to determine the mean difference value. 
 
2) T-test for hypothesis with df=(65-2), α=0.1, and left tailed test: 
Ha:  μp/reformed < μp/unreformed (commission)  
H0:  μp/reformed = μp/unreformed (commission) 
P = Growth in expenditure 
T = ( X 1 – X 2)/Standard error  
   = (5.0716-6.4638)/0.36758 
   = -3.787 
Critical value of T-stat = -1.282 
 
3) T-test result: T=-3.787 (calculated) < the critical value, T=-1.282 from the table.  Reject the null hypothesis. 
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 Table A-32:  Statistical Testing for Hypothesis II:  Mean Comparison for Growth in Expenditure (Used Model 3) between 
Metropolitan Counties which Had Commission Form of County Government and Metropolitan Counties which Changed 
Form of County Government to Reformed Government from Commission Form During 1970-2000 
Group Statistics
29 6.4651 1.65074 .30654
9 5.7884 .87298 .29099
Reformism
Traditional
Reformed
Growth in
Expenditure,
1970-2000
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Traditional: Remained commission form (X2) 
Reformed: Changed from commission to reformed government (X1) 
 
Independent Samples Test
1.923 .174 1.172 36 .249 .6767 .57726 -.29786 1.65131
1.601 26.339 .121 .6767 .42266 -.04383 1.39728
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Growth in Expenditure
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
90% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
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 Notes 
1) Equal variance assumption test: 
Ha:   
H0:   
2
1σ ≠
2
1σ
=
2
2σ
2
2σ
 
Since Levene’s test for equality of variances with α=0.1 exhibits a significance level at 0.174, the null hypothesis is not rejected 
which means the two sample mean variances are equal.  Therefore the “standard error difference for equal variances assumed”, 
0.57726, was used for two sample t-test to determine the mean difference value. 
2) T-test for hypothesis with df=(43-2), α=0.1, and left tailed test: 
Ha:  μp/reformed < μp/commission  
H0:  μp/reformed = μp/commission 
P = Growth in expenditure 
T = ( X 1 – X 2)/Standard error  
   = (5.7884-6.4651)/0.57726 
   = -1.172 
Critical value of T-stat = -1.282 
 
3) T-test result:  T=-1.172 (calculated) > the critical value of T=-1.282 from the table.  Do not reject the null hypothesis. 
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 Table A-33:  Statistical Testing for Hypothesis III:  Mean Comparison for Growth in Expenditure (Used Model 3) between Increase 
and Decrease in County Share of Service Responsibility 
Group Statistics
42 5.5979 1.61336 .24895
23 5.9265 1.65821 .34576
Growth in
County
Decrease
Increase
Growth in
Expenditure,
1970-2000
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Decrease (X2):  Change rate <0  
Increase (X1) :  Change rate >0 
 
Independent Samples Test
.082 .775 -.777 63 .440 -.3285 .42260 -1.03402 .37697
-.771 44.329 .445 -.3285 .42606 -1.04428 .38723
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Growth in Expenditure
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
90% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
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 Notes 
1) Equal variance assumption test: 
Ha:   21σ
≠
=
2
2σ
H0:   
Since Levene’s test for equality of variances with α=0.1 exhibits significance level at 0.775, the null hypothesis is not rejected 
which means the two sample mean variances are equal.  Therefore the “standard error difference for equal variances assumed,” 
0.42260,was used  for two sample t-test to determine the mean difference value. 
2
1σ
2
2σ
 
2) T-test for hypothesis with df=(65-2), α=0.1, and right tailed test: 
Ha:  μp/increase > μp/decrease 
H0:  μp/increase = μp/decrease, where 
P = Growth in expenditure 
T = ( X 1 – X 2)/Standard error  
   = (5.9265-5.5979)/0.42260 
   = 0.777 
Critical value of T-stat =1.282 
 
3) T-test result: T=0.777 (calculated) < the critical value, T=1.282 from the table.  Do not reject the null hypothesis. 
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 Table A-34:  Statistical Testing for Hypothesis IV:  Mean Comparison for Growth in Expenditure (Used Model 3) between Increase 
and Decrease in Municipal Share of Service Responsibility 
Group Statistics
51 5.8961 1.67083 .23396
14 5.0514 1.28284 .34285
Growth in
Municipal
Decrease
Increase
Growth in
Expenditure,
1970-2000
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Decrease (X2):  Change rate <0  
Increase (X1) :  Change rate >0) 
 
Independent Samples Test
1.608 .209 1.751 63 .085 .8447 .48230 .03959 1.64991
2.035 26.436 .052 .8447 .41508 .13722 1.55228
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Growth in Expenditure
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
90% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
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 Notes 
1) Equal variance assumption test: 
Ha:   21σ
≠
=
2
2σ
H0:   
Since Levene’s test for equality of variances with α=0.1 exhibits significance level at 0.209, the null hypothesis is not rejected 
which means the two sample mean variances are equal.  Therefore the “standard error difference for equal variances assumed,” 
0.48230, was used for two sample t-test to determine the mean difference value. 
2
1σ
2
2σ
 
2) T-test for hypothesis with df=(65-2), α=0.1, and left tailed test: 
Ha:  μp/increase < μp/decrease 
H0:  μp/increase = μp/decrease, where 
P = Growth in expenditure 
T = ( X 1 – X 2)/Standard error  
   = (5.0514-5.8961)/0.48230 
   = -1.751 
Critical value of T-stat = -1.282 
3) T-test result: T=-1.751 (calculated) < the critical value, T=-1.282 from the table.  Reject the null hypothesis. 
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 Table A-35:  Statistical Testing for Hypothesis V:  Mean Comparison for Growth in Expenditure (Used Model 3) between Increase 
and Decrease in Special District Share of Service Responsibility 
Group Statistics
12 5.3453 1.49988 .43298
53 5.7977 1.65289 .22704
Growth in
Secial
Decrease
Increase
Growth in
Expenditure,
1970-2000
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Decrease (X2):  Change rate <0  
Increase (X1) :  Change rate >0  
 
Independent Samples Test
.111 .740 -.870 63 .388 -.4524 .52020 -1.32081 .41605
-.925 17.599 .367 -.4524 .48890 -1.30120 .39644
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Growth in Expenditure
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
90% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
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Notes 
1) Equal variance assumption test: 
Ha:   21σ
≠
=
2
2σ
H0:   
Since Levene’s test for equality of variances with α=0.1 exhibits significance level at 0.740, the null hypothesis is not rejected 
which means the two sample mean variances are equal.  Therefore the “standard error difference for equal variances assumed,” 
0.52020, was used for two sample t-test to determine the mean difference value. 
2
1σ
2
2σ
 
2) T-test for hypothesis with df=(65-2), α=0.1, and left tailed test: 
Ha:  μp/increase < μp/decrease 
H0:  μp/increase = μp/decrease, where 
 
P = Growth in expenditure 
T = ( X 1 – X 2)/Standard error 
   = (5.7977-5.3453)/0.52020 
   = 0.870 
Critical value of T-stat = -1.282 
 
3)  T-test result: T=0.870 (calculated) > the critical value, T=-1.282 from the table.  Do not reject the null hypothesis.
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